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SUMMARY 
This d i s s e r t a t i o n c o n s i s t s of four independent s t u d i e s . I t s f i v e 
c h a p t e r s a r e : I . I n t r o d u c t i o n ; I I . C h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of Queueing P r o c e s s e s 
w i t h O p t i m i z a t i o n ; I I I . Queues w i t h Dec i s ion-Making by I n d i v i d u a l 
Customers; IV. An M/M/l Queue w i t h Two Users Choosing A r r i v a l R a t e s ; and 
V. The D i s t r i b u t i o n of Maximal Queue Length i n the M/G/l Queue. 
Chapter I I d e v e l o p s a c o n c e p t u a l framework t h a t s y s t e m a t i z e s the 
v a r i o u s e l e m e n t s of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g r e l a t i v e t o queues . Treated i n d e t a i l 
a r e : o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n and d e c i s i o n v a r i a b l e s ; d e c i s i o n p o i n t s and a c t i o n 
p o i n t s ; i n f o r m a t i o n s t r u c t u r e ; a c t i o n s , d e c i s i o n s , s t r a t e g i e s . 
Chapter I I I d i s c u s s e s d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i n queueing sys tems where 
i n d i v i d u a l customers have one or both of two o p t i o n s : (1) o p t i o n t o j o i n 
or b a l k ; (2) o p t i o n t o choose p r i o r i t y through a payment made on a r r i v a l . 
Each c u s t o m e r ' s o b j e c t i v e i s t o maximize the exp ec t ed n e t g a i n , d e f i n e d 
as 0 i f he b a l k s , and as R-b-hE(W) i f he j o i n s , where R = reward, h = u n i t 
t ime w a i t i n g l o s s , b = payment, E(W) = expec ted w a i t i n g t i m e . Considered 
a r e : (A) GI/M/s/N queue w i t h e i t h e r FIFO or LIFO r u l e , and b a l k i n g o p t i o n ; 
(B) M/M/s/N queue w i t h p r i o r i t y o p t i o n ; (C) M/M/s/N queue w i t h b a l k i n g 
and p r i o r i t y o p t i o n s . Customers l i m i t t h e i r c h o i c e t o a s e t of a c t i o n s 
d e r i v e d by c o n s i d e r i n g the a c t i o n s o f o t h e r c u s t o m e r s . I f the s e t c o n ­
s i s t s of j u s t one a c t i o n we c a l l i t o p t i m a l . A p o l i c y i s d e f i n e d a s a 
d e c i s i o n r u l e s e l e c t i n g an a c t i o n a s a f u n c t i o n of a r r i v a l s t a t e , R and 
h. The a n a l y s i s f o c u s e s on o p t i m a l and s t a b l e p o l i c i e s . For model A we 
show an opt ima l p o l i c y e x i s t s , e x c e p t , p o s s i b l y , for N=°° w i t h LIFO r u l e . 
viii 
For model B we give conditions for a policy to be stable and induce either 
FIFO or LIF0 service order. Similar results are derived in special cases 
of model C. An appendix discusses the effect of choice of dominance 
criterion in the process of reducing the action space, by deletion of 
dominated actions. 
Chapter IV analyzes decision-making in an M/M/l queue with two users, 
each choosing the rate (i=l,2) of a Poisson stream, attempting to maxi­
mize Ri(Ai)-hiAiw(A^+ A2;u), where R^CA^) = rewards per unit time, h = 
waiting loss factor, w(") = mean waiting time in system at service rate u. 
Following a treatment of the corresponding one-user model, the two-user 
model is analyzed under three different behavioral assumptions we can 
briefly characterize as (1) Mutual accommodation, (2) Domination, and 
(3) Cooperation. Our main purpose is to determine how arrival rates and 
profits depend upon behavioral assumptions. 
Chapter V begins with a simple recursive formula for calculation 
of the mean busy period b^ of an M/G/l/n queue. Next, it is shown that 
in an M/G/l queue that starts with i customers in system, the probability 
that at most k (k>i) customers will be present simultaneously during the 
i-busy period equals b./b, .. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Queueing t h e o r y has i t s o r i g i n i n a t t e m p t s t o s o l v e r e a l - w o r l d 
problems c o n c e r n i n g w a i t i n g l i n e phenomena. Y e t , f o r many y e a r s , up u n t i l 
about t e n y e a r s a g o , n e a r l y a l l papers i n queueing t h e o r y d e a l t w i t h queues 
w i t h o u t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . 
R e c e n t l y , however, t h e r e has been an upsurge of i n t e r e s t i n d e c i s i o n ­
making problems , e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e c l a s s i f i e d as opt imal d e s i g n and c o n t r o l 
of queues . S i g n i f i c a n t p r o g r e s s has been made i n f o r m u l a t i o n of meaning­
f u l o p t i m i z a t i o n models a s w e l l a s i n t h e i r a n a l y s i s . S t i l l i t seems t h a t 
l i t t l e more than a b e g i n n i n g has been made i n the a n a l y s i s of d e c i s i o n ­
making i n queue ing s y s t e m s . Many q u e s t i o n s have been l e f t unanswered, or 
have no t been asked a t a l l . 
We propose t o make two d i s t i n c t c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e queueing 
l i t e r a t u r e : (1) A c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of queue ing p r o c e s s e s w i t h o p t i m i z a t i o n 
(Chapter I I ) ; (2) An a n a l y s i s of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i n c e r t a i n queueing s y s ­
tems w i t h more than one d e c i s i o n - m a k e r (Chapters I I I and I V ) . The f i n a l 
c h a p t e r , Chapter V, i s a byproduct of an at tempt to g e n e r a l i z e some r e ­
s u l t s i n Chapter I I I . A l l c h a p t e r s can be read i n d e p e n d e n t l y . 
Chapter I I d i s c u s s e s and c l a s s i f i e s queueing p r o c e s s e s w i t h o p t i m i ­
z a t i o n . The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s by d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , but o n l y t h o s e 
which are p e c u l i a r t o d e c i s i o n s y s t e m s . Chapter I I has been m o t i v a t e d i n 
part by t h e apparent l a c k of a s y s t e m a t i c e x p o s i t i o n of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
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of d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s i n queues . In a d d i t i o n t o p r o v i d i n g a u s e f u l frame 
of r e f e r e n c e f o r queueing m o d e l s , our a n a l y s i s w i l l a l s o s e r v e the purpose 
of g i v i n g d i r e c t i o n t o f u t u r e r e s e a r c h . 
Models w i t h m u l t i p l e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s form a l a r g e and l a r g e l y u n e x ­
p l o r e d area i n queueing t h e o r y . Chapters I I I and IV are d e s i g n e d t o 
p a r t i a l l y f i l l t h e gap . 
Chapter I I I t r e a t s , i n much d e t a i l , some b a s i c models i n which i n ­
d i v i d u a l cus tomers a r e t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s , w i t h b a l k i n g o p t i o n or p r i o r i t y 
o p t i o n . In t h e l a t t e r c a s e , much space and e f f o r t are devoted t o d e r i v i n g 
c o n d i t i o n s under which a p o l i c y , or d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g r u l e , i s s t a b l e and 
l e a d s to e i t h e r f i r s t - i n - f i r s t - o u t or l a s t - i n - f i r s t - o u t p r o c e s s i n g of 
c u s t o m e r s . Analyzed models are e i t h e r new or g e n e r a l i z e d v e r s i o n s of 
models i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e . 
Chapter IV c o n t a i n s an a n a l y s i s of an M/M/l queueing sys tem w i t h 
two d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s , each c h o o s i n g h i s a r r i v a l r a t e a s a u s e r . The model , 
which has no t been a n a l y z e d b e f o r e , i s a s p e c i a l c a s e of a duopsony model . 
Here, the a r r i v a l r a t e i s e q u i v a l e n t t o a q u a n t i t y demanded per u n i t t ime . 
As a s t e p p i n g s t o n e t o t h e a n a l y s i s of t h e two-user model we a n a l y z e a 
model w i t h a s i n g l e u s e r . In t h e t w o - u s e r c a s e we d i s c u s s the s o l u t i o n s 
under t h r e e d i f f e r e n t b e h a v i o r a l a s s u m p t i o n s : (1) Mutual accommodation, 
(2) Dominat ion , and (3) Coopera t ion . 
Chapter V ( p u b l i s h e d j o i n t l y w i t h R. B. Cooper) d e a l s w i t h the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e maximal queue l e n g t h , k, dur ing a busy per iod of an 
M/G/l queue. I t i s found t h a t t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t a t most k cus tomers 
a r e p r e s e n t i n c a s e the queue s t a r t s w i t h i cus tomers e q u a l s b ^ / b ^ - i ' 
where b i s t h e mean busy p e r i o d of an M/G/ l /n queue (n = w a i t i n g room). 
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A similar formula is known in the literature. What is new, is the inter­
pretation of b. and b, ., as well as the simple derivation of the result. 
1 k-i 
The reading of the subsequent chapters requires a basic knowledge 
of standard queueing theory and its terminology, at the level of Cooper 
[1972] and Kleinrock [1975]. 
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CHAPTER I I 
CHARACTERIZATION OF 
QUEUEING PROCESSES WITH OPTIMIZATION 
Most of the queueing l i t e r a t u r e t o d a t e d e a l s w i t h queueing 
p r o c e s s e s t h a t do no t e x p l i c i t l y r e c o g n i z e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , and the s o l e 
purpose of t h e a n a l y s i s i s t o d e r i v e performance c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s f o r each 
queueing p r o c e s s a s s p e c i f i e d . In c o n t r a s t , our concern i s w i t h p r o c e s s e s 
which i n c l u d e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g by one or more d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s , and we 
f o c u s on the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . Our o b j e c t i v e i s t o d e v e l o p a c o n c e p t u a l 
framework t h a t s y s t e m a t i z e s the v a r i o u s e l e m e n t s of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g 
r e l a t i v e t o queues . 
Among o t h e r t h i n g s , the here c o n s t r u c t e d framework should h e l p i n 
i d e n t i f y i n g meaningfu l and important d e c i s i o n models and should make i t 
e a s i e r t o r e l a t e e x i s t i n g , and a s y e t unformula ted , d e c i s i o n models t o 
one a n o t h e r . Much of what w i l l be s a i d a p p l i e s t o c o n t r o l l e d s t o c h a s t i c 
p r o c e s s e s i n g e n e r a l . However, we need n o t , and s h a l l not d i s c u s s the 
broader i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e a n a l y s i s . 
In order not t o o v e r l y c o m p l i c a t e the e x p o s i t i o n , i t i s c o n f i n e d 
t o queues where each d e c i s i o n - m a k e r has a s i n g l e - v a l u e d o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n 
t h a t must be maximized or min imized . Without l o s s of g e n e r a l i t y we assume 
m a x i m i z a t i o n . In such c a s e s we may speak of queueing p r o c e s s e s w i t h o p t i ­
m i z a t i o n , and o p t i m i z a t i o n mode l s . A l s o i n the i n t e r e s t of s i m p l i c i t y 
we c o n c e n t r a t e on queues w i t h a s i n g l e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r . Only in the l a s t 
s e c t i o n do we d e a l w i t h queues w i t h two or more d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s . 
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1 . Concepts Current i n the L i t e r a t u r e 
The q u e s t i o n of c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of o p t i m i z a t i o n models has r e c e i v e d 
l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n i n the queueing l i t e r a t u r e . We s h a l l mention on ly two 
r e c e n t survey papers which touch upon the s u b j e c t . They are (1) C r a b i l l , 
Gross and Magazine [ 1 9 7 3 ] , "A Survey of Research on Optimal D e s i g n and 
Contro l of Queues ," and (2) Stidham and Prabhu [ 1 9 7 4 ] , "Optimal Contro l 
of Queueing S y s t e m s . " 
We choose t o quote i n f u l l the a p p r o p r i a t e s e c t i o n s of t h e two 
mentioned p a p e r s . The e x t r a c t s p r e s e n t what t h e a u t h o r s c o n s i d e r a s 
important d i s t i n c t i o n s t o make r e g a r d i n g o p t i m i z a t i o n mode l s . They a l s o 
employ a w i d e l y a c c e p t e d t e r m i n o l o g y . Hence they should s e r v e w e l l as a 
background for our d i s c u s s i o n of the s u b j e c t . 
1 . 1 . Quote from C r a b i l l , Gross and Magazine [ 1 9 7 3 ] , pp. 1-2 
In t h e l a s t 15 y e a r s t h e r e has been an i n c r e a s i n g i n t e r e s t 
i n the s tudy of d e s i g n i n g and c o n t r o l l i n g t h e behav ior of 
queueing sys t ems ( p r e s c r i p t i v e models a s opposed to d e s c r i p ­
t i v e models which make up the m a j o r i t y of queueing l i t e r a t u r e 
t o d a t e ) . I t i s t h e purpose of t h i s paper t o d e s c r i b e b r i e f l y 
some of t h e important work performed i n the p r e s c r i p t i v e a r e a . 
We s h a l l c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e models t h a t have been c o n s i d e r e d 
and the r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d r a t h e r than a n a l y t i c a l t e c h n i q u e s . 
Ear ly work i n v o l v i n g p r e s c r i p t i v e models was concerned 
w i t h d e s i g n a s p e c t s of queueing s y s t e m s . These were viewed 
as s t a t i c o p t i m i z a t i o n problems; t h a t i s , v a r i o u s sys tem c o n ­
f i g u r a t i o n s were c o n s i d e r e d and the a n a l y s i s of the r e s u l t i n g 
s t e a d y s t a t e b e h a v i o r a l lowed one t o determine the b e s t sys tem 
for o p t i m i z i n g some l o n g run average c r i t e r i o n such as c o s t 
or p r o f i t . The term s t a t i c model i s used i n the s e n s e t h a t 
once the sys tem c o n f i g u r a t i o n i s s e t , the sys tem c h a r a c t e r i s ­
t i c s do not change over t i m e . We w i l l c a l l models dynamic i f 
the sys tem o p e r a t i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are a l lowed t o change 
over t i m e . Most of the r e c e n t work i n the o p t i m i z a t i o n of 
queues has c o n c e n t r a t e d on dynamic mode l s . These t erms , s t a t i c 
and dynamic, a r e in tended on ly t o p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r a l o g i c a l 
breakdown of some of t h e work d i s c u s s e d in t h i s paper . Some 
models a r e a mixture of both s t a t i c and dynamic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . 
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1 . 2 . Quote from Stidham and Prabhu [ 1 9 7 4 ] - p . 263 
Research i n the c o n t r o l of queueing sys tems has been go ing 
on a t an e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g r a t e i n the l a s t few y e a r s . Pro ­
g r e s s i n t h i s f i e l d has reached the p o i n t where one can make 
some g e n e r a l s t a t e m e n t s about "the queueing c o n t r o l problem." 
C e r t a i n i s s u e s pervade the r e s e a r c h done so f a r on queueing 
c o n t r o l . I t i s u s u a l l y p o s s i b l e t o c a t e g o r i z e a paper by ( i ) 
the sys tem s t r u c t u r e ( e . g . , M/M/l, M/G/l , G l / M / s ) ; ( i i ) the 
d e c i s i o n v a r i a b l e s ( e . g . , s e r v i c e parameters (number of s e r v e r s , 
s e r v i c e r a t e ) , a r r i v a l parameters ( a r r i v a l r a t e s , a c c e p t a n c e 
or r e j e c t i o n i n d i c a t o r s for v a r i o u s c l a s s e s ) , queue parameters 
(which c l a s s t o s e r v e n e x t ) , o p e r a t i n g - t i m e parameters (when 
t o c l o s e a q u e u e ) ) ; ( i i i ) the a d m i s s i b l e d e c i s i o n epochs ( e . g . , 
a r r i v a l and /or d e p a r t u r e epochs or a l l e p o c h s : the c h o i c e 
u s u a l l y b e i n g made so t h a t the g i v e n sys tem s t r u c t u r e i n d u c e s 
a Markov or semi-Markov d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s ) ; ( i v ) the c o s t ( e . g . , 
p r i c e s f o r e n t e r i n g , rewards f o r b e i n g s e r v e d , w a i t i n g c o s t s , 
s e r v i c e c o s t s , s w i t c h i n g c o s t s ) ; (v) the o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n 
( e . g . , d i s c o u n t e d or average c o s t ) ; ( v i ) the t ime h o r i z o n 
( f i n i t e or i n f i n i t e ) . 
1 . 3 . Comments 
The purpose of the two c l a s s i f i c a t i o n schemes has been a c a t e g o r i ­
z a t i o n of e x i s t i n g o p t i m i z a t i o n mode l s . Therefore i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g 
t h a t many i n t e r e s t i n g o p t i m i z a t i o n m o d e l s , whose a n a l y s i s has s c a r c e l y 
begun, do no t f i t i n t o the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n schemes , or t h a t important 
s p e c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are unaccounted f o r . Examples a r e : queues w i t h 
m u l t i p l e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s ; w i t h r i s k w i t h r e s p e c t t o parameters of the 
sys tem; w i t h i n c o m p l e t e p r o c e s s i n f o r m a t i o n . B e s i d e s l a c k i n g i n coverage 
and d e t a i l , the proposed c l a s s i f i c a t i o n schemes s u f f e r from not b e i n g 
supported by a l o g i c a l development of the e l e m e n t s of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . 
Our c o n c e p t u a l framework i s based upon a s tudy of the d e c i s i o n 
p r o c e s s r a t h e r than e x i s t i n g o p t i m i z a t i o n mode l s . The s o l e b a s i s for our 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s h a l l be the d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the queueing 
p r o c e s s . N e i t h e r d e r i v e d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ( i . e . the r e s u l t s of an a n a l y s i s ) 
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nor a n a l y t i c a l method w i l l have a p a r t t o p l a y . 
2 . Concepts and D e f i n i t i o n s 
The p r e s e n t s e c t i o n b e g i n s by e x p l a i n i n g the meaning of the words 
sys tem and model i n subsequent d i s c u s s i o n s . Next , we p r e s e n t a p r e l i m i ­
nary survey of the main e l e m e n t s of the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . We conc lude 
w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n of r i s k and u n c e r t a i n t y . 
2.1. System and Model 
In the l i t e r a t u r e "system" o f t e n s t a n d s for something (perhaps 
j u s t a "black box") which t rans forms input i n a g i v e n way. In queueing 
t h e o r y i t i s c o n v e n i e n t t o d e f i n e "system" d i f f e r e n t l y . The c o n v e n t i o n 
t h a t we s h a l l f o l l o w i s t o l e t the i n p u t p r o c e s s be par t of the sys tem. 
Thus, f o r queues w i t h o u t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g the term sys tem d e n o t e s a w e l l -
d e f i n e d s t o c h a s t i c p r o c e s s . A s imple example of a system i n t h i s s e n s e 
i s an M/M/l queue ( P o i s s o n i n p u t , e x p o n e n t i a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d s e r v i c e 
t i m e s , a s i n g l e s e r v e r ) w i t h a r r i v a l r a t e X and s e r v i c e comple t ion r a t e 
u. 
The term "model" i s sometimes used synonymously w i t h sys tem as 
d e f i n e d by u s , but w i t h the c o n n o t a t i o n t h a t i t i s the approximate mathe­
m a t i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a r e a l - w o r l d phenomenon. However, when we 
speak of a model we mean a c l a s s of s y s t e m s . An example of a model i n 
t h i s s e n s e i s the c l a s s of a l l M/M/l queues such t h a t X/y < 1. O b v i o u s l y , 
we w i l l name as a model o n l y a c l a s s of s i m i l a r s y s t e m s , t h a t i s , sys tems 
which d i f f e r o n l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o a number of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which are 
or may be t r e a t e d as p a r a m e t e r s . 
A s tudy of a model may have as i t s s o l e o b j e c t i v e the d e r i v a t i o n 
of r e s u l t s c o n c e r n i n g each sys tem c o n s i d e r e d by i t s e l f . F r e q u e n t l y , 
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however, one w i l l a l s o be i n t e r e s t e d i n a comparison of the s y s t e m s , t h a t 
i s , measures of the e f f e c t of a change i n sys tem parameters . 
We s h a l l u s e the terms sys tem and model a l s o when c e r t a i n a s p e c t s 
of a queueing p r o c e s s depend on a c h o i c e by a d e c i s i o n - m a k e r . I f s o , we 
may speak of d e c i s i o n sys tem and d e c i s i o n model . 
In v i e w of the impl i ed s i m i l a r i t y of the sys tems t h a t comprise a 
model , we permi t o u r s e l v e s to speak of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a model , when 
we mean t h o s e of the s y s t e m s . 
2 . 2 . Elements of t h e D e c i s i o n P r o c e s s 
As f a r a s t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r i s concerned the e l e m e n t s of the 
d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s a r e : d e c i s i o n p o i n t s , d e c i s i o n s p a c e s , i n f o r m a t i o n , 
s t r a t e g y , and o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n . These c o n c e p t s w i l l now be b r i e f l y 
d i s c u s s e d . 
2 . 2 ( a ) . D e c i s i o n P o i n t s . The queueing p r o c e s s w i t h i t s c o n t a i n e d 
d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e v o l v e s i n t i m e . The p r o c e s s has a b e g i n n i n g but no t 
n e c e s s a r i l y an end. At c e r t a i n p o i n t s i n t ime the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r must 
make a d e c i s i o n . These epochs a r e c a l l e d d e c i s i o n p o i n t s . 
2 . 2 ( b ) . D e c i s i o n Spaces . At each d e c i s i o n p o i n t a c h o i c e of 
a c t i o n i s r e q u i r e d . The c h o i c e may be made d i r e c t l y , or i t may be made 
i n d i r e c t l y , v i a a c h o i c e of a p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n over t h e a v a i l a b l e 
a c t i o n s , i n which c a s e the a c t i o n i s drawn from the s e l e c t e d p r o b a b i l i t y 
d i s t r i b u t i o n . In g e n e r a l , we may assume t h a t d e c i s i o n - m a k e r c h o o s e s a 
p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n ( p o s s i b l y d e g e n e r a t e ) and we c a l l the s e l e c t e d 
d i s t r i b u t i o n the d e c i s i o n . The s e t of a l l a d m i s s i b l e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i ­
b u t i o n s a t the g i v e n d e c i s i o n p o i n t i s termed t h e d e c i s i o n s p a c e . For 
t e c h n i c a l r e a s o n s we may speak of c h o i c e , d e c i s i o n , and d e c i s i o n p o i n t , 
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even i f o n l y one a c t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e . 
The two t y p e s of d e c i s i o n s p a c e s c o m p l e t e l y dominat ing the l i t e r a ­
t u r e a r e : (1) t h e s e t of a l l d e g e n e r a t e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s , (2) 
t h e s e t of a l l p o s s i b l e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s . Observe t h a t a proba­
b i l i s t i c c h o i c e of a c t i o n may make s e n s e even i f t h e r e i s o n l y one 
d e c i s i o n - m a k e r . 
2 . 2 ( c ) . I n f o r m a t i o n . The d e c i s i o n - m a k e r does not a c t b l i n d l y . 
At each d e c i s i o n p o i n t he i s g i v e n some i n f o r m a t i o n . This has two p a r t s : 
(1) i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e queueing sys tem i t s e l f ( i . e . laws of e v o l u t i o n 
of the p r o c e s s ) , (2) i n f o r m a t i o n about the p a r t i c u l a r c o u r s e of the p r o ­
c e s s — t h e r e a l i z a t i o n — u p t o and i n c l u d i n g the d e c i s i o n p o i n t ( i . e . the 
h i s t o r y ) . N e i t h e r p i e c e of i n f o r m a t i o n i s n e c e s s a r i l y c o m p l e t e . As far 
a s p r o c e s s i n f o r m a t i o n i s concerned i t w i l l be assumed t h a t the d e c i s i o n 
space i s a lways known. Throughout we make the assumpt ion t h a t a l l i n f o r ­
mation r e c e i v e d by d e c i s i o n - m a k e r i s t r u e . 
2 . 2 ( d ) . S t r a t e g y Space . By a s t r a t e g y we s h a l l understand a 
d e c i s i o n r u l e by which the d e c i s i o n a t an a r b i t r a r y d e c i s i o n p o i n t i s a 
f u n c t i o n of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e to the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r a t t h a t p o i n t . 
By d e f i n i t i o n , under a g i v e n s t r a t e g y a l l d e c i s i o n p o i n t s w i t h i d e n t i c a l 
i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l have i d e n t i c a l d e c i s i o n s . 
A s t r a t e g y i s a d m i s s i b l e i f i t produces a d e c i s i o n a t every d e c i s i o n 
p o i n t i n e v e r y r e a l i z a t i o n and i f each d e c i s i o n n e c e s s a r i l y l i e s i n the 
proper d e c i s i o n s p a c e . An a d m i s s i b l e s t r a t e g y need n o t , of c o u r s e , p r o v i d e 
answers f o r s i t u a t i o n s ( d e f i n e d by the i n f o r m a t i o n ) which cannot occur under 
the s t r a t e g y . The s e t of a l l a d m i s s i b l e s t r a t e g i e s we c a l l the s t r a t e g y 
space and d e n o t e by II. An a d m i s s i b l e s t r a t e g y i s t y p i c a l l y denoted TT. 
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A d e c i s i o n - m a k e r does not have to make a d e c i s i o n a t a d e c i s i o n 
p o i n t u n t i l he a r r i v e s t h e r e . He need not make d e c i s i o n s ahead of time 
a c c o r d i n g t o a s t r a t e g y t h a t t a k e s i n t o account every c o n d i t i o n t h a t l a t e r 
may a r i s e . Ye t , the s t r a t e g y concept i s i n d i s p e n s a b l e i n d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g 
a s , in p r i n c i p l e , a d e c i s i o n - m a k e r should make each d e c i s i o n w i t h a l l 
p o s s i b l e f u t u r e s i n mind. There i s no l o s s of g e n e r a l i t y i n assuming, 
a s we s h a l l , t h a t a s t r a t e g y i s s e l e c t e d a l r e a d y a t the s t a r t i n g p o i n t 
of the p r o c e s s , say t^ . 
2 . 2 ( e ) . O b j e c t i v e F u n c t i o n . The d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ' s gu ide in making 
h i s d e c i s i o n s i s the o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n , t o be d e f i n e d . The b a s i c concept 
i s t h e outcome, or r e a l i z a t i o n . By t h a t i s meant t h e d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n 
of the p a r t i c u l a r c o u r s e taken by the queueing p r o c e s s . I t i s c l e a r t h a t 
the s t r a t e g y c h o i c e TT i s an important determinant of the outcome. However, 
i t i s a l s o a f f e c t e d by v a r i o u s random v a r i a b l e s . Among t h e s e may be 
randomly s e l e c t e d a c t i o n s . The p r o c e s s w i l l a lways be a f f e c t e d by random 
v a r i a b l e s which are i n h e r e n t i n a queueing p r o c e s s , namely i n t e r a r r i v a l 
t i m e s , s e r v i c e t imes and, perhaps , v a r i a b l e s connected w i t h a v a i l a b i l i t y 
of s e r v e r s . In a d d i t i o n , o t h e r q u a n t i t i e s which are t y p i c a l l y c o n s t a n t , 
such a s t h e a r r i v a l r a t e i n a P o i s s o n a r r i v a l p r o c e s s , may be random 
v a r i a b l e s . 
For a g i v e n TT £ II the queueing p r o c e s s i s a s t o c h a s t i c p r o c e s s . Sup­
pose any p a r t i c u l a r outcome can be summarized i n t o a s i n g l e r e a l number, 
the payo f f , which c o m p l e t e l y d e s c r i b e s the outcome as f a r a s our d e c i s i o n ­
maker i s concerned . The p a y o f f , W(TT) , g e n e r a l l y i s a random v a r i a b l e . 
Let F(»;TT) denote the d i s t r i b u t i o n f u n c t i o n of W(TT) , which i s 
a l l o w e d t o be d e g e n e r a t e . Suppose t h a t the d i s t r i b u t i o n F ( » ; 7 T ) by the 
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decision-maker is summarized into a number, V(TT), by some formula, say 
V(TT) = f(F (* ;Tr) ) , TT e II. Our assumption is that V(TT) measures the worth 
of the choice TT, and V(TT) is called the objective function value. A 
simple, but important example is that V(TT) is defined as the mean of 
W(TT) . More generally, V(TT) may be defined as any function of the outcome 
distribution. The objective function is V(TT) considered as a function of 
the strategy TT. 
The decision-maker's objective shall be the maximization of V(TT). 
Normally, one would assume that the decision-maker knows all admissible 
strategies and that, at the starting point, he is given sufficient infor­
mation about the system to enable him, at least in principle, to determine 
an optimal strategy. A detailed discussion of what constitutes sufficient 
information is beyond the scope of our analysis. 
2.3. Risk and Uncertainty 
Decision systems fall naturally into two classes: (1) systems with 
risk, (2) systems with uncertainty. We speak of a system with risk if, 
for each TT e II, W(TT) follows a distribution which may be calculated, with 
any accuracy desired, from the information available to the decision-maker 
at tg. We allow W(TT) to be constant for each TT. On the other hand, a 
system with uncertainty is a system where, for some TT e II, the distribu­
tion of W(TT) cannot be calculated by the decision-maker. 
It has been assumed that all information about the queueing process 
is true. Hence, if we have a system with uncertainty, then the decision­
maker must be uncertain about the system itself. That is, there is at 
least one defining characteristic whose distribution function is not com­
pletely known by the decision-maker, or some feature of the system is 
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i n c o m p l e t e l y d e s c r i b e d . 
Knowledge of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of a parameter i s here taken t o mean 
one of two t h i n g s . E i t h e r the d i s t r i b u t i o n i s g i v e n and the d e c i s i o n ­
maker i s informed t h e r e o f , or t h e parameter v a l u e i s unknown, but t h e 
d e c i s i o n - m a k e r has assumed a p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n and a c t s on t h a t 
a s sumpt ion . In t h e l a t t e r c a s e t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r has s u b s t i t u t e d a s u b ­
j e c t i v e , or a. p r i o r i , d i s t r i b u t i o n f o r the "unknown" q u a n t i t y or f e a t u r e . 
Systems w i t h u n c e r t a i n t y w i l l not be c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g . 
We go a s m a l l s t e p f a r t h e r and make t h e assumption t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n ­
maker has no u n c e r t a i n t y w i t h r e s p e c t t o the d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . 
3 . D e c i s i o n P o i n t s 
S e c t i o n s 3 t o 7 t r e a t i n some d e t a i l the e l e m e n t s of d e c i s i o n ­
making which were rev iewed i n S e c t i o n 2 . In the p r e s e n t s e c t i o n our 
s u b j e c t i s d e c i s i o n p o i n t s and c e r t a i n c l o s e l y r e l a t e d e v e n t s . 
3 . 1 . The Set of D e c i s i o n P o i n t s 
D e c i s i o n p o i n t s may be of d i f f e r e n t k i n d s , d i f f e r e n t i a t e d by type 
of i n f o r m a t i o n ( i n c l u d i n g d e c i s i o n space i n f o r m a t i o n ) and, perhaps , the 
p a r t i c u l a r v a l u e s d e s c r i b i n g the h i s t o r y . Here we are concerned w i t h 
the d i s t r i b u t i o n over t ime of one kind of p o i n t s . T y p i c a l l y , i t w i l l 
s u f f i c e t o d i s t i n g u i s h one or two k i n d s . 
Let P(TT) d e s i g n a t e the s e t of d e c i s i o n p o i n t s r e a l i z e d under s t r a ­
t e g y 7T. P(TT) may be a f i x e d s e t or a v a r i a b l e s e t . I t i s n a t u r a l to 
d i s t i n g u i s h four c a s e s : ( 1 ) P(TT) i s f i x e d f o r each TT e IT, and P(TT^) = 
P ^ ) f o r TT^ e IT, T^e JT; ( 2 ) P(TT) i s v a r i a b l e for each TT e JT, but P ^ ^ ) 
and P( iT2) have i d e n t i c a l p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s for TT^ e II, T\^e II; 
( 3 ) P(TT) i s f i x e d f o r each TT £ IT, but P(TT ) ^ P(TT ) for some TT e IT, 
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i\ £ II; ( 4 ) o t h e r . The queueing l i t e r a t u r e o f f e r s i n t e r e s t i n g examples of 
a l l four c a s e s . 
Case 1 i s e x e m p l i f i e d by s y s t e m s w i t h d e c i s i o n p o i n t s a s f o l l o w s : 
(a) P = ( t Q } (a pure d e s i g n s y s t e m ) ; (b) P = { t ^ , t Q + 6 , t Q + 2 6 , . . . } (a 
p e r i o d i c r e v i e w s y s t e m ) ; ( c ) P = [ t ^ , 0 0 ) (a c o n t i n u o u s - t i m e d e c i s i o n 
s y s t e m ) . Case 2 i s i l l u s t r a t e d by a sys tem w i t h c o n s t a n t P o i s s o n a r r i v a l 
r a t e and i n which t h e d e c i s i o n p o i n t s are a l l the a r r i v a l p o i n t s . A s im­
p l e example of c a s e 3 i s a sys tem w i t h d e c i s i o n p o i n t s P ( 6 ) = { t Q , t Q + 6 , 
t ^ + 2 6 , . . . } where t h e r e v i e w i n t e r v a l 6 i s t o be d e c i d e d a t t^ . For an 
example of c a s e 4 c o n s i d e r an M/M/l system w i t h v a r i a b l e s e r v i c e r a t e , 
whose l e v e l i s d e c i d e d a t a r r i v a l and d e p a r t u r e p o i n t s on the b a s i s of 
the c u r r e n t number of cus tomers i n the s y s t e m . 
3 . 2 . R e a c t i o n and Implementat ion Times 
A d e c i s i o n p o i n t may be predetermined by the d e f i n i t i o n of the 
sys tem. I t may a l s o have been s e t a t a p r e v i o u s d e c i s i o n p o i n t . Commonly, 
however, d e c i s i o n p o i n t s are genera ted by " e v e n t s " such as an a r r i v a l . 
In g e n e r a l , i n t h e s e c a s e s , t ime p a s s e s from the i n s t a n t a t which the 
event t a k e s p l a c e u n t i l the d e c i s i o n i s made a t the d e c i s i o n p o i n t . This 
d e l a y i s c a l l e d the r e a c t i o n t ime . Sometimes the r e a c t i o n t ime of a model 
can be i n t e r p r e t e d a s an i n f o r m a t i o n l a g . 
In n e a r l y a l l queueing models the r e a c t i o n t ime i s assumed to be 
z e r o . That may be an o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of r e a l - w o r l d s y s t e m s . Quite a s 
r e a s o n a b l e , but a l s o much harder t o a n a l y z e , are models where the r e a c t i o n 
t ime i s assumed t o be a p o s i t i v e c o n s t a n t or a random v a r i a b l e . 
A d e c i s i o n i s a d e t e r m i n i s t i c or p r o b a b i l i s t i c c h o i c e of a c t i o n . 
The u s u a l assumpt ion i s t h a t the i n d i c a t e d a c t i o n i s c a r r i e d out 
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immedia te ly . In g e n e r a l , the a c t i o n w i l l be c a r r i e d out i n one or more 
s t e p s , or even c o n t i n u o u s l y , f o l l o w i n g the d e c i s i o n . We s h a l l c o n s i d e r 
o n l y c a s e s w i t h a s i n g l e a c t i o n p o i n t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a d e c i s i o n p o i n t . 
The t ime between d e c i s i o n and a c t i o n we c a l l the implementat ion t i m e . 
O b v i o u s l y , models w i t h p o s i t i v e implementat ion t i m e s , be they c o n ­
s t a n t or v a r i a b l e , are much more d i f f i c u l t t o a n a l y z e than models w i t h 
z e r o implementa t ion t i m e s . In p a r t t h i s i s due to the c o m p l i c a t i o n t h a t 
a new d e c i s i o n p o i n t may occur b e f o r e a p r e v i o u s d e c i s i o n has been 
implemented. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , i n i n v e n t o r y t h e o r y models w i t h s e p a r a t e 
d e c i s i o n and a c t i o n p o i n t s have been known f o r a l o n g t ime whereas i n 
queueing t h e o r y such models are r a r e . 
4 . D e c i s i o n Spaces 
Our d i s c u s s i o n of d e c i s i o n p o i n t s d e a l t w i t h the q u e s t i o n of when 
d e c i s i o n s a r e made. Now we turn t o the q u e s t i o n of what s h a l l be dec ided 
a t a d e c i s i o n p o i n t a c c o r d i n g t o the sys tem s p e c i f i c a t i o n . For s i m p l i c i t y 
we l i m i t o u r s e l v e s t o a d e t e r m i n i s t i c c h o i c e of a c t i o n . A g e n e r a l i z a t i o n 
t o p r o b a b i l i s t i c c h o i c e can be accompl i shed wi thout d i f f i c u l t y . A l s o , 
for s i m p l i c i t y , implementat ion t ime z e r o i s assumed. 
4 . 1 . The D e c i s i o n Space 
In the c a s e of a d e t e r m i n i s t i c c h o i c e , the d e c i s i o n space i s , i n 
e f f e c t , the same as an a c t i o n s p a c e , namely, a s e t of ( a d m i s s i b l e ) a c t i o n s , 
from which the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r can choose f r e e l y . 
U s u a l l y t h e a c t i o n space i s d i r e c t l y s p e c i f i e d . An i n d i r e c t s p e c i ­
f i c a t i o n i s a l s o p o s s i b l e . Then a c t i o n s are termed a d m i s s i b l e and may be 
s e l e c t e d i f they be long to some g i v e n s e t and meet c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s . 
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An example i s t h e c h o i c e of number of s e r v e r s under the r e s t r i c t i o n t h a t 
f u t u r e customers w i t h p r o b a b i l i t y P or g r e a t e r wa i t a t most T u n i t s of 
t ime for s e r v i c e to b e g i n . 
An a c t i o n may concern any a s p e c t of a queueing p r o c e s s which can 
r e a s o n a b l y be assumed t o be under the c o n t r o l of the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r . In 
the queueing l i t e r a t u r e most a c t i o n s d e a l w i t h p h y s i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
of t h e s e r v i c e f a c i l i t y or customer f l ow c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . There are many 
ways a c t i o n s can be c a t e g o r i z e d . We s h a l l n o t , however, d i s c u s s t h a t 
s u b j e c t . 
Denote by A the s e t of a d m i s s i b l e a c t i o n s (or a l t e r n a t i v e s ) a t the 
d e c i s i o n p o i n t and l e t a d e n o t e an a r b i t r a r y a c t i o n i n A. The a c t i o n may 
be m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l . That i s , i t concerns n>2 q u a n t i t i e s whose l e v e l s 
are s e t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . I f so we may w r i t e a = (a^,a^t...,a ) . An impor­
t a n t s p e c i a l c a s e i s t h a t the n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s can be chosen i n d e p e n d e n t l y . 
Then A can be w r i t t e n A = A .X A_ . . . ) ( A , w i t h a.e A . , j = l , 2 , . . . , n . 
l / x 2 / N n j J 
I f the a c t i o n space A i s o n e - d i m e n s i o n a l and q u a n t i f i a b l e , then the 
a c t i o n , v iewed as a v a r i a b l e , i s u s u a l l y c a l l e d a d e c i s i o n v a r i a b l e . I t 
i s n a t u r a l t o ex tend the u s e of t h i s term t o each component of a e A i n 
c a s e A = V A . . 
J 
4 . 2 . The C o l l e c t i o n of D e c i s i o n Spaces 
U n t i l now o n l y the d e c i s i o n space a t a s i n g l e , a r b i t r a r y d e c i s i o n 
p o i n t has been the s u b j e c t . A c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of the whole c o l l e c t i o n 
of d e c i s i o n s p a c e s of a r e a l i z a t i o n i s a l s o of some i n t e r e s t . Our d i s ­
c u s s i o n of t h i s s u b j e c t i s l i m i t e d to the concept of a s t a t i o n a r y d e c i s i o n 
s p a c e . 
A sys tem i s s a i d to p o s s e s s a s t a t i o n a r y d e c i s i o n space i f a l l 
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d e c i s i o n p o i n t s , e x c e p t p o s s i b l y t,Q, have the same d e c i s i o n s p a c e . S i m i ­
l a r l y , we say a sys tem has a c l a s s - d e p e n d e n t , s t a t i o n a r y d e c i s i o n space 
i f t h e d e c i s i o n p o i n t s f a l l i n t o c l a s s e s w i t h i n which a l l p o i n t s have the 
same d e c i s i o n s p a c e , and, fur thermore , the d a t e i s not used i n the 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . We a r e i n t e r e s t e d o n l y i n c a s e s where the c l a s s e s are 
d e f i n e d by i n f o r m a t i o n g i v e n t o the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r , e x c e p t i n g the d e c i s i o n 
space i t s e l f . 
5 . In format ion 
Although i n f o r m a t i o n p l a y s a c r u c i a l r o l e i n d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , very 
l i t t l e i s s a i d i n the l i t e r a t u r e about i n f o r m a t i o n . Perhaps the reason i s 
t h a t most models i m p l i c i t l y assume an o m n i s c i e n t d e c i s i o n - m a k e r . 
To u s , o n l y i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e a t d e c i s i o n p o i n t s i s r e l e v a n t . 
G e n e r a l l y , t h e i n f o r m a t i o n a t a d e c i s i o n p o i n t has two components , namely 
sys tem i n f o r m a t i o n and p r o c e s s i n f o r m a t i o n . The two k inds of i n f o r m a t i o n 
w i l l be d i s c u s s e d in t u r n . 
5 . 1 . System Informat ion 
The sys tem has been d e f i n e d as t h e complete s e t of laws govern ing 
the e v o l u t i o n of the queueing p r o c e s s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The d e s c r i p t i o n 
of t h e sys tem must be a l l encompass ing . Among the t h i n g s s p e c i f i e d are 
the mechanism f o r g e n e r a t i o n of d e c i s i o n p o i n t s as w e l l a s the i n f o r m a t i o n 
a v a i l a b l e a t each i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n p o i n t . System i n f o r m a t i o n i s s imply 
i n f o r m a t i o n about the sys tem as s p e c i f i e d . 
An important s p e c i a l c a s e i s when the system i n f o r m a t i o n i s the 
same a t a l l d e c i s i o n p o i n t s . In t h a t c a s e we may a s w e l l suppose t h a t the 
i n f o r m a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e from the b e g i n n i n g , t^ . In the f o l l o w i n g we 
assume c o n s t a n t sys tem i n f o r m a t i o n . 
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5 . 2 . P r o c e s s I n f o r m a t i o n 
C o n s i d e r a r e a l i z a t i o n o f t h e q u e u e i n g p r o c e s s . D e n o t e b y H ( t ) 
t h e d e s c r i p t i o n i n c o m p l e t e d e t a i l o f t h e o u t c o m e u n t i l t i m e t , t > t ^ . 
I f t i s a d e c i s i o n p o i n t t h e n H ( t ) w i l l i n c l u d e t h e c u r r e n t d e c i s i o n 
s p a c e , b u t n o t t h e d e c i s i o n . A s s u m i n g t h a t t i s a d e c i s i o n p o i n t , l e t 
I ( t ) d e n o t e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r a t t a b o u t 
H ( t ) . T h u s I ( t ) i s a s u b s e t o f H ( t ) o r h a s b e e n d e r i v e d f r o m H ( t ) . W e 
r e q u i r e t h a t I ( t ) a l w a y s s t a t e s t h e c u r r e n t d e c i s i o n s p a c e . I ( t ) w i l l 
a l s o b e r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e p r o c e s s i n f o r m a t i o n a t t . 
T h e s u b s e q u e n t d i s c u s s i o n o f p r o c e s s i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n s ( a ) 
C h o i c e o f i n f o r m a t i o n ; ( b ) C o n t e n t s ; ( c ) I ( t ) ' s r e l a t i o n t o H ( t ) ; 
( d ) R e l a t i o n b e t w e e n I ( t ) ' s . 
5 . 2 ( a ) . C h o i c e o f I n f o r m a t i o n . T h e s y s t e m m a y l e a v e i t t o t h e 
d e c i s i o n - m a k e r t o d e c i d e a t s o m e d e c i s i o n p o i n t w h a t i n f o r m a t i o n s h o u l d 
b e m a d e a v a i l a b l e t o h i m , a t p r e s e n t o r f u t u r e d e c i s i o n p o i n t s . F o r i n ­
s t a n c e , h e m i g h t h a v e t o c h o o s e b e t w e e n n u m b e r o f c u s t o m e r s i n t h e s y s t e m 
a n d t o t a l s e r v i c e t i m e r e q u i r e d o f a l l c u s t o m e r s p r e s e n t . T y p i c a l l y , 
d i f f e r e n t c o s t s w i l l b e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h d i f f e r e n t c h o i c e s o f i n f o r m a t i o n 
b a s i s a s w e l l a s t h e c o l l e c t i o n o f t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n . I f d e c i s i o n - m a k e r 
e x e r c i s e s c o n t r o l o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n g i v e n h i m w e s h a l l s p e a k o f v a r i a b l e 
i n f o r m a t i o n , a n d o t h e r w i s e f i x e d i n f o r m a t i o n . 
5 . 2 ( b ) . C o n t e n t s . P r o c e s s i n f o r m a t i o n m a y d e a l w i t h v i r t u a l l y 
a n y a s p e c t o f t h e p r o c e s s . A c a t e g o r i z a t i o n o f a l l i t e m s o f i n f o r m a t i o n 
w i l l n o t b e a t t e m p t e d . T w o c a t e g o r i e s t h a t s u g g e s t t h e m s e l v e s a r e f a c i l i t y 
i n f o r m a t i o n a n d c u s t o m e r f l o w i n f o r m a t i o n . I n a s p e c i a l c a t e g o r y o n e f i n d s 
i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t i n g t o p a s t d e c i s i o n p o i n t s , c o n c e r n i n g t h e i n f o r m a t i o n 
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a v a i l a b l e ( d a t a , or kind o n l y ) , d e c i s i o n s made, and a c t i o n t a k e n . 
5 . 2 ( c ) . I ( t ) ' s R e l a t i o n to H ( t ) . I ( t ) may range a l l the way 
from the minimal , where o n l y the d e c i s i o n space i s g i v e n , t o the maximal, 
H ( t ) , where d e c i s i o n - m a k e r i s t o l d e v e r y t h i n g t h a t has happened. Note 
t h a t w h i l e few queueing models p r e s c r i b e maximal i n f o r m a t i o n , f r e q u e n t l y 
t h e i n f o r m a t i o n I ( t ) , though l e s s than H ( t ) , i s a s good a s H( t ) for the 
purpose of maximiz ing the o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n . 
In the i n t e r m e d i a t e c a s e s , I ( t ) i s more than j u s t d e c i s i o n space 
at t , but l e s s than H ( t ) . T y p i c a l l y , I ( t ) i s the r e s u l t of both a r e d u c ­
t i o n and a summarizat ion of the da ta c o n t a i n e d in H ( t ) . Reduct ion may 
take the form of u n a v a i l a b i l i t y of da ta i n H ( t ) , caused by t ime l a g s in 
the i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s . 
F r e q u e n t l y I ( t ) l e s s c u r r e n t d e c i s i o n space c o n s i s t s of a. v e c t o r 
of da ta of t h e same type for a l l d e c i s i o n p o i n t s , except p o s s i b l y t^. In 
such c a s e s the v e c t o r i s commonly c a l l e d the s t a t e of the sys tem. The 
data may r e p r e s e n t c u r r e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the p r o c e s s a t t , a s number 
of cus tomers i n the s y s t e m , t o t a l r e s i d u a l s e r v i c e t ime (work l o a d ) , 
whether a p a r t i c u l a r s e r v e r i s a v a i l a b l e or n o t . However, some data may 
a l s o be based on the p a s t h i s t o r y . Examples are t o t a l number of a r r i v a l s 
or o p e r a t i n g c o s t s t o d a t e . The s e t of a l l p o s s i b l e v e c t o r s i s o f t e n 
c a l l e d the i n f o r m a t i o n s p a c e . 
5 . 2 ( d ) . R e l a t i o n between I ( t ) ! s . An i n t e r e s t i n g and s i g n i f i c a n t 
a s p e c t of the i n f o r m a t i o n s t r u c t u r e i s the r e l a t i o n between I ( t ) ' s a t 
d i f f e r e n t d e c i s i o n p o i n t s of a r e a l i z a t i o n . We are e s p e c i a l l y i n t e r e s t e d 
i n the d e g r e e of l o s s of i n f o r m a t i o n about the p r o c e s s a s time p a s s e s . 
The q u e s t i o n w i l l be d i s c u s s e d o n l y under the assumption t h a t the d e c i s i o n 
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maker i s informed of e i t h e r the e x a c t d a t e or the d e c i s i o n p o i n t number. 
We b e g i n by d e f i n i n g sys tems w i t h no l o s s of i n f o r m a t i o n . Let t^ 
and t^ ^ t ^ < t 2 ^ d e n o t e two d e c i s i o n p o i n t s i n a r e a l i z a t i o n of the p r o c e s s . 
We s h a l l say t h e r e i s no l o s s of i n f o r m a t i o n between t^ and i f and on ly 
i f the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r a t knows I ( t ^ ) e x a c t l y . Observe , i t i s not s u f ­
f i c i e n t t h a t I ( t ^ ) c; i ( t ) , or i n o t h e r words that e v e r y t h i n g known a t t^ 
i s a l s o known a t t^ . This weaker c o n d i t i o n means o n l y t h a t the p r o c e s s 
i n f o r m a t i o n i s r e f i n e d and extended in t i m e . We say t h a t the sys tem has 
no l o s s of i n f o r m a t i o n provided t h e r e i s no l o s s of i n f o r m a t i o n between 
any two d e c i s i o n p o i n t s , whatever d e c i s i o n s are made. 
At the o t h e r extreme one f i n d s the sys tems w i t h a t o t a l l o s s of 
i n f o r m a t i o n . Here n o t h i n g i s known a t a d e c i s i o n p o i n t about the p r o c e s s 
i n f o r m a t i o n g i v e n a t p r e v i o u s d e c i s i o n p o i n t s , not even the d a t e , e x c e p t 
what might be deduced from the sys tem i n f o r m a t i o n . 
Between the two ex tremes a r e a v a r i e t y of sys tems w i t h , a t l e a s t 
p o t e n t i a l l y , a p a r t i a l l o s s of i n f o r m a t i o n . 
5 . 3 . Des ign v e r s u s Contro l Systems 
The i n f o r m a t i o n s t r u c t u r e p l a y s an important part in our d i s t i n c t i o n 
between d e s i g n sys tems and c o n t r o l s y s t e m s . N o t i c e tha t our concept of 
d e s i g n and c o n t r o l s y s t e m s d i f f e r s somewhat from o t h e r s appear ing i n the 
l i t e r a t u r e . 
A d e s i g n sys tem i s d e f i n e d as a d e c i s i o n system w i t h the f o l l o w i n g 
two p r o p e r t i e s : (1) D e c i s i o n p o i n t d a t e s (as measured by the exac t t ime 
or the sequence number) are f i x e d , and the d e c i s i o n space i s a f u n c t i o n 
of d e c i s i o n p o i n t d a t e ; (2) The p r o c e s s i n f o r m a t i o n c o n s i s t s of on ly d e ­
c i s i o n p o i n t d a t e and a s s o c i a t e d d e c i s i o n s p a c e . Thus, i n a d e s i g n system 
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the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r w i l l never be t o l d anyth ing not known a t t^ . As a 
consequence , o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n s can be made, u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y , a l r e a d y a t 
t ^ , f o r a l l d e c i s i o n p o i n t s . 
An o b v i o u s example of a d e s i g n sys tem i s a system in which the 
o n l y d e c i s i o n i s made a t t ^ , c o n c e r n i n g , s a y , the number of s e r v e r s for 
a l l t i m e . For a n o t h e r example , c o n s i d e r a c o n t i n u o u s - t i m e d e c i s i o n system 
where the a r r i v a l r a t e i s a known f u n c t i o n of t i m e , the d e c i s i o n v a r i a b l e 
i s the number of s e r v e r s , and no p r o c e s s i n f o r m a t i o n except d a t e and com­
mon d e c i s i o n space i s a v a i l a b l e . 
By a c o n t r o l sys tem i s meant a d e c i s i o n system which i s not a d e ­
s i g n sys t em. Here, t y p i c a l l y , some p r o c e s s i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l be a v a i l a b l e 
which p r e c l u d e s the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of a sequence of opt imal d e c i s i o n s a l ­
ready a t the s t a r t of the p r o c e s s . 
A comparison of our d e s i g n and c o n t r o l sys tem c o n c e p t s w i t h o t h e r s 
i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e i s i n t e r e s t i n g . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e s e and the r e l a t e d 
t erms , s t a t i c and dynamic s y s t e m s , or m o d e l s , are o f t e n i l l - d e f i n e d or 
not d e f i n e d a t a l l . L i t t l e w i l l t h e r e f o r e be s a i d on the s u b j e c t . We 
l i m i t o u r s e l v e s t o a comment on the quoted paper by C r a b i l l , Gross and 
Magazine [ 1 9 7 3 ] . They make a d i s t i n c t i o n between s t a t i c m o d e l s , w i t h 
c o n s t a n t "sys tem o p e r a t i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , " and dynamic mode l s . To u s , 
t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n d o e s not seem so important . What i s needed i n the c a s e 
of d e c i s i o n models i s a d i s t i n c t i o n which , l i k e o u r s , i s based on the 
i n f o r m a t i o n s t r u c t u r e . 
6 . S t r a t e g y Space 
R e c a l l t h a t the s t r a t e g y space i s the s e t of a v a i l a b l e s t r a t e g i e s , 
and t h a t a s t r a t e g y g i v e s a d e c i s i o n a s a f u n c t i o n of the i n f o r m a t i o n a t 
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a d e c i s i o n p o i n t . One obv ious d e s c r i p t o r of a s t r a t e g y space i s the num­
ber of s t r a t e g i e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r whether f i n i t e or i n f i n i t e . Further 
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n r e s t s on a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s t r a t e g i e s . 
We have mentioned t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of s t r a t e g i e s i n t o randomized and 
nonrandomized s t r a t e g i e s . Here, our s u b j e c t s a r e the c l a s s of s t a t i o n a r y 
s t r a t e g i e s and the s u b c l a s s of s t a t i c s t r a t e g i e s . Of ten , i n the l i t e r a t u r e , 
a l l s t r a t e g i e s in the s t r a t e g y space b e l o n g to one of t h e s e c l a s s e s . 
6 . 1 . S t a t i o n a r y S t r a t e g i e s 
We c a l l a s t r a t e g y s t a t i o n a r y i f the d e c i s i o n s do not depend on 
i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e d a t e of the d e c i s i o n p o i n t , e x c e p t p o s s i b l y a t t^ , 
whether such i n f o r m a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e or n o t . A s imple i l l u s t r a t i o n i s 
a s t r a t e g y making the d e c i s i o n a f u n c t i o n of number of customers in sys tem 
and c u r r e n t number of a c t i v a t e d s e r v e r s . 
6 . 2 . S t a t i c S t r a t e g i e s 
An i n t e r e s t i n g group of s t a t i o n a r y s t r a t e g i e s are formed by s t r a t e ­
g i e s whereby the d e c i s i o n i s a f u n c t i o n of d e c i s i o n space o n l y . Among 
t h e s e s t r a t e g i e s a r e the s t a t i c s t r a t e g i e s , t o be d e f i n e d . The term may 
not be t o o f o r t u n a t e , but i t has ga ined some currency i n the l i t e r a t u r e . 
An u n d e r l y i n g assumpt ion i s t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s a s t r i c t , s imple o r d e r i n g 
of a l l p o s s i b l e d e c i s i o n s , or a c t i o n s , f o r each d e c i s i o n p o i n t . Thus, a l l 
d e c i s i o n s i n a d e c i s i o n space are ranked so t h a t (1) of any two d e c i s i o n s , 
one i s ranked the h i g h e r , and (2) i f d e c i s i o n 1 i s ranked h igher than 
d e c i s i o n 2 , which i n turn i s ranked h i g h e r than d e c i s i o n 3 , then d e c i s i o n 
1 w i l l be ranked h i g h e r than d e c i s i o n 3 . 
A s t a t i c s t r a t e g y i s a s t r a t e g y which a t every d e c i s i o n p o i n t , e x ­
c e p t p o s s i b l y t n , s e l e c t s the one a v a i l a b l e d e c i s i o n which i s ranked the 
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h i g h e s t . Consider for example queueing sys tems where the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r 
may s e l e c t for s e r v i c e any customer i n the queue. C l e a r l y , FIFO and LIF0 
s e r v i c e o r d e r s q u a l i f y a s s t a t i c s t r a t e g i e s , w i t h customers ranked by 
a r r i v a l t ime or number. Suppose the customers be long to predetermined 
p r i o r i t y c l a s s e s 1 , 2 , . . . . Then the s t r a t e g y ( a s i n the s imple p r i o r i t y 
queue) of s e l e c t i n g the customer who i s in the h i g h e s t p r i o r i t y c l a s s 
r e p r e s e n t e d and a r r i v e d the f i r s t , i s s t a t i c . 
7. O b j e c t i v e Funct ion 
Our s u b j e c t i s not the o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n V(TT) a s such , t h a t i s , 
V (TT) 'S dependence on TT. Rather , our concern i s t h e e x p r e s s i o n for V(TT) 
or f o r the payof f on whose d i s t r i b u t i o n V(TT) i s based . 
T y p i c a l l y , the payof f i s g i v e n a s a s imple e x p r e s s i o n i n (a) system 
c o n s t a n t s , (b) d e c i s i o n v a r i a b l e s , and (c ) performance v a r i a b l e s . We are 
i n t e r e s t e d i n the form and the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s e x p r e s s i o n . In 
S e c t i o n s 7 . 1 and 7 . 2 we d i s c u s s sys tem c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s based upon p r o p e r ­
t i e s of the e x p r e s s i o n f o r the p a y o f f , and hence c h a r a c t e r i z e the o b j e c t i v e 
f u n c t i o n e x p r e s s i o n . In S e c t i o n 7 . 3 we d i s c u s s economic sys tems a s 
opposed t o p h y s i c a l s y s t e m s , w i t h emphasis on the o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n . 
F i n a l l y , i n S e c t i o n 7 . 4 we d i s c u s s a c a t e g o r i z a t i o n of d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s , 
based s o l e l y on an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the e x p r e s s i o n f o r the o b j e c t i v e 
f u n c t i o n v a l u e . 
7 . 1 . P l a n n i n g Horizon 
Consider a r e a l i z a t i o n under s t r a t e g y TT. Suppose T i s a p o i n t i n 
t ime such t h a t the e x a c t payof f can be determined a t T, but not b e f o r e . 
T i s c a l l e d the p l a n n i n g h o r i z o n . In g e n e r a l , T i s a random v a r i a b l e 
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which is dependent on TT. Possibly, T = °°. 
Systems with infinite horizon (T = °°) are predominant in the queue­
ing literature and need not be discussed. Among other possibilities we 
shall consider only systems with the property that for no TT e II can T = 0 0 
occur. Such systems we call finite horizon systems. The following dis­
tinction of four categories is natural: (1) T is independent of TT and 
constant (fixed horizon); (2) T is independent of TT, but is a random 
variable; (3) T is dependent on TT and constant for each TT e II; (4) T is 
dependent on TT and, at least for some TT, a random variable. In each cate­
gory, interesting examples are easily found. 
7.2. Additivity Properties 
We shall discuss two additivity properties often encountered in 
optimization models, either singly or in combination. 
First we define additivity with respect to performance variables. 
Let n be the number of performance variables. For given TT e II let XQ(TT) 
be a constant and let x, (TT) , X 0 ( T T ) , . . . , X (TT) denote the n performance 
L L n 
variables, which may themselves be expressions involving more basic 
performance variables. We say the payoff is additive in the performance 
variables if 
n 
W(TT) = X„(TT) + I x. (TT) . 
1=1 
This property is particularly useful in case the objective function value 
equals expected payoff. 
Second we define additivity with respect to time. Let TT e II and 
let tn,t t (m < 0 0 ) be a partition of the time scale, which may be 
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randomly determined o r , p e r h a p s , even a r b i t r a r y . Let V q ( ^ ) be a c o n s t a n t , 
and denote by y ( t ^ _ ^ , t ;TT) a p a r t i a l payof f a s s o c i a t e d w i t h i n t e r v a l n o . 
j , and which depends on t h e h i s t o r y of t h e p r o c e s s b e f o r e t . We say the 
payof f i s t ime a d d i t i v e i f 
m 
W(TT) = y (TT) + I y ( t . , t.;iT). 
j = l 3 ~ 3 
I t i s ea sy t o s e e t h a t a sys tem p o s s e s s e s both of the mentioned 
a d d i t i v i t y p r o p e r t i e s i f we have 
i = l j = l 
m 
W(TT) = k(TT) + I a.(Tr) + I b ( t . _ , t . ; T T ) 
n m 
+
 I I M V i ' V 7 0 ' 
i = l j = l J J 
where k(iT) i s an o v e r a l l c o n s t a n t ; a_^(TT) i s a c o n s t a n t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h 
performance v a r i a b l e no . i ( i = l , n ) ; h ( t^ ^, t^;TT) i s a c o n s t a n t a s s o c i a t e d 
w i t h i n t e r v a l no . j ( j = l , m ) ; z^(t^._^, t^ ;TT) i s the c o n t r i b u t i o n of i n t e r v a l 
no . j t o performance v a r i a b l e no . i . 
7 . 3 . Economic I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
Both queueing sys tems w i t h and w i t h o u t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g may be 
d i v i d e d i n t o p h y s i c a l sys tems and economic s y s t e m s . T y p i c a l l y , a system 
w i t h o u t a d e c i s i o n - m a k e r i s a p h y s i c a l sys tem and has no o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n , 
w h i l e a sys tem w i t h a d e c i s i o n - m a k e r must have an o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n and 
t y p i c a l l y i s an economic sys tem. We w i l l d i s c u s s on ly sys tems w i t h a 
d e c i s i o n - m a k e r . 
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By a p h y s i c a l sys tem i s meant a sys tem whose d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s ­
t i c s a r e a l l p h y s i c a l v a r i a b l e s , d e a l i n g for i n s t a n c e w i t h number of u n i t s 
and t ime i n t e r v a l s , and t h e i r p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s . The o b j e c t i v e 
f u n c t i o n v a l u e i s a l s o r e q u i r e d t o be a p h y s i c a l v a r i a b l e . 
C o n v e r s e l y , an economic sys tem i s a sys tem i n which a t l e a s t one 
d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s an economic v a r i a b l e by i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Exam­
p l e s of economic v a r i a b l e s a r e v a r i a b l e s w i t h an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as r evenue , 
c o s t , p r o f i t , d i s c o u n t f a c t o r , or u t i l i t y . We n o t e t h a t o f t e n the o b j e c ­
t i v e f u n c t i o n i s a d d i t i v e i n performance v a r i a b l e s i n t e r p r e t e d as revenue 
or c o s t . 
P h y s i c a l d e c i s i o n sys tems may seem odd, but they do occur i n the 
l i t e r a t u r e . However, they a r e o f t e n , i m p l i c i t l y , economic s y s t e m s . Con­
s i d e r f o r example an M/M/l s y s t e m , where cus tomers may be s e l e c t e d from 
the queue i n any o r d e r , each c u s t o m e r 1 s s e r v i c e t ime i s known i n advance , -
and the o b j e c t i v e i s t o minimize the mean queueing t ime (a r e f o r m u l a t i o n 
as a m a x i m i z a t i o n problem i s e a s y ) . The s o l u t i o n i s t o a lways s e l e c t the 
customer w i t h the s h o r t e s t p r o c e s s i n g t ime ( s e r v i c e t i m e ) . No economic 
v a r i a b l e s e n t e r e x p l i c i t l y i n t o the sys tem d e f i n i t i o n . Yet the sys tem 
i s i m p l i c i t l y economic . I f a f i x e d c o s t per u n i t t ime spent i n queue by 
a customer were p a r t of the sys tem d e f i n i t i o n and the o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n 
were d e f i n e d a s t h i s c o s t c o n s t a n t t imes the mean queueing t i m e , then t h e 
opt imal s t r a t e g y would not change . 
7 . 4 . Types of Dec i s ion-Maker 
A d e c i s i o n - m a k e r i s an a c t u a l or imagined i n d i v i d u a l , or c o l l e c t i o n 
of i n d i v i d u a l s . In the r e a l world as w e l l a s in the l i t e r a t u r e the 
d e c i s i o n - m a k e r common;ly b e l o n g s t o one of t h r e e t y p e s t o be d e s c r i b e d . 
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The s o l e b a s i s for the c a t e g o r i z a t i o n i s the d e f i n i t i o n of the o b j e c t i v e 
f u n c t i o n . S i n c e i t i s of some i n t e r e s t what s t r a t e g i e s are a v a i l a b l e , 
t h i s q u e s t i o n w i l l a l s o be d i s c u s s e d , for each type of d e c i s i o n - m a k e r , 
but o n l y i n terms of d e c i s i o n v a r i a b l e s . 
7 . 4 ( a ) . F a c i l i t y Owner. The term f a c i l i t y owner i s a p p l i e d t o 
an i n d i v i d u a l , a f i r m , or the l i k e , t h a t bears the c o s t of f a c i l i t i e s and 
t h e i r o p e r a t i o n , and i n r e t u r n d e r i v e s revenue from the s e r v i c e of 
c u s t o m e r s . Both c o s t terms and revenue terms e n t e r the o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n 
and the payof f e x p r e s s i o n , which i s i n c r e a s i n g in revenue terms and d e ­
c r e a s i n g i n c o s t t e rms . 
When the payof f e q u a l s the d i f f e r e n c e between revenue and c o s t , i t 
i s f r e q u e n t l y named p r o f i t , and the f a c i l i t y owner i s l a b e l e d p r o f i t 
maximizer . I f c o s t terms a r e absent or independent of TT, then the f a c i l i t y 
owner may be c a l l e d a revenue maximizer . S i m i l a r l y , i f revenue terms are 
a b s e n t or independent of TT, then he may be c a l l e d a c o s t m i n i m i z e r . 
There i s h a r d l y any a s p e c t of a queueing p r o c e s s which c a n n o t , i n 
one c o n t e x t or a n o t h e r , r e a s o n a b l y be assumed t o be under the p a r t i a l or 
complete c o n t r o l of the f a c i l i t y owner. Among the most important d e c i s i o n 
v a r i a b l e s a r e , of c o u r s e , the p h y s i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which d e f i n e the 
f a c i l i t y , such a s number of s e r v e r s , w a i t i n g room and s e r v i c e r a t e . An­
o t h e r f a m i l y of d e c i s i o n v a r i a b l e s t h a t may w e l l be s e t by the f a c i l i t y 
owner are v a r i a b l e s i n f l u e n c i n g the customer f l o w , d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y . 
Examples abound in the l i t e r a t u r e , but w i l l not be g i v e n h e r e . 
7 . 4 ( b ) . Customer Agent . This term d e n o t e s a d e c i s i o n - m a k e r whose 
o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n summarizes a l l b e n e f i t s and c o s t s of i n d i v i d u a l c u s t o ­
mers , among which a r e : reward from s e r v i c e , payment for s e r v i c e , w a i t i n g 
27 
l o s s . We s h a l l not d i s c u s s how the c o l l e c t i v e w e l f a r e might be or should 
be measured. S u f f i c e i t t o say t h a t o f t e n the o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n i s 
d e f i n e d s imply a s t h e expec ted t o t a l or average payof f t o i n d i v i d u a l 
c u s t o m e r s , each of whom i s endowed w i t h h i s own payof f f u n c t i o n . 
The i d e n t i t y of the cus tomers of i n t e r e s t t o the customer agent i s 
n o t a lways o b v i o u s . C e r t a i n l y a l l a r r i v a l s should be i n c l u d e d , and i f 
the customer agent can i n f l u e n c e i n any way the stream of a r r i v a l s , then 
the c l a s s of cus tomers t o be c o n s i d e r e d should i n c l u d e p o t e n t i a l a r r i v a l s 
a s w e l l . In the c a s e of queues w i t h s o u r c e s f o r r e p e a t e d r e q u e s t s for 
s e r v i c e — c a l l them u s e r s — o n e might d e f i n e u s e r p a y o f f s and c a l c u l a t e the 
a g e n t ' s payof f from t h e u s e r p a y o f f s . 
Perhaps the most important c l a s s of d e c i s i o n s under the purview of 
a customer agent a r e customer f low c o n t r o l s . These f a l l i n t o two broad 
c a t e g o r i e s . In the f i r s t c a t e g o r y f a l l d e c i s i o n s t h a t may be thought of 
a s hav ing been d e l e g a t e d by the customers t o t h e i r a g e n t . Examples are 
b a l k i n g and r e n e g i n g o p t i o n s . In the second c a t e g o r y f a l l o ther means 
of c o n t r o l . A good example i s the a g e n t ' s u s e of a t o l l , the d e c i s i o n 
v a r i a b l e b e i n g i t s l e v e l , w i t h the purpose of d i s c o u r a g i n g e n t r y i n t o the 
sys tem of c e r t a i n customers who would o t h e r w i s e c a u s e c o n g e s t i o n w h i l e 
p r o f i t i n g l i t t l e t h e m s e l v e s by j o i n i n g r a t h e r than b a l k i n g . Another 
example i s an a g e n t ' s freedom t o d e c i d e the order of s e r v i c e . 
Observe t h a t the p r e s e n c e of a customer agent does not p r e c l u d e 
the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t some d e c i s i o n , such a s a b a l k i n g o p t i o n , i s l e f t w i t h 
the i n d i v i d u a l cus tomers who a c t t o maximize t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l o b j e c t i v e 
f u n c t i o n s . 
7 . 4 ( c ) . T o t a l System Opt imizer . This term s u g g e s t s a d e c i s i o n -
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maker w i t h an o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n which t a k e s i n t o account the i n t e r e s t s 
of both f a c i l i t y owner and i n d i v i d u a l customers a s d e s c r i b e d above . The 
d e c i s i o n v a r i a b l e s under the c o n t r o l of the t o t a l sys tem o p t i m i z e r may be 
v i r t u a l l y any f e a t u r e of a queueing s y s t e m , and t h e r e i s no need for 
t h e i r enumeration i n t h i s p l a c e . The d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n i s how the i n ­
t e r e s t s of the two p a r t i e s are t o be r e f l e c t e d i n the o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n . 
We s h a l l no t examine t h i s q u e s t i o n . 
8. Two or More Dec i s ion-Makers 
As b e f o r e , our i n t e r e s t i s the c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of queueing s y s t e m s , 
no t r e s u l t s , nor a n a l y t i c a l methods . E v i d e n t l y , the c l a s s of d e c i s i o n 
sys t ems w i t h two or more d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y more d i f f i c u l t 
t o c h a r a c t e r i z e than the c l a s s of d e c i s i o n sys t ems w i t h a s i n g l e d e c i s i o n ­
maker. For t h i s r e a s o n we s h a l l make no at tempt a t a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n w i t h 
r e s p e c t to a l l important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h i s f a m i l y of d e c i s i o n 
s y s t e m s . Only a few o b s e r v a t i o n s on the s u b j e c t w i l l be o f f e r e d . 
A c l a s s i f i c a t i o n by number and type of d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s i s u s e f u l . 
In t h i s r e s p e c t we d i s t i n g u i s h t h r e e c l a s s e s of d e c i s i o n s y s t e m s . In 
c l a s s 1 a r e a l l s y s t e m s w i t h a f i x e d and f i n i t e number of d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s , 
such a s a sys tem w i t h a f a c i l i t y owner a s w e l l a s a customer a g e n t , or a 
sys tem w i t h two u s e r s making repea t ed r e q u e s t s f o r s e r v i c e . In c l a s s 2 
are the sys tems in which the s e t of d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s , though not f i x e d 
and f i n i t e , i s independent of s t r a t e g i e s f o l l o w e d . An example t h e r e o f i s 
an M/M/l sys tem where the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s are the f a c i l i t y owner ( d e c i d i n g 
s e r v i c e r a t e ) p l u s every a r r i v i n g customer ( d e c i d i n g whether t o b a l k ) . 
In c l a s s 3 a r e the sys tems i n which s t r a t e g y c h o i c e s w i l l a f f e c t the 
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composition of the set of decision-makers. Either a decision-maker 
can directly create other decision-makers, or he can by his actions in­
fluence the mechanism for generation of decision-makers. An example of 
the latter is a system where a facility owner decides the size of the 
waiting room, and where the other decision-makers are those arrivals 
which can be admitted into the system. 
A full description of a multiple decision-maker queue will contain 
largely the same elements as does the single decision-maker queue. In 
particular, the decision process for each decision-maker is formally little 
changed by the existence of other decision-makers. One difference is that 
each decision-maker is given some information concerning the other 
decision-makers. It goes without saying that the presence of other 
decision-makers may vastly complicate the decision-making for all. 
A further characterization of these decision-systems shall not be 
attempted however important and interesting the subject. 
In conclusion we shall offer a few remarks on the possibility of 
a solution, that is, a determination of an optimal strategy by each 
decision-maker, a most important issue. 
Typically, in systems with multiple decision-makers no one can 
determine an optimal strategy. The reason is, of course, that the very 
existence of a strategy choice by other decision-makers typically consti­
tutes an element of uncertainty which precludes an exact calculation of 
objective, function value for some or all TT e II. There are, however, 
exceptions to the rule. 
Consider for instance a decision-maker, D, with complete system 
information. D will be in a position to select an optimal strategy under 
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a v a r i e t y of c o n d i t i o n s among which a r e : (1) The s t r a t e g y c h o i c e s by 
o t h e r d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s are not r e l e v a n t ; an example i s an M/M/l sys tem w i t h 
FIFO s e r v i c e r u l e , where D i s an a r b i t r a r y cus tomer , a f a c i l i t y owner 
d e c i d e s a r r i v a l r a t e a t tQ, and each customer d e c i d e s whether t o j o i n or 
b a l k , informed o n l y of number of cus tomers p r e s e n t on a r r i v a l ; (2) D w i l l 
be informed of o t h e r d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s 1 s t r a t e g y c h o i c e s b e f o r e he i s 
r e q u i r e d t o s e l e c t h i s s t r a t e g y ; (3) D w i l l be informed of d e c i s i o n s or 
a c t i o n s by o t h e r d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s and t h i s knowledge s u f f i c e s f o r i d e n t i ­
f i c a t i o n of an op t ima l s t r a t e g y ; (4) D can deduce the ( o p t i m a l ) s t r a t e g i e s 
by a l l t h o s e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s who may a f f e c t h i s o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n v a l u e . 
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CHAPTER I I I 
QUEUES WITH DECISION-MAKING 
BY INDIVIDUAL CUSTOMERS 
Queueing models l e t t i n g i n d i v i d u a l customers d e c i d e whether t o 
j o i n t h e sys tem or b a l k , or l e t t i n g them choose t h e i r own p r i o r i t y have 
appeared i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e o n l y r e c e n t l y . Among t h e papers d e a l i n g w i t h 
a s p e c t s of customer d e c i s i o n s a r e : A d i r i and Y e c h i a l i [1974], Balachandran 
[1972], Balachandran and Lukens [1976], Balachandran and Schaefer [1975], 
K l e i n r o c k [1967], Knudsen [1972], Naor [1969], and Y e c h i a l i [1972]. 
The p r e s e n t c h a p t e r i s most c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o Balachandran [1972]. 
Like h i s work, t h i s c h a p t e r f o c u s e s on s t a b l e p o l i c i e s t h a t r e s u l t i n a 
g i v e n s e r v i c e o r d e r . Here we i n c l u d e the b a l k i n g o p t i o n b e s i d e s t h e p r i ­
o r i t y o p t i o n , and we d e a l w i t h FIFO queues i n a d d i t i o n t o LIFO queues . 
Moreover, the o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n parameters are a l lowed to be random v a r i ­
a b l e s , and t h e queue ing sys tem i s g e n e r a l i z e d from M/M/l t o M/M/s/N and 
i n some c a s e s t o Gl /M/s /N . 
Our a n a l y s i s concerns i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i n t h r e e b a s i c 
models t o be d e s c r i b e d i n d e t a i l i n S e c t i o n 1. Model A i s a GI/M/s/N 
queue w i t h b a l k i n g o p t i o n . Model B i s an M/M/s/N queue w i t h p r i o r i t y 
o p t i o n . Model C i s an M/M/s/N queue w i t h b a l k i n g o p t i o n and p r i o r i t y 
o p t i o n . 
Our aim i s t w o f o l d : (1) t o put the a n a l y s i s of i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n ­
making i n our and r e l a t e d models on a f i rm t h e o r e t i c a l b a s i s ; and (2) t o 
d e r i v e i n t e r e s t i n g and u s e f u l r e s u l t s for t h e important b a s i c models we 
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c a l l A, B, C. 
The u n d e r l y i n g d i f f i c u l t y i n the a n a l y s i s of Models A, B, C i s t h a t , 
g e n e r a l l y , one cannot d e r i v e customer behav ior from the d e f i n i n g c h a r a c ­
t e r i s t i c s of the model . (The important e x c e p t i o n s are f o r Model A. ) 
For t h i s r e a s o n the concept of b e h a v i o r a l a s sumpt ions and the a s s o c i a t e d 
concept of a s t a b l e p o l i c y have been in troduced i n t o the a n a l y s i s . The 
i n c l u s i o n of b e h a v i o r a l as sumpt ions on t h e par t of the customers removes 
a r e s i d u a l u n c e r t a i n t y i n d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g due t o the i n t e r a c t i o n of c u s ­
tomer d e c i s i o n s . 
In S e c t i o n 2 we d e v e l o p the t h e o r e t i c a l framework for d e a l i n g w i t h 
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g by i n d i v i d u a l c u s t o m e r s . The key c o n c e p t s are : complete 
a c t i o n s e t s , reduced a c t i o n s e t s , op t ima l p o l i c y , s t a b l e ( i . e . s e l f -
s u s t a i n i n g ) p o l i c y . 
In S e c t i o n s 3 , 4 , and 5 t h e mentioned c o n c e p t s are used i n e x p l o r ­
ing d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i n Models A, B, C, r e s p e c t i v e l y . Model A, f o r the 
c a s e s of FIFO r u l e , and LIFO r u l e w i t h N < 0 0 , a lways has an op t ima l 
p o l i c y . In a l l o t h e r c a s e s , an o p t i m a l p o l i c y d o e s not g e n e r a l l y e x i s t , 
and the q u e s t i o n s of e x i s t e n c e and u n i q u e n e s s of s t a b l e p o l i c i e s s t i l l 
awai t t h e i r comple te r e s o l u t i o n . However, for Models B and C we do have 
some i n t e r e s t i n g r e s u l t s c o n c e r n i n g c o n d i t i o n s under which a p o l i c y i s 
s t a b l e and a t the same t ime i n d u c e s FIFO or LIFO s e r v i c e o r d e r . 
1. Model S p e c i f i c a t i o n 
We c o n s i d e r a sys tem w i t h s >^  1 s e r v e r s and a s i n g l e w a i t i n g l i n e 
( q u e u e ) , w i t h room for N customers i n the queue. S e r v i c e t i m e s f o l l o w 
the e x p o n e n t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n f u n c t i o n H(t ) = 1-e ^ J t ( t 2L 0) • Customers 
a r r i v e a t i n t e r v a l s t h a t a r e i n d e p e n d e n t , i d e n t i c a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d random 
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v a r i a b l e s f o l l o w i n g e i t h e r a g e n e r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n f u n c t i o n G(t ) 
( t >i 0, G(0) = 0) w i t h f i n i t e mean A ^ (Model A ) , or the e x p o n e n t i a l d i s ­
t r i b u t i o n f u n c t i o n F ( t ) = 1-e ^ t ( t > 0) (Models B and C) . Customers 
a r r i v i n g when t h e w a i t i n g room i s f u l l are turned away, never t o r e t u r n . 
Once a c c e p t e d i n t o t h e sys tem a customer s t a y s u n t i l s e r v e d . S e r v i c e i s 
nonpreempt ive . In order t o avo id c e r t a i n t r i v i a l c o m p l i c a t i o n s we assume 
t h a t the sys tem s t a r t s empty. 
A customer r e c e i v e s a reward R > 0 i f s e r v e d , but must make some 
n o n n e g a t i v e payment when j o i n i n g the s y s t e m , and a l s o s u f f e r s a w a i t i n g 
l o s s equa l t o h > 0 per u n i t t ime spent i n the sys tem. I f a customer 
d o e s not j o i n the s y s t e m , and c o n s e q u e n t l y i s not s e r v e d , he r e c e i v e s a 
reward r < R. Without l o s s of g e n e r a l i t y we s e t r = 0. The p a i r (R,h) 
i s a random v a r i a b l e on t h e p o p u l a t i o n of c u s t o m e r s , say w i t h d i s t r i b u ­
t i o n f u n c t i o n U ( R , h ) . The s e t of p o s s i b l e v a l u e s of ( R , h ) , the sample 
s p a c e , i s denoted by tt, and we l e t H d e n o t e the s e t of p o s s i b l e v a l u e s 
of h. Thus H = { h : ( h , R ) e Q f or some R > 0>. A c u s t o m e r ' s n e t g a i n , V, 
s h a l l be d e f i n e d a s f o l l o w s : V = r = 0 i f the customer does not j o i n 
t h e sy s t em; V = R-b-hW i f the customer j o i n s , w i t h b b e i n g h i s payment, 
however de termined , and W b e i n g h i s a c t u a l ( t o t a l ) w a i t i n g t i m e , i . e . 
t h e t ime from a r r i v a l u n t i l c o m p l e t i o n of s e r v i c e . Each c u s t o m e r ' s 
o b j e c t i v e i s max imiza t ion of h i s e x p e c t e d n e t g a i n , E(V) . 
U s u a l l y in queueing t h e o r y a c t i o n s by the customers are p r e s c r i b e d 
i n every d e t a i l by the model . Here we e x p l i c i t l y a l l o w i n d i v i d u a l c u s t o ­
mers some measure of i n f l u e n c e upon t h e i r expec ted n e t ga in through a 
d e c i s i o n t o be made a t the t ime of a r r i v a l . In Model A we g i v e the c u s ­
tomers a b a l k i n g o p t i o n , i n Model B a p r i o r i t y o p t i o n and i n Model C both 
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of t h e s e o p t i o n s . A b a l k i n g o p t i o n i s the r i g h t of an a r r i v i n g customer 
t o j o i n or ba lk (not j o i n ) a s he s e e s f i t . A p r i o r i t y o p t i o n i s the r i g h t 
of a customer who j o i n s the queue t o choose any p r i o r i t y payment b from 
a g i v e n s e t B of n o n n e g a t i v e payments , w i t h the unders tanding t h a t p r i ­
o r i t y payments de termine t h e order of s e r v i c e of t h o s e w a i t i n g in the 
queue; h igh payment g i v e s p r i o r i t y over low payment, and FIFO ( f i r s t - i n , 
f i r s t - o u t ) r u l e a p p l i e s to customers who have made the same p r i o r i t y 
payment. F i r s t - o u t i s i n t e r p r e t e d a s f i r s t out of queue ( i n t o s e r v i c e ) . 
S i n c e Model A has no p r i o r i t y o p t i o n , the order of s e r v i c e of 
customers i n t h e queue must be s p e c i f i e d : We s h a l l assume e i t h e r FIFO 
or LIFO ( l a s t - i n , f i r s t - o u t ) r u l e . L i k e w i s e , s i n c e Model B has no b a l k ­
ing o p t i o n the c o n d i t i o n s under which a customer j o i n s the sys tem need 
t o be s p e c i f i e d : A l l a r r i v i n g cus tomers w i l l be assumed t o j o i n , w a i t i n g 
room p e r m i t t i n g . T h i s r u l e we r e f e r t o a s "forced j o i n i n g " . 
We are i n t e r e s t e d mainly i n s i t u a t i o n s i n which customers a c t under 
assumpt ions t h a t permit c a l c u l a t i o n of E(V) f o r each a v a i l a b l e a c t i o n . 
I t may happen t h a t two d i f f e r e n t a c t i o n s r e s u l t i n the same v a l u e of E(V) . 
Such t i e s a r e r e s o l v e d by the f o l l o w i n g p r e f e r e n c e r u l e : A customer w i t h 
a b a l k i n g o p t i o n p r e f e r s t o j o i n r a t h e r than b a l k , i f the expec ted n e t 
g a i n by j o i n i n g e q u a l s r = 0 , and a customer w i t h a p r i o r i t y o p t i o n p r e ­
f e r s t h e s m a l l e r payment i f two p r i o r i t y payments y i e l d the same expec ted 
n e t g a i n . Thus, outcomes a r e ordered l e x i c o g r a p h i c a l l y , w i t h E(V) a s 
the primary c r i t e r i o n and t h e a c t i o n i t s e l f as the secondary c r i t e r i o n . 
Further model s p e c i f i c a t i o n n e c e s s i t a t e s some a d d i t i o n a l n o t a t i o n . 
Let t h e v a r i a b l e n d e n o t e the number of customers p r e s e n t i n the system 
j u s t p r i o r t o the a r r i v a l of a cus tomer . C l e a r l y , 0 < n < s+N. For 
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n o t a t i o n a l c o n v e n i e n c e we d e f i n e v = n-s+1 and r e f e r t o v a s the a r r i v a l 
s t a t e . Thus -s+1 £ v <^ N+l . (Note t h a t an a r r i v a l s t a t e V ^ 1 i n d i c a t e s 
v-1 customers i n queue w i t h a l l s e r v e r s b u s y . ) The term ( v , R , h ) - c u s t o m e r 
s h a l l mean a customer who a r r i v e s i n s t a t e V w i t h o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n p a r a ­
meter s R and h. S i m i l a r l y , l e t a v - c u s t o m e r be any customer a r r i v i n g i n 
s t a t e v . 
Each customer must make some n o n n e g a t i v e payment b upon j o i n i n g 
the sys t em. I f a p r i o r i t y o p t i o n i s n o t a v a i l a b l e (Model A ) , or V £ 0, 
then we w i l l assume t h a t the payment f o r j o i n i n g i s a f u n c t i o n of v , R 
and h, say b ( v , R , h ) i i 0. I f , on t h e o t h e r hand, a p r i o r i t y o p t i o n i s 
a v a i l a b l e and V >^ 1, then the customer can f r e e l y choose h i s payment from 
the s e t B. However, i n t h e l a t t e r c a s e we may be s t u d y i n g a p o l i c y where ­
by c u s t o m e r s , v o l u n t a r i l y , pay an amount t h a t i s a f u n c t i o n of V, R and 
h, and then we w i l l extend t h e f u n c t i o n n o t a t i o n b ( v , R , h ) t o d e n o t e a 
p o l i c y payment a s w e l l . 
The i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t our models make a v a i l a b l e t o an a r r i v i n g c u s ­
tomer has two d i s t i n c t components: p r i v a t e d a t a and sys tem i n f o r m a t i o n . 
P r i v a t e d a t a a r e v a r i a b l e s t h a t r e l a t e s p e c i f i c a l l y t o the c u s t o ­
mer h i m s e l f , namely t h e number of cus tomers observed i n the system a t 
a r r i v a l , measured by V, and h i s o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n , d e f i n e d by R and h. 
In what f o l l o w s we d e n o t e the p r i v a t e da ta by the t r i p l e ( v , R , h ) . 
The sys tem i n f o r m a t i o n , on t h e o t h e r hand, i s p u b l i c d a t a which i s 
shared by a l l . I t c o n s i s t s of the comple te knowledge of the queueing 
sys tem a s d e s c r i b e d , i n c l u d i n g parameter v a l u e s , d i s t r i b u t i o n f u n c t i o n s 
and o p t i o n ( s ) , p l u s , of c o u r s e , the i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t every customer i s 
g i v e n t h e same kind of i n f o r m a t i o n he h a s , both the p r i v a t e data and the 
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system i n f o r m a t i o n . Thus, the words "system in format ion" are meant t o 
summarize the g e n e r a l knowledge about t h e queueing sys tem, e x c e p t d e c i s i o n ­
making. 
2. Customer Behavior 
The a n a l y s i s of customer d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g n a t u r a l l y f a l l s i n t o two 
p a r t s . F i r s t we deduce a s much a s we p o s s i b l y can about t h e d e c i s i o n ­
making. That i s , we assume t h a t the i n f o r m a t i o n upon which cus tomers base 
t h e i r d e c i s i o n s c o n s i s t s of p r i v a t e d a t a and system i n f o r m a t i o n o n l y , and 
we ask what a c t i o n s v a r i o u s c a t e g o r i e s of cus tomers w i l l or w i l l not t a k e . 
I f an o p t i m a l a c t i o n can be determined f o r each a r r i v i n g customer , then 
the d e c i s i o n problem has been s o l v e d . However, t h e r e are c a s e s where not 
every a r r i v a l has an o p t i m a l a c t i o n . For f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s of such c a s e s 
we i n t r o d u c e b e h a v i o r a l as sumpt ions on the par t of the c u s t o m e r s . 
The key c o n c e p t s of our a n a l y s i s a r e : comple te a c t i o n s e t s , r e ­
duced a c t i o n s e t s , o p t i m a l p o l i c y , and s t a b l e p o l i c y . These and r e l a t e d 
c o n c e p t s a r e perhaps e a s i e r to understand i f f i r s t we d i s c u s s the c o r r e ­
sponding c o n c e p t s of a s i m p l e r model than o u r s , namely the n -person game 
w i t h pure s t r a t e g i e s . 
2.1. An Analogy 
Consider a n o n c o o p e r a t i v e n - p e r s o n game w i t h a r b i t r a r y s e t s of 
pure s t r a t e g i e s t o be termed a c t i o n s . Let v ^ ( a ^ , . . . , a ^ ) d e s i g n a t e the 
payof f t o p l a y e r k when p l a y e r £ s e l e c t s a c t i o n a^ from the s e t A^, 
£ = l , . . . , n . Each p l a y e r knows a l l n payof f f u n c t i o n s . No p l a y e r has p r i o r 
knowledge of a c t i o n s taken by o t h e r s . Mixed s t r a t e g i e s are no t a d m i s s i b l e . 
What w i l l t h e p l a y e r s do? 
We suppose each p l a y e r a t t e m p t s t o maximize h i s p a y o f f . Th i s 
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o b j e c t i v e i s i n t e r p r e t e d as f o l l o w s . Let p l a y e r k assume t h a t the o ther 
n - l p l a y e r s w i l l s e l e c t an a c t i o n combinat ion t £ T, where T i s some s e t 
of combinat ions of a v a i l a b l e a c t i o n s . No t £ T i s ru led o u t . Denote the 
c o n d i t i o n a l payof f f u n c t i o n by v ^ ( a ^ ; t ) . Let t h e r e a l s o be g i v e n a p r e f e ­
r e n c e r u l e which , f o r each p l a y e r , p r o v i d e s a s t r i c t , s imple order ing of 
a c t i o n s , a s i n models A, B, C. That i s , a l l a c t i o n s are ranked so t h a t 
for any two a c t i o n s one i s ranked h i g h e r than the o t h e r , and i f a^ i s 
ranked h i g h e r than aj^, w h i l e a£ i s ranked h i g h e r than a £ r , then a£ w i l l 
be ranked h i g h e r than a£ ' . Given a c h o i c e between a^ £ A^ and a£ £ A^ 
we s h a l l assume the p l a y e r w i l l choose a^, and we say a^ dominates a^ i f 
v ^ C a ^ j t ) > v ^ t e ^ t ) f o r a 1 1 t £ T and, i n c a s e v ^ C a ^ t ) = v ^ ( a ^ ; t ) for 
any t £ T then a^ i s p r e f e r r e d to a £ . 
Note t h a t our dominance concept d i f f e r s from the u s u a l dominance 




a \ * t ^ ^ o r a ^ t e ^ 
and v, ( a ' ; t ) > v ( a " ; t ) for some t. £ T. When we need t o d i s t i n g u i s h the 
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two, we c a l l ours s t r o n g dominance and the u s u a l concept i s termed normal 
dominance. These c o n c e p t s a s w e l l a s a t h i r d c o n c e p t , s t r i c t dominance, 
r e q u i r i n g v ^ ( a ^ ; t ) > v ^ ( a ^ ; t ) f o r a l l t £ T, are d i s c u s s e d i n S e c t i o n 6. 
N o t i c e , s t r o n g dominance, a s opposed t o normal dominance, i m p l i e s p r e s e r ­
v a t i o n of dominance under r e d u c t i o n of T. This f a c t works i n favor of 
the s t r o n g dominance c o n c e p t . 
P l a y e r k ' s comple te a c t i o n s e t , A^, i s the s e t of a c t i o n s a v a i l a b l e 
t o him. F r e q u e n t l y some of t h e s e a c t i o n s can be r u l e d out by a s u c c e s s i v e 
dominance argument. 
One v e r s i o n of t h i s argument, s i m u l t a n e o u s r e d u c t i o n — d i s c u s s e d by 
Luce and R a i f f a [1957 , p . 108] f o r the c a s e of mixed s t r a t e g i e s — r u n s as 
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follows. First, considering v,(a.. ,. .. ,a , .. . ,a ) defined for aQ £ 
(£=l,...,n), player k (k=l,...,n) eliminates all d ominated actions. The 
2- 
result is the partially reduced action sets { A 0 } . NOW, each player need 
2 
consider only {A p}. An examination of v,(a ,.. . ,a, ,. . . ,a ) defined on 
2 
a^ £ A^ (£=l,...,n) may reveal new dominated actions, resulting in the 
3 
second-stage reduced action sets {A^}. Continuing, one derives for each 
1 2 * i * player k a decreasing sequence A^,A^,.... Let A^ = lim^A^. We call A^ 
1 * 
the reduced action set. Conceivably, if A^ is an infinite set, A^ may be 
empty. 
Another natural reduction scheme is cyclical reduction, by which 
the players in cyclical order, say 1,2,...,n,1,2,... reduce their action 
sets as much as possible. 
Many different reduction schemes may be devised, including some 
according to which some players are never called upon to reduce their 
action set. Clearly then, {A^} may depend on the choice of reduction 
scheme. However, some reduction schemes are of little interest to us 
and will not be considered. Let an admissible reduction scheme be defined 
by two requirements: (1) there is a finite upper limit on the number of 
consecutive steps at which a player does not reexamine his actions, and 
(2) on his turn a player eliminates all dominated actions. 
In Section 6 we show that under our dominance criterion, strong 
dominance, {A, } is unique, that is, the same for all admissible reduction 
schemes, for arbitrary {Aj^ }. 
If A^ consists of a single action a^ then we term it player k s 
optimal action. If each player has an optimal action, then we shall say 
that the action combination (a1,...,a ) is an optimal solution. 
1 n — 
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D e f i n e a s t a b l e s o l u t i o n ( e q u i l i b r i u m p o i n t ) a s any combinat ion of 
( i ) Optimal , 
o n e - s t e p 
s o l u t i o n 
( i i ) Optimal , 
m u l t i - s t e p 
s o l u t i o n 
( i i i ) S t a b l e , 
not opt imal 
s o l u t i o n 
2 3 4 
1 2 3 








2 LO 3 
1 4 0 
1 0 4 
F i g u r e I I I - l . S o l u t i o n Concepts i n Games w i t h Pure S t r a t e g i e s 
As u s u a l , the e n t r y i n row i and column j i s the payof f t o p l a y e r 1 
( l o s s for p l a y e r 2) when p l a y e r 1 c h o o s e s h i s a c t i o n no . i and p l a y e r 2 
c h o o s e s h i s a c t i o n n o . j . Each game has a s i n g l e s t a b l e s o l u t i o n ( i , j ) = 
(1,1) w i t h p a y o f f s (2,-2). In games ( i ) and ( i i ) t h e s o l u t i o n i s o p t i m a l . 
a c t i o n s ( a ° , . . . , a ° ) such t h a t , f o r each k, af dominates a l l a, £ A?" - a ° 
I n k k It k 
. o _
 / o o o o. 
o n
 - Ka^t. . . » a j c _2» a j c + - j . '" * * , a n Thus, by our d e f i n i t i o n of dominance, 
( a ° , . . . , a ° ) i s ( s t r o n g l y ) s t a b l e i f v k ( a ° , . . . , a ° , . . . , a ° ) > v k ( a ° , . . . , 
a k , . . . , a ° ) , or vk(aj a°) = vk(a°,...,ak>...,a°> but a ° i s 
p r e f e r r e d t o a k , f or a l l a k £ - a ° , a l l k. 
I t i s shown i n S e c t i o n 6 t h a t w i t h our d e f i n i t i o n s every s t a b l e 
o o ^ 
s o l u t i o n ( ^ k ) l i e s i n the reduced a c t i o n s p a c e , t h a t i s , a k £ A^, a l l k. 
We a l s o show t h a t an op t ima l s o l u t i o n i s s t a b l e . Hence an op t ima l s o l u ­
t i o n i s t h e u n i q u e l y s t a b l e s o l u t i o n . 
In F i g u r e I I I - l we i l l u s t r a t e w i t h two-person games w i t h t h r e e 
a c t i o n s for each p l a y e r . These games have been d e s i g n e d t o h i g h l i g h t 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between o p t i m a l and s t a b l e s o l u t i o n . The p r e f e r e n c e 
r u l e p l a y s no r o l e h e r e . 
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Asuming simultaneous reduction, the optimal solution in game (i) is iden­tifed in one step wheras in game (i) four steps are neded to fuly reduce the action sets and identify the stable solution as optimal. In game (ii) a stable solution exists but no reduction of the action sets is possible. In our application the distinction betwen optimal and stable solu­tions is of fundamental importance. The main diference betwen the two is that an optimal solution follws from the model itself, wheras a merly stable solution wil be efcted by the decison-makers only under behavi­oral asumptions that go beyond the model specifation. 2.2. Decison-Making in Models A, B, and C The conceptual appartus developed for the analysi  of decision­making in games with pure strategies applies to Models A, B, and C, with minor modification, due mainly to the fact that our models are not charac­terized by a fixed and finite number of players as is the n-person game. Now, rather than n players we deal with a number of categories of potential customers, each category being defined as customers with the same (v,R,h). In al our decision models the complet  action set for a (v,R,h)-customer is a function of V only, say A(v,R,h) = A^. Let A = ij A^. The reduced action sets are derived by the inductive reasonig pro­ces  described in Section 2.1. Denote the unique reduced action sets by {A (v,R,h)i. Observe that A (v,R,h) is the same for al (v,R,h)-customers. In Section 3.2(c) we shal present an actual derivation of {A (v,R,h)} for for a special case of Model A, whic  exhibits a fair degre  of complexity. A similar aproach can be employed in other models. In case A (v,R,h) has a single elment we denote the action by a (v,R,h), and cal it the 
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opt imal a c t i o n f o r ( v , R , h ) - c u s t o m e r s . 
S u r e l y , a ( v , R , h ) - c u s t o m e r c h o o s e s h i s a c t i o n from the s e t A ( v , R , h ) 
( u n l e s s A ( v , R , h ) = 0 ) . On the o t h e r hand, the model s p e c i f i c a t i o n does 
not permit f u r t h e r r e d u c t i o n . 
At t h i s p o i n t we pause to d e f i n e a p o l i c y and i t s b a l k i n g l i m i t : 
DEFINITION ( P o l i c y ) . A p o l i c y i s a s t a t i o n a r y , nonrandomized d e c i s i o n 
r u l e which i s used by a l l a r r i v i n g customers and s e l e c t s an a c t i o n depend­
ing o n l y on ( v , R , h ) . 
The words " a l l a r r i v i n g " imply t h e r e i s a b a l k i n g l i m i t v , 
- s + 1 < V q < N, such t h a t an a c t i o n i s s p e c i f i e d f o r a l l v - c u s t o m e r s w i th 
V < V + 1 , where f o r each V < v the p r e s c r i b e d a c t i o n f o r a t l e a s t some 
o = o 
(R,h) E i s to j o i n , and f o r V = V Q + 1 the p r e s c r i b e d a c t i o n , for a l l 
a r r i v a l s , i s not t o j o i n . 
By i t s d e f i n i t i o n , a p o l i c y need not s p e c i f y an a c t i o n f o r v > V Q + 1 , 
assuming , of c o u r s e , t h a t every customer f o l l o w s t h e p o l i c y . A comple te 
p o l i c y i s a p o l i c y t h a t s p e c i f i e s an a c t i o n f o r a l l ( v , R , h ) , t h a t i s , for 
a l l V < N + 1 , a l l (R,h) £ fi. 
I f a l l a r r i v i n g cus tomers have an op t ima l a c t i o n , then t h e d e c i s i o n 
problem i s a u t o m a t i c a l l y s o l v e d . Aga in , t h e r e e x i s t s a b a l k i n g l i m i t V Q 
and a ( v , R , h ) w i l l be the a c t i o n taken by a customer w i t h V < V Q + 1 . The 
f u n c t i o n a ( v , R , h ) d e f i n e s a p o l i c y for V < V Q + 1 , a l l ( R , h ) . We say t h i s 
p o l i c y i s o p t i m a l . 
In the s e q u e l we s h a l l be concerned m o s t l y w i t h complete p o l i c i e s . 
We t h e r e f o r e extend the concept of o p t i m a l i t y t o op t ima l p o l i c i e s tha t are 
made c o m p l e t e . 
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DEFINITION (Optimality). Let P:{(v,R,h)} -* A be a complete policy with 
balking limit v . We say P is optimal if P(v,R,h) = a (v,R,h) for 
V < V Q + 1, and P(v,R,h) e A (v,R,h) for V > V Q + 1. 
If an optimal policy does not exist there must be some arriving 
customers who do not have an optimal action under the model specification 
(the inference {A (v,R,h)} leaves too much uncertainty for determination 
of an optimal action). Still, each arrival has to make a choice. The 
decision will then be made on the basis of his assumptions of how other 
customers act. These behavioral assumptions should be in agreement with 
the inference that (v,R,h)-customers select an action from A (v,R,h). 
For stationary models like ours a strong case can be made (but we will not 
give the arguments) that all arriving customers accept identical behavioral 
assumptions and that these will take the form of a policy assumption. By 
that we mean the assumption that all other customers select an action as 
a function of (v,R,h). Denoting such a policy assumption by P^, we assume, 
for simplicity, that the domain of P is {(v,R,h)} = {(v,R,h): V < N+l, 
(R,h) e fi}, that is that P^ is complete, and, usually, P^(v,R,h) e A (v,R,h). 
Given P^, each (v,R,h)-customer can, in principle, calculate the 
(steady-state) payoff, E(V), for each alternative action he may contemplate. 
Consequently, each arrival can determine an optimal or at least an 
e-optimal action. If a (v,R,h)-customer has an optimal action given P^, 
we denote it by P2(v,R,h). 
We are now ready to state our definition of a stable policy in the 
case of a complete policy assumption. 
DEFINITION (Stability). Let P.. : {(v,R,h)}-*A be a complete policy 
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(assumption) w i t h b a l k i n g l i m i t V q . We say P^ i s a s t a b l e p o l i c y i f ( i ) 
each ( v , R , h ) - c u s t o m e r w i t h V < V q + 1 has an opt ima l a c t i o n P 2 ( v , R , h ) , 
g i v e n P 1 , and ( i i ) P 2(v ,R,h) = P 1(v ,R,h) for a l l v < V q + 1 . 
Normally P^(v,R,h) e A (v ,R,h), but we do a l l o w "unreasonable" 
b e h a v i o r a l as sumpt ions in our d e f i n i t i o n of s t a b i l i t y . 
The j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the t e r m i n o l o g y " s t a b l e " i s c l e a r . By d e f i ­
n i t i o n , i f a p o l i c y (assumption) i s s t a b l e , a l l a r r i v i n g customers w i l l 
a c t i n accordance w i t h the assumed b e h a v i o r . Thus t h e r e i s no r e a s o n f o r 
f u t u r e customers t o change the p o l i c y assumpt ion . Hence the o b s e r v a b l e 
customer a c t i o n s d e f i n e a p o l i c y t h a t does not change over t ime . In s h o r t , 
a s t a b l e p o l i c y i s s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g . 
Two complete p o l i c y a s s u m p t i o n s , P | and P^, are s a i d t o be e q u i v a ­
l e n t i f the r e s p e c t i v e r e s p o n s e p o l i c i e s , P^ and P^, are w e l l d e f i n e d , 
have i d e n t i c a l b a l k i n g l i m i t V , and P'(v,R,h) = P"(v,R,h) for v < V + 1 . 
O A Z = O 
The s t a t e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the d i s t i n c t i o n b e ­
tween opt imal and s t a b l e s o l u t i o n s t o games, a p p l i e s e q u a l l y to op t ima l 
and s t a b l e p o l i c i e s i n Models A, B and C. 
3 . Model A: A Gl/M/s /N System w i t h Balking Option 
In Model A the s e r v i c e order i s imposed as a r u l e , but each customer 
may j o i n or ba lk as he d e s i r e s . When assuming FIFO r u l e we s h a l l c o n s i d e r 
the G/M/s/N s y s t e m , a s l i g h t l y g e n e r a l i z e d sys tem, w i t h g e n e r a l a r r i v a l s 
r a t h e r than g e n e r a l independent a r r i v a l s . S e c t i o n 3 . 1 d e a l s w i th FIFO 
r u l e . S e c t i o n 3 . 2 d e a l s w i t h LIFO r u l e . 
3 . 1 . A G/M/s/N/FIFO (N .< °°) System w i t h Balk ing Option 
Of a l l c a s e s the G/M/s/N/FIFO system w i t h b a l k i n g o p t i o n i s by far 
4 4 
the easiest one to analyze, almost to the point of being trivial. Still, 
for future reference, and completeness, we state our findings in Theorem 1 
that covers both N < 0 0 and N = 00. 
THEOREM 1. In a G/M/s/N/FIFO (N < °°) system with balking option there 
exists an optimal policy as follows: if -s+1 < v < 0, join if 
R-b(v,R,h)-h/y > 0, and otherwise balk; if 1 < V < N, join if R-b(v,R,h) 
-h[s+v]/(sy) > 0, and otherwise balk; if V = N+l, always balk. 
PROOF. We omit the proof since it is straightforward. The policy clearly 
is optimal as every customer can make an optimal choice regardless of 
what others do. • 
It is worth noting the arrival rate is irrelevant for the decision­
making. In the special case that all customers are alike, i.e. (R,h) is 
a constant, the resulting policy is of the control limit type, that is, 
there is a number v so that all customers will join as long as v < V , 
o = o 
and balk if V = V + 1. 
It is convenient to introduce special notation for Model A, taking 
advantage of the fact that it recognizes only two actions. A complete 
policy will be given as A: {(v,R,h)} -> {0,l}, where A(v,R,h) = 0 if balk­
ing is specified, and A(v,R,h) = 1 if joining is specified. Also let 
A(v,R,h)=0 
We shall refer to f^  as the joining fraction, and to g^ as the balking 
fraction for v-customers. 
o 
f v = / dU(R,h) 
A(v,R,h)=l 
(1) 
g = / dU(R,h) (2) 
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T h e s a m e , o r s i m i l a r , n o t a t i o n w i l l b e e m p l o y e d f o r a p o l i c y a s s u m p ­
t i o n , a n d f o r t h e r e s p o n s e p o l i c y t h a t g i v e s t h e o p t i m a l a c t i o n u n d e r t h e 
p o l i c y a s s u m p t i o n . 
A n a l o g o u s l y , l e t A ( v , R , h ) d e s c r i b e t h e r e d u c e d a c t i o n s e t s a s 
it ~k % 
f o l l o w s : A ( v , R , h ) = 0 i f b a l k i n g i s o p t i m a l ( A ( v , R , h ) = { 0 } ) ; A ( v , R , h ) = 1 
•k & 
i f j o i n i n g i s o p t i m a l ( A ( v , R , h ) = { l } ) ; A ( v , R , h ) = 1 / 2 i f t h e c u s t o m e r h a s 
i n s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n , a s g i v e n b y m o d e l , f o r a c e r t a i n d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
t h a t e i t h e r c h o i c e i s o p t i m a l ( A ( v , R , h ) = { 0 , 1 } ) . 
3 . 2 . A G I / M / s / N / L I F O ( N ^ ° ° ) S y s t e m w i t h B a l k i n g O p t i o n 
B e c a u s e o f s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e c a s e s N < 0 0 a n d 
N = oo t h e y w i l l b e t r e a t e d s e p a r a t e l y , i n S e c t i o n s 3 . 2 ( b ) a n d 3 . 2 ( c ) , 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . F i r s t , h o w e v e r , w e s h a l l p r e s e n t s o m e r e s u l t s t h a t w i l l b e 
n e e d e d f o r c a l c u l a t i o n o f t h e e x p e c t e d q u e u e i n g t i m e u n d e r L I F O r u l e . 
3 . 2 ( a ) . T h e M e a n B u s y P e r i o d i n a n M / M / l / k S y s t e m w i t h B a l k i n g . 
R e c a l l t h a t a b u s y p e r i o d i s t h e l e n g t h o f t i m e f r o m t h e e p o c h a t w h i c h 
a n a r r i v a l j o i n s a n e m p t y s y s t e m u n t i l t h e s y s t e m a g a i n b e c o m e s e m p t y . 
W e a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e m e a n o f t h e b u s y p e r i o d i n a n M / M / l / k s y s t e m i n 
w h i c h a v - c u s t o m e r j o i n s w i t h p r o b a b i l i t y f . O b v i o u s l y , t h e m e a n b u s y 
p e r i o d d o e s n o t d e p e n d u p o n f ^ . L e m m a 1 g i v e s u s t h e m e a n b u s y p e r i o d 
f o r a l l k > 0 a n d a l l f ' s . 
L E M M A 1 . L e t B ( f , . . . , f , ) d e n o t e t h e m e a n b u s y p e r i o d i n a n M / M / l / k 
K. J. K. 
s y s t e m w i t h a r r i v a l r a t e A , j o i n i n g p r o b a b i l i t y i n s t a t e V e q u a l t o 
f ( v = l , . . . , k ) , a n d s e r v i c e r a t e y . T h e n v 
B k ( f r . . . , f k ) -
i - 1 j = l 
( 0 < k < ° ° ) . 
( k = 0 ) , 
( 3 ) 
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In p a r t i c u l a r , B = B ( 1 , . . . , 1 ) = - £ ( X / y ) 1 f o r 0 < k < °°. 
k k M
 i=0 " " 
PROOF. For k = 0 the r e s u l t i s o b v i o u s . Next c o n s i d e r 1 < k < 0 0 . (Note , 
w i t h s = 1 we have V = n . ) Let X ^ = f ^ X d e n o t e the r a t e of j o i n i n g g i v e n 
s t a t e i . t h e n , i s the mean i d l e p e r i o d . Let p^ be the s t e a d y - s t a t e 
p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e r e a r e 0 customers i n the sys t em. With depar ture r a t e 
- 1 2 y i n a l l nonzero s t a t e s i t i s known t h a t p^ = 1 + X ^ / y + X ^ X ^ / y + . . . + 
k+1 
. . Cons ider ing t h a t busy and i d l e p e r i o d s a l t e r n a t e i n a 
renewal p r o c e s s , i t i s e a s y t o s e e t h a t B ^ ( f ^ , . . . , f ^ ) / [ B ^ ( f ^ , . . . , f ^ ) 
+ XQ"'"] = 1 - P Q , or B^(f , . . . , f ^ ) = A ^" (PQ^-1) . I n s e r t i o n of the e x p r e s ­
s i o n for p."'" and u s e of X , = f . X y i e l d Equat ion 3 , f o r 0 < k < °°. In 
0 i l i = 
k 
p a r t i c u l a r , we have B = B ( 1 , . . . , 1 ) = ( 1 / y ) £ ( X / y ) 1 f or 0 < k < °°. The 
k k
 i=0 
l a s t e q u a t i o n i s known t o hold a l s o for k = °°, then u s u a l l y w r i t t e n B^ = 
( l / y ) ( l - X / y ) " 1 for X / y < 1 , and B^ = 0 0 f or X / y > 1 . S i m i l a r l y , 
Equation 3 w i l l hold f o r k = 0 0 . • 
As a c o r o l l a r y t o Lemma 1 we have : 
COROLLARY 1 . The mean queueing t ime of a j o i n i n g v -cus tomer ( v > l ) i n an 
M/M/s/N/LIFO sys tem i n which v - c u s t o m e r s j o i n w i t h p r o b a b i l i t y f i s 
l / ( s y ) (v=N) 
[ l / ( s y ) ] [ l + I ( n f )(X / ( s y ) ) 1 ] (l<v<N) 
i = l j = l 
In p a r t i c u l a r , i n a system w i t h forced j o i n i n g the mean queueing t ime 
N-V 
e q u a l s Q = [ l / ( s y ) ] £ ( X / ( s y ) ) 1 f o r 1 < V < N. 
V
 i = 0 
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PROOF. Observe, t h e queueing t ime of a v -customer (1<V<N) i s d i s t r i b u t e d 
as the busy per iod i n an M/M/l/N-V sys tem w i t h a r r i v a l r a t e A, j o i n i n g 
p r o b a b i l i t y ^ v + j i n a r r i v a l s t a t e j = 1 , . . . ,N-V, and s e r v i c e r a t e s u . An 
a p p l i c a t i o n of Lemma 1 then y i e l d s the c o r o l l a r y . (Note , Equation (4) i s 
v a l i d f o r N = °°.) ^ 
Q^( ) does no t depend on the s u b s c r i p t V which i s i n c l u d e d for 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o n l y . Q^( ) has N-v arguments . I f N-v = 0 we may w r i t e 
Q v ( « ) . A l s o , we d e f i n e = Q ( 1 , . . . , 1 ) and = Q N ( " ) . The n o t a t i o n 
Q v ( f v + l» f v + 2' *' * ' V ^ e u s e c * a l s o t o d e s i g n a t e the mean queueing 
t ime of a v -customer who j o i n s a GI/M/s/N/LIFO system i n which v -customers 
j o i n w i t h p r o b a b i l i t y f . This makes s e n s e b e c a u s e , a s one can e a s i l y 
v e r i f y , the queueing t ime of a j o i n i n g v-customer has the d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
t h e busy p e r i o d i n t h e Gl/M/l/N-V sys tem w i t h the same i n t e r a r r i v a l d i s ­
t r i b u t i o n f u n c t i o n G ( t ) , j o i n i n g p r o b a b i l i t y ^ v + j i R a r r i v a l s t a t e j , and 
s e r v i c e r a t e s u . However, we do no t have a formula from which Q (f 
' v v+1 
f > • • • > f £ j ) can be c a l c u l a t e d i n the c a s e of a g e n e r a l i n t e r a r r i v a l 
d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
3 . 2 ( b ) . The Case N < 0 0 . We now turn our a t t e n t i o n t o a system 
w i t h i n t e r a r r i v a l t ime d i s t r i b u t i o n G ( t ) , e x p o n e n t i a l s e r v i c e time d i s t r i ­
b u t i o n , f i n i t e w a i t i n g room, LIFO r u l e and b a l k i n g o p t i o n . Again, an o p t i ­
mal p o l i c y a lways e x i s t s a s s t a t e d i n t h e n e x t theorem. The opt imal 
d e c i s i o n for each (v ,R,h)-customer such t h a t 1 < V < N, i s a r r i v e d a t by 
backward i n d u c t i o n . 
THEOREM 2. In a GI/M/s/N/LIFO (N<°°) system w i t h b a l k i n g o p t i o n t h e r e 
e x i s t s an opt imal p o l i c y as f o l l o w s : i f - s + 1 < V < 0 , j o i n i f R-b(v,R,h) 
4 8 
— H / u > 0 , A N D O T H E R W I S E B A L K ; I F V - N + L , A L W A Y S B A L K ; I F 1 < V < N , J O I N 
I F R - B ( V , R , H ) - H [ L / Y + Q V ( F V + L , F V + 2 " " , F N ) 1 = ° [ A ( V ' R ' H ) = 1 ] ' A N D O T H E R " 
W I S E B A L K [ A ( V , R , H ) = 0 ] , W H E R E F I S G I V E N B Y E Q U A T I O N ( 1 ) A N D Q ^ ( F V + 1 ^ 
, F ) I S T H E E X P E C T E D Q U E U E I N G T I M E O F A J O I N I N G V - C U S T O M E R , G I V E N B Y 
N 
E Q U A T I O N ( 4 ) I N T H E M / M / S / N / L I F O C A S E . F O R V = 1 , . . . , N T H E D E C I S I O N 
F U N C T I O N A ( V , R , H ) I S D E R I V E D R E C U R S I V E L Y T H R O U G H T H E S T E P S : Q N ( # ) = 
L / ( S Y ) , A ( N , R , H ) F O R A L L ( R , H ) E fi, F N > Q ^ ^ ) . A ( N _ 1 » R » H ) F O R A 1 1 
( R , H ) E fi, F N _ 1 , . . . , Q 1 ( F 2 , F 3 , . . . , F N ) , A ( L , R , H ) F O R A L L ( R , H ) E fi, ( F ± ) . 
P R O O F . F O R - S + 1 < V < 0 A N D V = N + L T H E O P T I M A L A C T I O N I S O B V I O U S . C O N ­
S I D E R A N ( N , R , H ) - C U S T O M E R . U N D E R L I F O R U L E H I S E X P E C T E D N E T G A I N B Y 
J O I N I N G I S E ( V ) = R - B ( N , R , H ) - H [ L / Y + Q N ( # ) ] , W I T H Q N ( « ) = L / ( S Y ) . L E T ­
T I N G A ( N , R , H ) = 1 I F E ( V ) > 0 A N D A ( N , R , H ) = 0 I F E ( V ) < 0 , T H E ( N , R , H ) -
C U S T O M E R W I L L , O F C O U R S E , J O I N I F A ( N , R , H ) = 1 , A N D O T H E R W I S E B A L K . T H E 
J O I N I N G P R O B A B I L I T Y F O R N - C U S T O M E R S I S F ^ , G I V E N B Y ( 1 ) , A N D A L L C U S T O ­
M E R S W H O N E E D T O K N O W W I L L K N O W F ^ . N O W , K N O W I N G F ^ A N ( N - 1 , R , H ) - C U S T O M E R 
C A N D E T E R M I N E H I S E X P E C T E D N E T G A I N B Y J O I N I N G A S E ( V ) = R - B ( N - L , R , H ) 
- H [ L / Y + ^ N - 1 ^ N ^ W ^ E R E % - L ^ N ^ I S T T I E M E A N C L U E U E I N G T I M E O F A J O I N I N G 
( N - L ) - C U S T O M E R , A N D T H E N E A S I L Y D E C I D E W H E T H E R T O J O I N O R B A L K . T H E S E 
D E C I S I O N S A R E R E P R E S E N T E D B Y A ( N - L , R , H ) F O R A L L ( R , H ) e fi, A N D T H I S I N 
T U R N F O R M S T H E B A S I S F O R C A L C U L A T I O N O F F „ , . C O N T I N U I N G T H I S W A Y W E 
N - 1 
D E R I V E A ( N , R , H ) , A ( N - L , R , H ) , . . . , A ( L , R , H ) F O R A L L ( R , H ) E fi. T H E P O L I C Y 
A ( V , R , H ) , N O W D E F I N E D F O R E V E R Y C O N C E I V A B L E C U S T O M E R , I S A C O M P L E T E 
P O L I C Y , A N D B Y I T S D E R I V A T I O N I T I S C L E A R L Y O P T I M A L . • 
N O T E , I N T H E S P E C I A L C A S E T H A T A L L C U S T O M E R S A R E A L I K E , T H E R E S U L T ­
I N G P O L I C Y I S O F T H E C O N T R O L L I M I T T Y P E , J U S T A S I N T H E F I F O Q U E U E . 
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However, the LIFO queue w i t h a l l customers a l i k e e x h i b i t s some p a t h o l o g i c a l 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . As N -»• 0 0 the opt imal a c t i o n by a v -cus tomer does not 
n e c e s s a r i l y converge t o e i t h e r j o i n i n g or b a l k i n g . This r e s u l t , e a s i l y 
v e r i f i e d , s u g g e s t s t h a t the GI/M/s/°°/LIFO b a l k i n g model i s a s t r a n g e 
c r e a t u r e , a s indeed i t i s . 
3 . 2 ( c ) . The Case N = 0 0 . Perhaps one would e x p e c t t h e a n a l y s i s t o 
s i m p l i f y when go ing from f i n i t e t o i n f i n i t e w a i t i n g room, but the o p p o s i t e 
i s t r u e . Three q u e s t i o n s w i l l be d e a l t w i t h h e r e . F i r s t , we p r e s e n t a 
d e t a i l e d d e r i v a t i o n of t h e reduced a c t i o n s e t s and the corresponding j o i n ­
i n g and b a l k i n g f r a c t i o n s . Second, we show by example t h a t an opt imal 
p o l i c y need not e x i s t , and t h a t the number of s t a b l e p o l i c i e s may be 
g r e a t e r than one . Third , we g i v e n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s for 
t h e e x i s t e n c e of an o p t i m a l p o l i c y . 
As a l w a y s , for - s + 1 < v < 0 , each v - c u s t o m e r has an opt imal a c t i o n , 
and j o i n i n g f r a c t i o n s , f , and b a l k i n g f r a c t i o n s , g^ = l ~ f v » a r e e a s i l y 
o b t a i n e d by Equat ions (1) and ( 2 ) . Now c o n s i d e r the d e c i s i o n s by customers 
a r r i v i n g a t a busy s y s t e m . 
The reduced a c t i o n s e t s f o r v > 1 are d e r i v e d i n an i n d u c t i v e 
r e a s o n i n g p r o c e s s a s e x p l a i n e d i n S e c t i o n 2 . 2 . Assume s imul taneous r e d u c ­
t i o n . Let { A 1 ( v , R , h ) } d e n o t e the p a r t i a l l y reduced (complete i f i = l ) 
a c t i o n s e t s a t s t a g e i ( p r i o r t o r e d u c t i o n ) . Let A 1 ( v , R , h ) = 0 , 1 , 1 /2 
a c c o r d i n g a s A 1 ( v , R , h ) = { 0 } , { l } , { 0 , l } . Let f*, g* d e n o t e the c o r r e ­
sponding j o i n i n g and b a l k i n g f r a c t i o n s . As A"^(v ,R,h) = { 0 , l } , we have 
A 1 ( v , R , h ) = 1 /2 and = g^ = 0. Now c o n s i d e r the r e s u l t of the r e d u c t i o n 
2 2 
a t s t a g e 1 , namely {A ( v , R , h ) } o r , e q u i v a l e n t l y , {A ( v , R , h ) } . O b v i o u s l y , 
f o r V > 1 , 
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0 i f R-b(v ,R,h)-h[l/y + Q ( 0 , . . . ) ] < 0 , 
1 /2 o t h e r w i s e , 
where 0 ^ ( 0 , . . . ) = l / ( s y ) , ( 1 , 1 , 1 , . . . ) = l / ( s y - A ) i f A < sy and 
2 
Q ( 1 , 1 , 1 , . . . ) = 0 0 i f A > s y . A (v,R,h) = 0 means t h a t b a l k i n g i s the 
b e s t c h o i c e even under the most o p t i m i s t i c assumption t h a t no h i g h e r -
s t a t e customer w i l l j o i n ; c o n s e q u e n t l y the customer w i l l b a l k . 
2 
A (v,R,h) = 1 means t h a t j o i n i n g i s t h e b e s t c h o i c e even under the most 
p e s s i m i s t i c assumpt ion t h a t a l l h i g h e r - s t a t e cus tomers w i l l j o i n ; c o n -
2 
s e q u e n t l y the customer w i l l j o i n . A (v,R,h) = 1/2 means t h e customer 
d o e s n o t have s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n a t s t e p 1 t o de termine an opt imal 
d e c i s i o n . C l e a r l y , 
f^ = / dU(R,h ) , g^ = / dU(R,h) . 
/ftv,R,h)=l A^V,R,h)=0 
2 2 At s t a g e 2 each v-customer w i l l know f ,. and g , . f o r a l l j > 1 . 
&
 V+j & V + j J = 
2 
The sequence ( f ^ j ) . w i l l be h i s new most o p t i m i s t i c assumpt ion of j o i n i n g 
2 
p r o b a b i l i t i e s , and ( l - g ^ _ ) w i l l be h i s new most p e s s i m i s t i c assumpt ion . 
Hence, 
0 i f R-b(v ,R ,h ) -h [ l / y + Q v ( ( f ^ + j ) j ) ] < 0 , 
A 3(v ,R,h) = | 1 i f R-b(v ,R ,h ) -h [ l / y + Q v ( ( l - g ^ + j ) j ) ] > 0 , 
1 /2 o t h e r w i s e . 
Thus, a t s t a g e 2 , i f a customer has an op t ima l c h o i c e i t i s i n d i c a t e d by 





R - h [ l / y + [ l / ( s y ) ] I (A / C s y ) ) 1 ] > 0 , 
i = 0 
but 
2 
R - h [ l / y + [ l / ( s y ) ] I (A / C s y ) ) 1 ] < 0 . 
i=0 
In t h e p r e s e n t c a s e no op t ima l p o l i c y e x i s t s , s i n c e for v < 0 c l e a r l y 
A(v,R,h) = 1 , but f o r v > 1 no v -customer has an opt imal a c t i o n a t s t a g e 1 
or l a t e r . However, t h e r e are e x a c t l y t h r e e n o n e q u i v a l e n t s t a b l e p o l i c i e s , 
a l l w i t h A(v,R,h) = 1 for V < 0, but w i t h d i f f e r e n t (A(v , R , h ) ) v > 1 a s 
f o l l o w s : (a) ( 0 , 1 , 1 , . . . ) , (b) ( 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , . . . ) , ( c ) ( 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 1 , . . . ) . Here, 
i n d i c a t e a r b i t r a r y a c t i o n s . 
To s e e t h i s , n o t e t h a t under a complete p o l i c y a l l (v ,R,h)-
customers make t h e same d e c i s i o n . S i n c e (R,h) i s c o n s t a n t , then for a l l 
v - c u s t o m e r s , e i t h e r A(v,R,h) = 0 or A(v,R,h) = 1 . Now, c l e a r l y the p o l i c y 
( 1 , 1 , 1 , . . . ) i s no t s t a b l e , because a 1 -cus tomer , who assumed t h a t a l l 
the v a l u e of A (v ,R,h) . The c o r r e s p o n d i n g j o i n i n g and b a l k i n g f r a c t i o n s , 
3 3 
f^ and g^, are c a l c u l a t e d a s b e f o r e . A d e c i s i o n t o j o i n or ba lk c l e a r l y 
1 2 3 1 2 
w i l l no t change from one s t a g e t o the n e x t , so f < f < f and g < g < 
3 i g^. Cont inuing i n t h i s manner we o b t a i n i n c r e a s i n g sequences ( f ^ ) ^ a n ^ 
i * i * i (g ) . f o r each V > 1 . The l i m i t s f = l i m . f and g = l i m . g a lways &v I = v i v &v i &v J 
e x i s t . They are t h e j o i n i n g and b a l k i n g f r a c t i o n s , r e s p e c t i v e l y . The 
* i 
reduced a c t i o n s e t s a r e g i v e n by A (v,R,h) = lim^A (v ,R,h) , but may a l s o 
be determined v i a c a l c u l a t i o n of Q ( ( 1 - g , . ) . ) and Q ( ( f , . ) . ) , a s above . 
Hv V + j ' j Hv V+J j 
The a s s e r t i o n t h a t m u l t i p l e ( n o n e q u i v a l e n t ) s t a b l e p o l i c i e s may 
e x i s t w i l l be proved by an example. Consider an M/M/s/°°/LIFO system 
w i t h c o n s t a n t ( R , h ) , b(v,R,h) = 0 f o r a l l V , and parameters such t h a t 
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2-and 3-customers join, would, by the second inequality, be better off 
not joining. Thus stability requires that 1-, 2- or 3- customers balk. 
Considering the remaining possibilities it is readily verified that the 
three listed policies are the only stable policies. 
The next theorem gives conditions for the existence of an optimal 
policy. It also specifies the optimal action for each arrival. As the 
theorem is based upon (f^) a nd > t n e results may not be too useful. 
THEOREM 3. In a Gl/M/s/°°/LIF0 system with balking option, an optimal 
* A 
policy exists if and only if (i) g^ = 1 for some V > -s+1, or (ii) g^ < 1 
and f + g^ = 1 for all V > -s+1. In case (i) Theorem 2 applies. In 
case (ii) the policy is to join if either R-b(v,R,h)-h/lJ > 0 for -s+1 
< V < 0, or if R-b(v,R,h)-h[l/ri + Qv((f^.).)] > 0 for V > 1, and to balk 
otherwise. 
PROOF. First it will be shown the condition ((i) or (ii)) is necessary. 
Observe, the only two possibilities are: g^ = 1 for some v, and g^ < 1 
for all V . When g^ < 1 for all V , evidently we must have f + g^ = 1 for 
all V in order to ensure that all arriving customers have an optimal choice 
as required for optimality. Thus the condition is necessary. Next we show 
the condition is sufficient. In case (i) there is, in effect, a limit on 
the queue length, and we can apply Theorem 2 which tells us that an opti­
mal policy exists. In case (ii) the existence of an optimal policy fol­
lows directly from the definition of optimality. Hence the condition ((i) 
or (ii)) is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an optimal 
policy. In case (i) Theorem 2 gives the policy; N can be any V such that 
g = 1. In case (ii) the policy follows from the discussion preceding the 
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theorem. • 
More d i r e c t l y a p p l i c a b l e i s Theorem 4 which f o l l o w s . I t c o v e r s 
the s p e c i a l c a s e where a l l cus tomers are a l i k e . That i s , (R,h) = c o n ­
s t a n t . To emphasize t h i s f a c t we w r i t e b(v) i n s t e a d of b(v ,R,h) . 
THEOREM 4 . In a GI/M/s/°°/LIFO sys tem w i t h a b a l k i n g o p t i o n and c o n s t a n t 
( R , h ) , an op t ima l p o l i c y e x i s t s i f and o n l y i f 
( i ) A < su, R-b(v)-h/u > 0 for v < 0, and 
R - b(v ) - h [ l / y + l / (su-A)] > 0 f or v > 1; or 
( i i ) R-b(v)-h/u < 0 for some v < 0 or 
R - b(v ) - h [ l / y + l / ( s y ) ] < 0 f o r some v > 1; or 
( i i i ) A < s y , R-b(v)-h/y > 0 f or v < 0, and 
R - b(v ) - h [ l / y + l / ( s y ) ] > 0 f o r v > 1, and t h e r e 
e x i s t N > 0 and k, 1 < k < °°, such t h a t 
R - b ( N + l + j ) - h [ l / y + l / (sy-A)] > 0 ( j = l , k ) and 
R - b ( N + l ) - h [ l / y + QN+1(1,1,...,1,0,...)] < 0 (w i th 
k l e a d i n g l ' s i n Q^+-^) • 
In c a s e ( i ) t h e p o l i c y i s t h a t e v e r y a r r i v a l j o i n s . In c a s e s ( i i ) and 
( i i i ) t h e r e i s a b a l k i n g l i m i t V Q < °°. 
PROOF. Suppress t h e c o n s t a n t (R,h) and l e t A 1(v)=A 1(v ,R,h), 
A (v)=A (v ,R,h) . In the p r e s e n t c a s e an op t ima l p o l i c y , by i t s d e f i n i -
t i o n , w i l l e x i s t i f and o n l y i f (a) A (v) = 1 f or a l l V, or (b) A (V Q+ 1) 
0 f o r some V > - s , w i t h A (v) = 1 f o r a l l V < V . We must prove t h a t 
o= = o 
( i ) , ( i i ) or ( i i i ) i s n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t for (a) or ( b ) . This we 
do by showing t h a t ( i ) =* ( a ) , ( i i ) =» ( b ) , ( i i i ) =* ( b ) , and t h a t t h e 
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mutua l ly e x c l u s i v e c o n d i t i o n s ( i ) , ( i i ) and ( i i i ) exhaust the ways (a) 
or (b) may o c c u r . 
At s t a g e 1 we have A^ "(v) = 1 /2 f o r a l l V. Assume s imul taneous 
r e d u c t i o n and c o n s i d e r a l l c o u r s e s the r e d u c t i o n p r o c e s s may t a k e . There 
2 2 
a r e four d i s t i n c t p o s s i b i l i t i e s : ( i ) A (v) = 1 f o r a l l v ; ( i i ) A (v) = 0 
2 2 2 for some V; ( i i i ) A (v) 4 0 f o r a l l v, A (v) = 1 for some V, A (v) = 1 /2 
3 2 2 f o r some V, and A (v) = 0 f o r some V; ( i v ) A (v) 4 0 for a l l V, A (v) = 1 
2 3 for some V, A (v) = 1 /2 f o r some V, and A (v) 4 0 for a l l V. From the 
p r e v i o u s d i s c u s s i o n of the r e d u c t i o n p r o c e s s for the GI/M/s/°°/LIFO sys tem 
i t f o l l o w s that the above p o s s i b i l i t i e s ( i ) , ( i i ) , ( i i i ) a r e , r e s p e c t i v e l y , 
e q u i v a l e n t t o c o n d i t i o n s ( i ) , ( i i ) , ( i i i ) of the theorem. 
C l e a r l y , i n c a s e ( i ) , A (v) = 1 f o r a l l V, so ( i ) => ( a ) . In c a s e 
2 
( i i ) , l e t N d e n o t e the s m a l l e s t V such t h a t A (v+1) = 0 . I f N < 0, s e t 
V = N. Then, o b v i o u s l y , A (v) = 1 for V < V , and A (v +1) = 0 . I f 
N > 0 we can , a s i n the proof of Theorem 2 , show t h a t t h e r e i s a V , 
= o 
0 < V < N, such t h a t A*(v) = 1 for V < V , and A*(v + 1) = 0. Thus, 
= o= o o 
( i i ) =* ( b ) . In c a s e ( i i i ) , an o p t i m a l p o l i c y has not been i d e n t i f i e d a t 
3 
s t a g e 1. However, a t s t a g e 2 , for some N > 0 , we f i n d A (N+l) = 0 , 
* 
imply ing a s b e f o r e t h e e x i s t e n c e of a v , 0 < V q < N, such t h a t A (v) = 1 
* 2 
for v < v , and A (^ Q+ 1) = 0 . ( N o t i c e , for the g i v e n (A ( v ) ) ^ we can 
have A 3 ( N + l ) = 0 o n l y i f A 2 ( N + l ) = 1 /2 and A 2 (N+2) = 1 . ) Hence, 
( i i i ) => ( b ) . On the o t h e r hand, c o n d i t i o n ( i v ) can never l ead t o (a) or 
2 3 * 
( b ) , s i n c e here A (v) = A (v) = A (v) f o r a l l V. This c o n c l u d e s our proof 
t h a t ( i ) , ( i i ) or ( i i i ) a r e n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t for the e x i s t e n c e 
of an op t ima l p o l i c y . D 
5 5 
4 . Mode l B: An M/M/s /N S y s t e m w i t h P r i o r i t y O p t i o n 
I n Mode l B a l l a r r i v i n g c u s t o m e r s m u s t j o i n t h e s y s t e m u n l e s s a l l 
w a i t i n g p o s i t i o n s a r e o c c u p i e d , b u t e a c h c u s t o m e r who j o i n s t h e q u e u e may 
make a n y p r i o r i t y payment b e B. The a n a l y s i s w i l l c o n c e r n o n l y t h e 
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g b y c u s t o m e r s who j o i n t h e q u e u e (v= l , . . . , N ) s i n c e o t h e r 
c u s t o m e r s (v<0 and v=N+l) h a v e n o c h o i c e t o m a k e . N o t e , t h e o b j e c t i v e 
f u n c t i o n o f a c u s t o m e r j o i n i n g t h e q u e u e (v= l , . . . , N ) i s E(V) = R - b - h E ( W ) . 
S i n c e t h e c u s t o m e r w i l l r e c e i v e h i s r e w a r d R w h a t e v e r c h o i c e b £ B h e 
m a k e s , c l e a r l y , m a x i m i z a t i o n o f t h e e x p e c t e d n e t g a i n i s e q u i v a l e n t t o 
m i n i m i z a t i o n o f t h e e x p e c t e d c o s t b+hE(W). Our m a i n p u r p o s e i n s t u d y i n g 
Mode l B i s t o s t a t e n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r a c u s t o m e r 
p o l i c y t o b e s t a b l e and i n d u c e e i t h e r FIFO o r LIFO s e r v i c e o r d e r . 
H e r e , a s i n t h e a n a l y s i s o f M o d e l C we s h a l l d e a l w i t h s t a b i l i t y 
b a s e d u p o n o u r d o m i n a n c e c o n c e p t , s t r o n g d o m i n a n c e . As b e f o r e , we s p e a k 
o f s t r o n g s t a b i l i t y , b u t o m i t t h e word s t r o n g when n o m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
s h o u l d o c c u r . B e s i d e s we s h a l l p r e s e n t r e s u l t s c o n c e r n i n g s t a b i l i t y o f 
two d i f f e r e n t k i n d s , n a m e l y weak s t a b i l i t y (> ) and s t r i c t s t a b i l i t y ( > ) , 
d i s c u s s e d a t l e n g t h i n S e c t i o n 6 . Our t h e o r e m s c o v e r a l l t h r e e k i n d s o f 
s t a b i l i t y . P r o o f s a r e g i v e n o n l y f o r t h e c a s e o f s t r o n g s t a b i l i t y . For 
c o n v e n i e n c e , we d e f i n e a s t r o n g l y ( w e a k l y , s t r i c t l y ) F I F O - s t a b l e p o l i c y 
a s a p o l i c y w h i c h i s s t r o n g l y ( w e a k l y , s t r i c t l y ) s t a b l e and i n d u c e s FIFO 
s e r v i c e o r d e r . A s t r o n g l y ( w e a k l y , s t r i c t l y ) L I F O - s t a b l e p o l i c y i s s i m i ­
l a r l y d e f i n e d . 
The c a s e N = 1 i s t r i v i a l , s o h e n c e f o r t h N > 1 w i l l b e a s s u m e d . 
S e c t i o n 4 . 1 d e a l s w i t h t h e FIFO c a s e , and S e c t i o n 4 . 2 d e a l s w i t h t h e 
LIFO c a s e . 
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4 . 1 . FIFO-Stable P o l i c i e s i n an M/M/s/N (N < °°) 
System w i t h P r i o r i t y Option 
Because of s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s between the c a s e s N < 0 0 and 
N = oo they w i l l be d i s c u s s e d s e p a r a t e l y , i n S e c t i o n 4 . 1 ( b ) and 4 . 1 ( c ) , 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . We b e g i n , i n S e c t i o n 4 . 1 ( a ) , by p r e s e n t i n g a lemma which 
l i n k s FIFO s e r v i c e order t o p r i o r i t y payments. 
4 . 1 ( a ) . P r i o r i t y Payment P o l i c i e s That Induce FIFO S e r v i c e Order. 
LEMMA 2. Consider a G/M/s/N (N<°°) sys tem w i t h forced j o i n i n g and p r i o r i t y 
payments , where f o r V = 1 , . . . , N the ( v , R , h ) - c u s t o m e r pays b ( v , R , h ) . Then 
FIFO s e r v i c e order i s induced i f and o n l y i f b ( l , R , h ) > b Q f or a l l 
(R,h) e fi, and b ( v , R , h ) = b f o r a l l (R,h) e fi, v = 2 , . . . , N , where b i s 
o o 
a c o n s t a n t . 
PROOF. O b v i o u s l y , the c o n d i t i o n i s s u f f i c i e n t t o induce FIFO s e r v i c e 
o r d e r . I t w i l l be shown the c o n d i t i o n i s a l s o n e c e s s a r y . We s t a r t w i t h 
the o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t i t i s n e c e s s a r y t h a t b ( v , R ' , h f ) > b ( v + l , r " , h " ) for 
V = 1 , . . . , N - 1 and a l l ( R f , h ' ) , ( R " , h " ) e fi. We w i l l show t h a t f o r v > 2 
a l l v - c u s t o m e r s must pay the same, say b ( v ) . Suppose, on the c o n t r a r y , 
t h a t f o r some v=v*>2, b (v* ,R ,h ) i s not t h e same for a l l (R,h) e fi. Ima­
g i n e t h a t s+v* cus tomers a r r i v e a t an i n i t i a l l y empty s y s t e m , the l a s t 
customer paying b ( v * , R ' , h ' ) , and then a s e r v i c e comple t ion o c c u r s , f o l ­
lowed by t h e a r r i v a l of another V*-customer paying b ( v * , R " , h " ) . Now we 
may have b ( v * , R ' , h ' ) < b ( v * , R " , h " ) . This would v i o l a t e t h e FIFO s e r v i c e 
order requ irement . Hence, b ( v , R , h ) = b(v) f o r V = 2 , . . . , N i s n e c e s s a r y . 
Thus we can assume b ( l , R , h ) > b ( 2 ) > . . . > b ( N ) . Next , we w i l l show 
b(v) = b f o r v = 2 , . . . , N i s n e c e s s a r y . Suppose, on t h e c o n t r a r y , t h a t 
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f o r some V = V * > 2 , b(v*) > b(v*+l ) . I m a g i n e t h a t s + V * + l c u s t o m e r s 
a r r i v e a t an i n i t i a l l y empty s y s t e m , t h e l a s t c u s t o m e r p a y i n g b(v*+l ) , and 
t h e n two s e r v i c e c o m p l e t i o n s t a k e p l a c e , f o l l o w e d by t h e a r r i v a l o f a n o t h e r 
c u s t o m e r , who i s a v* - c u s t o m e r p a y i n g b(v*). S i n c e t h e l a s t a r r i v a l p a y s 
b(v*), w h i c h i s m o r e t h a n t h e b(v*+l) p a i d by t h e p r e c e d i n g a r r i v a l , s t i l l 
i n t h e q u e u e , t h e FIFO s e r v i c e o r d e r r e q u i r e m e n t i s n o t m e t . We c o n c l u d e 
b ( l , R , h ) > b ( 2 ) = . . . = b ( N ) . H e n c e , t h e c o n d i t i o n i s a l s o n e c e s s a r y a s 
c l a i m e d . • 
4 . 1 ( b ) . The C a s e N < °°. 
THEOREM 5 . I n a n M / M / s / N (2<N<°°) s y s t e m w i t h f o r c e d j o i n i n g and p r i o r i t y 
o p t i o n , t h e p o l i c y o f p a y i n g b = b ( v , R , h ) £ B i n a r r i v a l s t a t e s V = 1 , . . . , N 
i s F I F O - s t a b l e i f and o n l y i f 
( i ) b(v ,R,h) = b £ B ( v = l , . . . , N ) , and 
° -
 N _ 1
 A ' 
( i i ) i f b > i n f b , t h e n b , < N b E i n f b + i n f h [ l / ( s y ) ] V ( — ) 1 , and 
o ' o ( = ) su ' 
1=1 
( i i i ) i f b Q < s u p b , t h e n b Q ^ i n f { b : b £ B , b > b Q } - sup h [ 1 / ( s y ) ] ( N - l ) . 
I n ( i i ) we h a v e < o n l y i n c a s e o f s t r i c t o r s t r o n g FIFO s t a b i l i t y and o n l y 
i f i n f b £ B and i n f h £ H. I n ( i i i ) we h a v e < o n l y i n c a s e o f s t r i c t 
F I F O - s t a b i l i t y and o n l y i f i n f { b : b £ B , b > b Q } £ B and s u p h £ H. A F I F O -
s t a b l e p o l i c y n e e d n o t e x i s t f o r a n y A / ( s y ) . I f A / ( s y ) < 1 , and a FIFO-
s t a b l e p o l i c y e x i s t s , t h e n i t i s u n i q u e , g i v e n b y b(v ,R,h) = b Q , w i t h 
b Q £ B b e i n g t h e g r e a t e s t v a l u e s a t i s f y i n g ( i i ) . I f A / ( s y ) > 1 , a FIFO-
s t a b l e p o l i c y i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y u n i q u e . 
PROOF. We s h a l l p r o v e t h e t h e o r e m o n l y f o r t h e c a s e o f s t r o n g FIFO-
s t a b i l i t y , o m i t t i n g t h e d e s c r i p t o r " s t r o n g " t h r o u g h o u t . P r o o f s f o r t h e 
c a s e s o f weak and s t r i c t F I F O - s t a b i l i t y a r e n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l t o t h e o n e 
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GIVEN HERE. WE BEGIN BY SHOWING CONDITIONS (I), (II), (III) ARE NECES­
SARY FOR FIFO-STABILITY. FIRST, BY LEMMA 2, FIFO SERVICE ORDER REQUIRES 
B(v,R,H) = B Q e B FOR v = 2, . . . ,N , ALL (R,H) e fi AND B(L,R,H) > B Q FOR 
ALL (R,H) £ fi. FURTHER, STABILITY REQUIRES B(L,R,H) = B Q , SINCE A 1-
CUSTOMER CAN ONLY LOSE BY PAYING MORE. HENCE, (I) IS NECESSARY. 
SECOND, STABILITY REQUIRES THAT IF A CUSTOMER SHOULD MAKE A PAY­
MENT WHICH IS LOWER THAN THE POLICY PAYMENT B Q (ASSUMES B Q> INF B ) , THEN 
HIS EXPECTED COST MUST EXCEED THE COST ASSOCIATED WITH B Q . THE EXPECTED 
COST FOR A (V,R,H)-CUSTOMER WHO PAYS B Q LIKE EVERYONE ELSE IS B Q + 
H[L/Y + V/(SY)]. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF HE PAYS B < B WHILE OTHERS PAY 
N-1 °K 
B , HIS EXPECTED COST WILL BE B + H[L/Y + £ [L/(SY)] I (^/(SY)) 1]. TO 
° K=N - V I=0 
SEE THIS, OBSERVE THAT IN THE LATTER CASE OUR CUSTOMER WILL BE THE LAST 
ONE SERVED, AND HIS EXPECTED QUEUEING TIME THEREFORE IS THE SUM OF V SIM-
K 
PIE BUSY PERIODS WITH MEANS [L/(SY)] £ (X/(SY)) FOR K = N -V,...,N-1, 
I=0 
RESPECTIVELY, AS ONE CAN SEE BY SERVING ALL OTHER CUSTOMERS LIFO-WISE 
(WHICH HAS NO EFFECT UPON OUR CUSTOMER'S QUEUEING TIME DISTRIBUTION) AND 
APPLYING THE FORMULA FOR IN COROLLARY 1, REPLACING N BY N-1. IT FOL­
LOWS THAT STABILITY AGAINST LOWER PAYMENT REQUIRES 
N-1 K 
B + H[L/Y + V/(SY)] < B + H[L/Y + £ [L/(SY)] £ (X/(SY)) 1] ( 6 ) 
K=N - V I=0 
ALL B<B , BEB, 
O 
ALL HEH, V=L,...,N. 
REWRITING ( 6 ) WE OBTAIN 
N-1 K . ALL B<B , B£B, 
B < B + H[ I [L/(SY)]( I (X/(SY)) 1-L)], ° (7) 




][ (A / ( s y ) ) - 1 i s 0 f o r k = 0 and p o s i t i v e f o r k > 1 , s o t h e d o u b l e sum 
i = 0 
o f ( 7 ) i s p o s i t i v e and a t t a i n s i t s minimum f o r V = 1 . We c o n c l u d e t h a t 
s t a b i l i t y a g a i n s t l o w e r p a y m e n t r e q u i r e s b < i n f b + i n f h [ l / ( s y ) ] 
N - l . ° 
•( I (A / C s y ) ) 1 - ! ) , i f i n f b e B and i n f h e H, and b < i n f b + . . . 
i = 0 ° 
o t h e r w i s e . H e n c e , ( i i ) i s n e c e s s a r y . 
T h i r d , s t a b i l i t y r e q u i r e s t h a t i f a c u s t o m e r s h o u l d make a payment 
w h i c h i s h i g h e r t h a n t h e p o l i c y payment b Q ( a s s u m e s b Q < sup b ) , t h e n h i s 
e x p e c t e d c o s t m u s t e x c e e d o r e q u a l t h e c o s t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h b Q . The e x ­
p e c t e d c o s t f o r a ( v , R , h ) - c u s t o m e r p a y i n g b > b i s b + h [ l / y + l / ( s y ) ] , 
o 
s i n c e a n y p a y m e n t h i g h e r t h a n b^ w i l l g u a r a n t e e a c u s t o m e r h e w i l l b e 
s e r v e d n e x t , i f a l l o t h e r s p a y b Q . I t f o l l o w s t h a t s t a b i l i t y a g a i n s t 
h i g h e r p a y m e n t r e q u i r e s 
a l l b>b , b e B , 
b + h [ l / y + v / ( s y ) ] < b + h [ l / u + l / ( s y ) ] ° ( 8 ) 
a l l heH, v = l , . . . , N 
R e w r i t i n g ( 8 ) we o b t a i n 
b Q < b - h [ l / ( s u ) ] ( v - l ) ° ( 9 ) 
a l l b>b , b e B , 
o 
a l l heH, v = l , . . . , N 
The c o n c l u s i o n , t h a t ( i i i ) i s n e c e s s a r y , f o l l o w s e a s i l y . 
C o n d i t i o n s ( i ) , ( i i ) , ( i i i ) a r e a l s o s u f f i c i e n t . O b v i o u s l y ( i ) 
e f f e c t s t h e d e s i r e d s e r v i c e o r d e r . A l s o , f o r f i x e d p r i o r i t y payment b Q , 
( i i ) => ( 6 ) , ( i i i ) => ( 8 ) , and ( 6 ) and ( 8 ) t o g e t h e r g u a r a n t e e s t a b i l i t y 
a g a i n s t a l l p a y m e n t s o t h e r t h a n b Q , s o c o n d i t i o n s ( i ) , ( i i ) , and ( i i i ) 
a r e i n d e e d s u f f i c i e n t f o r F I F O - s t a b i l i t y . 
O b s e r v e , ( i i ) p l a c e s an u p p e r l i m i t b o n b Q , w h i l e ( i i i ) p l a c e s a 
l o w e r l i m i t o n t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n b Q and t h e n e x t h i g h e r payment i n B, 
6 0 
T h u s , w h a t e v e r t h e v a l u e s o f A / ( s y ) and N > 1 , i f t h e e l e m e n t s o f B a r e 
c l o s e e n o u g h , n o F I F O - s t a b l e p o l i c y c a n e x i s t e x c e p t p o s s i b l y b Q = s u p b . 
ft 
Now s u p p o s e A/ ( s y ) < 1 . Assume b £ B s a t i s f i e s ( i i ) . Then a b < b r r
 o o o 
w i t h b Q £ B a l s o s a t i s f i e s ( i i ) , b u t i t c a n n o t s a t i s f y ( i i i ) s i n c e 
ft ft 
i n f { b : b £ B , b>b } - b < b - i n f b 
o o = o 
N - 1 
< i n f h [ l / ( s y ) ] I ( A / ^ s y ) ) 1 [ b y ( i i ) ] 
i = l 
N - 1 
< s u p h [ l / ( s y ) ] I ( A A s y ) ) 1 
i = l 
< s u p h [ l / ( s y ) ] ( N - 1 ) [ s u p h > 0 , N>1] 
i s i n v i o l a t i o n o f c o n d i t i o n ( i i i ) . We c o n c l u d e t h a t b ( v , R , h ) = b Q c a n 
b e a F I F O - s t a b l e p o l i c y o n l y i f b Q i s t h e maximum o f t h o s e e l e m e n t s o f 
B t h a t s a t i s f y ( i i ) , i n c l u d i n g a n i n f b e B. 
F i n a l l y , i t i s n o t d i f f i c u l t t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t , i f A / ( s y ) > 1 , 
t h e n more t h a n o n e F I F O - s t a b l e p o l i c y may e x i s t . For a c o u n t e r e x a m p l e 
w i t h A / ( s y ) > 1 , l e t 0 < i n f h < s u p h < 0 0 , s e l e c t s , y and N>1 s o t h a t 
s u p h [ l / ( s y ) ] ( N - 1 ) = 1 / 2 , and l e t B - { 1 , 2 , . . . , 1 0 } . I n a d d i t i o n , c h o o s e 
A s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e s o t h a t A / ( s y ) > 1 and b > sup b = 1 0 . Then i t c a n 
b e e a s i l y v e r i f i e d t h a t a n y b Q £ B s a t i s f i e s ( i ) , ( i i ) , and ( i i i ) . For 
a c o u n t e r e x a m p l e w i t h A / ( s y ) = 1 , l e t i n f h = s u p h = h Q > 0 , i n f b £ B , 
b £ B, B = { i n f b , b } . Then i t c a n b e e a s i l y v e r i f i e d t h a t b o t h b = 
J
 o 
i n f b and b = b s a t i s f y ( i ) , ( i i ) , and ( i i i ) . 
o 
4 . 1 ( c ) . The C a s e N = °°. 
THEOREM 6 . I n a n M / M / s / 0 0 s y s t e m w i t h f o r c e d j o i n i n g and p r i o r i t y o p t i o n 
t h e p o l i c y o f p a y i n g b = b ( v , R , h ) £ B i n a r r i v a l s t a t e s V = 1 , 2 , . . . i s 
6 1 
F I F O - s t a b l e i f and o n l y i f 
( i ) b(v,R,h) = s u p b £ B (v=l,2,...), and 
( i i ) A/(sy) > 1 , o r , A/(sy) < 1 and s u p b - i n f b / < N i n f h* — i-r- m 
- ( = ; s y s y - A 
I n ( i i ) we h a v e < i n t h e l a s t i n e q u a l i t y o n l y i n c a s e o f s t r i c t o r s t r o n g 
F I F O - S t a b i l i t y and o n l y i f i n f b £ B and i n f h £ H. 
PROOF. As b e f o r e we s h a l l p r o v e t h e t h e o r e m o n l y f o r t h e c a s e o f s t r o n g 
F I F O - s t a b i l i t y , and we s u p p r e s s t h e word " s t r o n g . " We b e g i n b y s h o w i n g 
t h a t c o n d i t i o n s ( i ) , ( i i ) , a r e n e c e s s a r y f o r F I F O - s t a b i l i t y . F i r s t , by 
Lemma 2 and t h e s t a b i l i t y r e q u i r e m e n t we d e d u c e b(v,R,h) = b Q £ B. R e p l a c ­
i n g ( 6 ) a s t h e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r s t a b i l i t y a g a i n s t l o w e r payment we h a v e 
0 0
 . a l l b<b , b £ B , 
b Q + h [ l / y + v / ( s u ) ] < b + h [ l / y + (v/(sy)) £ (A/(sy))1] ° ( 6 ' ) 
i = 0 a l l h£H, v=l,2,... 
w h i l e ( 8 ) c o n t i n u e s t o b e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r s t a b i l i t y a g a i n s t h i g h e r 
p a y m e n t . Now h o w e v e r , n o b Q < s u p b c a n s a t i s f y ( 8 ) f o r a l l V , s o we mus t 
h a v e s u p b £ B and b Q = s u p b . H e n c e ( i ) i s n e c e s s a r y . S i n c e n o b > 
sup b e x i s t s , ( i ) i n e f f e c t e l i m i n a t e s ( 8 ) , and we a r e l e f t w i t h ( 6 1 ) 
w h i c h , u s i n g b Q = s u p b , c a n b e w r i t t e n a s 
0 0
 a l l b < s u p b , b £ B , 
s u p b < b + h ( v / ( s u ) ) ( I (A/(sy))-l) ( 7 ' ) 
i = 0 a l l h£H, v=l,2,... 
I t i s e a s i l y shown t h a t ( 7 ! ) => ( i i ) . H e n c e , ( i ) and ( i i ) a r e n e c e s s a r y . 
N e x t we show ( i ) and ( i i ) a r e s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s . C l e a r l y , ( i ) 
i m p l i e s FIFO s e r v i c e o r d e r . I n a d d i t i o n ( i ) => ( 8 ) ( f o r b Q = sup b ) . A l s o , 
( i i ) => ( 7 1 ) => ( 6 ' ) ( f o r b Q = s u p b ) . Now, t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f ( 6 ' ) and 
( 8 ) f o r b Q = s u p b g u a r a n t e e s s t a b i l i t y o f t h e p o l i c y b(v,R,h) = s u p b . 
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H e n c e , ( i ) and ( i i ) e n s u r e F I F O - s t a b i l i t y . Our p r o o f i s c o m p l e t e . N o t e 
t h a t h e r e , i f a F I F O - s t a b l e p o l i c y e x i s t s , t h e n i t i s u n i q u e . • 
4 . 2 . L I F O - S t a b l e P o l i c i e s i n a n M / M / s / N (N<°°) S y s t e m w i t h P r i o r i t y O p t i o n 
A g a i n t h e r e a r e s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e c a s e s N < 0 0 and 
N = 0 0 and we c h o o s e t o d i s c u s s t h e two c a s e s s e p a r a t e l y , i n S e c t i o n 4 . 2 ( c ) 
and 4 . 2 ( d ) , r e s p e c t i v e l y . F i r s t , h o w e v e r , we p r e s e n t a lemma, i n S e c t i o n 
4 . 2 ( a ) , t h a t l i n k s LIFO s e r v i c e o r d e r t o p r i o r i t y p a y m e n t s . A l s o , i n 
S e c t i o n 4 . 2 ( b ) , we c a l c u l a t e c e r t a i n e x p e c t e d q u e u e i n g t i m e s n e e d e d i n 
t e s t i n g a p o l i c y f o r s t a b i l i t y . The f i n a l S e c t i o n 4 . 2 ( e ) d e a l s w i t h t h e 
d e s i g n o f t h e p r i o r i t y payment s e t B. 
4 . 2 ( a ) . P r i o r i t y Payment P o l i c i e s That I n d u c e LIFO S e r v i c e O r d e r . 
LEMMA 3 . C o n s i d e r a G / M / s / N (N<°°) s y s t e m w i t h f o r c e d j o i n i n g and p r i o r i t y 
p a y m e n t s , w h e r e f o r V = 1 , . . . , N t h e ( v , R , h ) - c u s t o m e r p a y s b ( v , R , h ) . Then 
LIFO s e r v i c e o r d e r i s i n d u c e d i f and o n l y i f b ( v , R ' , h f ) < b ( v + l , R " , h " ) f o r 
a l l ( R \ h ' ) e fi, a l l ( R " , h " ) e fi, v = 1 , . . . , N - 1 . 
PROOF. O b v i o u s . • 
4 . 2 ( b ) . Some E x p e c t e d Q u e u e i n g T i m e s . C o n s i d e r a n M/M/s /N (N<°°) 
s y s t e m w i t h f o r c e d j o i n i n g and p r i o r i t y o p t i o n . I n t h i s s u b s e c t i o n i t w i l l 
b e a s s u m e d t h a t B = { b . } . . when N i s f i n i t e and B = { b . } . . , when N = 0 0 , 
J 1 < J < N j J > 1 
w h e r e ( b j ) i s a s t r i c t l y i n c r e a s i n g s e q u e n c e o f n o n n e g a t i v e n u m b e r s . We 
s h a l l c o n s i d e r t h e p o l i c y o f p a y i n g b = b^ i n s t a t e v > 1 . O b s e r v e t h a t , 
by Lemma 3 , t h e g i v e n p o l i c y w i l l r e s u l t i n LIFO s e r v i c e o r d e r . I n o r d e r 
t o t e s t t h i s p o l i c y f o r s t a b i l i t y we n e e d t o know t h e e x p e c t e d q u e u e i n g 
t i m e f o r e a c h a r r i v a l s t a t e v > 1 , f o r a n y c h o i c e o f p r i o r i t y payment f rom 
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t h e s e t { b . } , on t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t a l l o t h e r c u s t o m e r s make t h e p o l i c y 
3 
p a y m e n t . 
D e f i n e (1<V<N, 1<6<N) a s t h e e x p e c t e d q u e u e i n g t i m e o f a V-
c u s t o m e r who d e c i d e s t o p a y b ^ , l i k e a r e g u l a r 6 - c u s t o m e r , r a t h e r t h a n b ^ , 
g i v e n t h a t a l l o t h e r s m a k e t h e p o l i c y p a y m e n t when j o i n i n g t h e q u e u e . By 
N-V 
C o r o l l a r y 1, q = Q = [l/(su)] £ (A/Csu))1 f o r 1 < V < N. I n o t h e r 
i=0 
c a s e s t h e e x p e c t e d q u e u e i n g t i m e i s g i v e n b y o n e o f t h e f o l l o w i n g 
e x p r e s s i o n s : 
V V N-j 
q = I Q = [ l / ( s u ) ] I I (A/Csu))1 (1<6<V<N), (10) 
V
° j=6 J j=6 i=0 
N-6 
q v 6 = l/(su) + ^(A/CA+su)) 6 -^ Q 6 + j - l (11) 
N-6 N-6-j+l 
= l / ( s u ) + [ l / ( s u ) ] I {(A/(A+su))° ^ J ( ^ / ( s y ) ) 1 } 
j = l i=0 
( l<v<6<N - l ) , 
q v N = l / ( s u ) (1<V<N). (12) 
F i r s t , l e t 1 < 6 < V < N . I n t h i s c a s e o u r v - c u s t o m e r , C ^ , i s p a y ­
i n g l e s s t h a n t h e p o l i c y p a y m e n t . C o n s e q u e n t l y V-6 c u s t o m e r s i n t h e q u e u e 
w h e n C^ a r r i v e s w i l l h a v e h i g h e r p r i o r i t y t h a n C ^ . C a l l t h e s e c u s t o m e r s 
C ^ , C ^ , . . . , C ^ ^ ^ , a r r a n 8 e ( l b y i n c r e a s i n g p r i o r i t y . C ^ ' s q u e u e i n g t i m e i s 
t h e sum o f v-6+1 b u s y p e r i o d s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h C^ $+!''''* ^2' ^1' i n t f t a t 
o r d e r . L e t C^ g e n e r a t e b u s y p e r i o d n o . j . T h e n t h e f i r s t b u s y p e r i o d , n o . 
V-6+1, i s t h e t i m e f r o m C ' s a r r i v a l u n t i l C
 r , . . g o e s i n t o s e r v i c e , a n d 
1 v-6+1 & 
f o r 1 < j < v-6 b u s y p e r i o d n o . j i s t h e t i m e f r o m C^ b e c o m e s t h e h i g h e s t 
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priority customer (by C^+^'s removal from the queue) until goes into 
service. The mean of each busy period is given by Corollary 1. (We have 
been careful to take into account C^'s presence in the queue.) Equation (10) 
is simply the result of the summation of the v-6+1 mean busy periods. Note 
(10) is valid also for 6 = v. 
Next, let 1 < v < 6 < N-1. Observe, we allow 6 = v . In this case 
C^'s payment gives him a higher priority than any customer in the queue 
at his arrival, but it is not high enough to guarantee that he will be 
served first. We may conceive of C^fs queueing time as being composed of 
two time intervals. Let 1^, denote these intervals as well as their 
respective length. 1^ is the time from C^Ts arrival until the next service 
completion, and 1^ is the remainder of C^'s queueing time, if any. Clearly, 
E(I^) = l/(sy). If at the end of 1^ C^ is still the customer with the 
highest priority, then he will enter service immediately, and 0. 
Otherwise C^ must wait until all higher priority customers as well as him­
self are cleared from the queue. It is seen that, if not equal to zero, 
I^  is the sum of busy periods of the kind just encountered. If 6-v or less 
customers arrive during 1^, clearly 0. If more than 6-v customers 
should arrive during 1^, denote by C^, C^,..., C^+i t* i e ^ joining customers 
who obtain higher priority than C^, where 1 < k < N-6. At the end of 1^ 
a service completion occurs and C^+i will go into service, leaving behind 
in the queue C^, C^t...y C^ besides lower priority customers. Now, at the 
start of I^  a C^  (l<j<N-6) will be present in the queue if and only if at 
least 6-v+j customers arrive during 1^. The probability thereof is 
(A/(A+sy))^ . Also, the mean busy period associated with C., if present, 
N-6 3 
is Q(5+j_1« Hence E(I2) = £ (A/(A+sy)) J Q^+^._1 Equation (11) results 
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by adding E ( I 1 ) and E ( I 2 ) . 
F i n a l l y , l e t 1 < v < N, 6 = N. In t h i s c a s e buys the h i g h e s t 
p r i o r i t y and s u r e l y w i l l be served f i r s t . Hence h i s mean queueing t ime 
i s l / ( s u ) . 
4 . 2 ( c ) . The Case N < °°. The n e x t theorem g i v e s n e c e s s a r y and 
s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s t h a t a p r i o r i t y payment p o l i c y b = b ( v , R , h ) £ B i s 
L I F O - s t a b l e . N o t i c e , i f a LIFO-s tab le p o l i c y e x i s t s , then i t i s un ique . 
THEOREM 7. In an M/M/s/N (2<N<°°) sys tem w i t h forced j o i n i n g and p r i o r i t y 
o p t i o n t h e p o l i c y of pay ing b = b ( v , R , h ) £ B i n a r r i v a l s t a t e s V = 1 , . . . , N 
i s LIFO-s tab le i f and o n l y i f 
( i ) B c o n t a i n s N s m a l l e s t v a l u e s b^< b^ < . . . < b^, and 
( i i ) b ( v , R , h ) = b , ( v = l , . . . , N ) , and 
In ( i i i ) we have < i n t h e f i r s t i n e q u a l i t y o n l y i n c a s e of s t r i c t LIFO-
s t a b i l i t y and o n l y i f sup h £ H; and we have < i n the second i n e q u a l i t y 
o n l y i n c a s e of s t r i c t or s t r o n g L I F O - s t a b i l i t y and o n l y i f i n f h £ H. 
PROOF. We p r e s e n t a proof o n l y f o r t h e c a s e of s t r o n g L I F O - s t a b i l i t y . 
We b e g i n by showing t h a t ( i ) , ( i i ) , and ( i i i ) are n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s . 
F i r s t , we show ( i ) and ( i i ) a r e n e c e s s a r y . By Lemma 3 LIFO s e r v i c e order 
r e q u i r e s b ( v , R \ h ' ) < b ( v + 1 , R " , h " ) for a l l ( R ' , h ' ) £ fi, a l l (R",h") £ fi, 
V = 1 , . . . , N - 1 . We now apply t h e s t a b i l i t y requirement i n a l i m i t e d way. 
Let each customer assume a payment p o l i c y b = b ( v , R , h ) t h a t meets the above 
requirement for LIFO s e r v i c e o r d e r . A moment's r e f l e c t i o n w i l l show t h a t 
t h e p o l i c y cannot be s t a b l e u n l e s s B c o n t a i n s a s m a l l e s t v a l u e b^ and 
b ( l , R , h ) = b- f o r a l l (R,h) £ fi, because o t h e r w i s e some 1-customer can 
v 
( i i i ) sup h __A 1_ 
A+su su 
6 6 
e f f e c t a s a v i n g on p r i o r i t y payment w i t h o u t a f f e c t i n g the s e r v i c e order 
under t h e p o l i c y . Suppose t h e r e f o r e b ( l , R , h ) = for a l l (R,h) £ fi, and 
c o n s i d e r once more the q u e s t i o n of s t a b i l i t y . Now we f ind t h a t the p o l i c y 
cannot be s t a b l e u n l e s s B c o n t a i n s a 2nd s m a l l e s t v a l u e and b ( 2 , R , h ) = 
b^ f o r a l l (R,h) £ fi. By i n d u c t i o n we prove c o n d i t i o n s ( i ) and ( i i ) are 
n e c e s s a r y . 
Next we show ( i i i ) i s n e c e s s a r y , employing c o n d i t i o n s ( i ) and ( i i ) 
t h a t we have a l r e a d y shown are n e c e s s a r y . Thus c o n s i d e r a p o l i c y 
b = b ( v , R , h ) = b^ f o r V = 1 , . . . , N where b^9b^9...tb i s a s t r i c t l y i n ­
c r e a s i n g sequence of payments t h a t a r e t h e N s m a l l e s t i n the s e t B. 
S t a b i l i t y i m p l i e s s t a b i l i t y a g a i n s t lower payment. Thus i t i s 
r equ ired t h a t should a V - c u s t o m e r pay l e s s than b^, w h i l e assuming t h a t 
everyone e l s e makes the p o l i c y payment, then h i s e x p e c t e d c o s t w i l l exceed 
the c o s t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h b . That i s , s t a b i l i t y r e q u i r e s t h a t b + hq 
V v M v v 
< br. + hq
 r f o r 1 < 6 < V < N and a l l h £ H, w i t h q and q ~ a s d e f i n e d 6 Mv6 = = * M v v Mv6 
i n S e c t i o n 4 . 2 ( b ) . I t f o l l o w s t h a t 
b - b x , < N i n f h (q x - q ) (1<6<V<N), 
v 6 (=) v^6 H v v = = 
v 
w i t h < i f i n f h £ H, and < i f i n f h e H. By (10) q ^- q ^ = ][ Q. - Q v = 
v - 1 j=6 J 
£ Q. . Hence the above c o n d i t i o n f o r s t a b i l i t y a g a i n s t lower payment can 
3=6 J 
be s t a t e d a s 
v - 1 
V " b6 (=) i n f Q j (1<6<V<N). (13) 
We w i l l show (13) » ( 1 4 ) , where 
b ^ - b , < N i n f h Q ( 1 < V < N - 1 ) , (14) 
v+1 v (=) v = = 
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i.e. stability against lower payment is ensured by stability against the 
next lower payment. Obviously, (13) (14), as seen by letting 6 = v-1 
in (13). To prove (14) => (13) let 1 < 6 < V < N. Then 
V-1 
b - b = I (b. - b.) 
V 6 ^ g v j+1 2 
V-1 
.< inf h I Q [by (14)]. 
k
 > j=6 J 
This proves (13) <=> (14). Therefore (14) is the necessary condition sought. 
N - V 
Substitution of Q = [l/(su)] £ (A/(su)) into (14) yields the second set 
V
 i=0 
of inequalities of condition (iii). 
Similarly, stability against higher payment requires 
b 6 - b v > sup h (q^- q v 6 ) (1<V<6<N) . 
Observe, we need not consider payments higher than b^ since a customer 
making this payment will always be the first one served. By (11) and (12), 
6-1 6-1 . 
qvv" qv6 = E <q v 1- %i+1> = I (^/(A+sy))3" Q for 1 < v < 6 < N. Hence, 
j = V j = V J 
the above condition for stability against higher payment can be stated as 
6-1 , . 
b^ - b v > sup h I ^ Q (1<V<6<N). (15) 
j= V J 
We will show (15) <=> (16), where 
VI" bv iSUphxkl % (1<V<N-1) , (16) 
i.e. stability against higher payment is ensured by stability against the 
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n e x t h i g h e r payment. O b v i o u s l y , (15) => ( 1 6 ) , a s s e e n by l e t t i n g 6 = v+1 
i n ( 1 5 ) . To prove (16) => (15) l e t 1 < v < 6 < N. Then 
6 -1 
b b = I ( b . ^ - - b . ) 
<5 v j + 1 j 
5 - 1
 x 
> sup h I j£- Q [by ( 1 6 ) ] 
V / A . J - V + l ^ 
isup h J W V 
This p r o v e s (15) » ( 1 6 ) . There fore (16) i s the n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n 
N~V 
s o u g h t . S u b s t i t u t i o n of Q = [ l / ( s u ) l I (A/(s]i)) i n t o (16) y i e l d s the 
V
 i=0 
f i r s t s e t of i n e q u a l i t i e s of c o n d i t i o n ( i i i ) . This c o m p l e t e s the proof 
t h a t ( i i i ) i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t o n f o r L I F O - s t a b i l i t y . 
I t remains t o demonstrate t h a t ( i ) , ( i i ) , ( i i i ) t o g e t h e r are 
s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s for L I F O - s t a b i l i t y . By Lemma 3 , ( i ) and ( i i ) guar ­
a n t e e LIFO s e r v i c e o r d e r . ( i i i ) i s the same as (14) and ( 1 6 ) . Backtrack­
ing we f i n d (14) -» (13) => < b v ~ b f i < i n f h ( q ^ - q ^ ) ; 1 < 6 < V < N ) 
= > < b + hq < b r + hq r ; 1 < (S < V < N, h £ H ) . This e s t a b l i s h e s N
 v ^vv 6 M v 6 = = ' 
s t a b i l i t y a g a i n s t lower payment. S i m i l a r l y , we can prove s t a b i l i t y a g a i n s t 
h i g h e r payment. Thus, ( i ) , ( i i ) , ( i i i ) a r e n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t c o n ­
d i t i o n s for L I F O - s t a b i l i t y . • 
4 . 2 ( d ) . The Case N = °°. We s h a l l no t go i n t o a d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n 
of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , s i n c e i t would be l a r g e l y a r e p e t i t i o n of the 
d i s c u s s i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e c a s e N < 0 0 . The t r u t h of Theorem 8 should become 
apparent by an e x a m i n a t i o n of the e f f e c t of l e t t i n g N •> 0 0 i n Theorem 7. 
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Previously Balachandran [1972, p. 321] has dealt with the case N = 00 for 
s = 1, h = constant, and weak stability, obtaining conditions which are 
in agreement with ours, although stated differently. 
THEOREM 8. In an M/M/s/°° system with forced joining and priority option 
the policy of paying b = b(v,R,h) £ B in arrival states V = 1,2,... is 
LIFO-stable if and only if 
(0) A/(su) < 1, and 
(1) B is a countable set {b.}.._ where (b.) is a strictly increasing 
J J _ T J 
sequence, and 
(ii) b(v,R,h) = bv (v=l,2,...), and 
(iii) sup h -T-T ^-r b , - b ,<x inf h —^r- (v=l,2,. . . ) . 
K
 A+su su-A (=) v+1 v (=) su-A v * 9 ' 
In (iii) we have < in the first inequality only in case of strict LIFO-
stability and only if sup h £ H; and we have < in the second inequality 
only in case of strict or strong LIFO-stability and only if inf h £ H. 
4.2(e). Design of Priority Payment Set B. When the waiting loss 
factor h is the same for all customers it is always possible to construct 
a priority payment set B such that a corresponding LIFO-stable policy 
exists (in case N = °  we must have A/(su) < 1). B is constructed as 
follows: b1 > 0 is arbitrary, b^ is selected in any way such that the 
two inequalities of (iii) involving b^~ b^  are satisfied, and so on. If, 
on the other hand, h is a variable, it is not always possible to construct 
a set B with the desired properties. Corollary 2 states conditions for 
the existence of such a set. 
COROLLARY 2. In an M/M/s/N (2<N<°°) system with forced joining and priority 
7 0 
o p t i o n , w h e r e A / ( s y ) < 1 i f N = 0 0 , a p r i o r i t y payment s e t B t o w h i c h t h e r e 
c o r r e s p o n d s a L I F O - s t a b l e p o l i c y c a n b e c o n s t r u c t e d i f and o n l y i f s u p h 
[l+(s]j/A) ] i n f h , w h e r e we h a v e < o n l y i n c a s e o f s t r i c t o r s t r o n g 
L I F O - s t a b i l i t y and o n l y i f i n f h e H ( s t r i c t and s t r o n g ) o r s u p h e H 
( s t r i c t ) . 
PROOF. The c o r o l l a r y w i l l b e p r o v e d o n l y f o r t h e c a s e o f s t r o n g LIFO-
s t a b i l i t y . We f i r s t p r o v e i t f o r N < 0 0 . R e c a l l , Theorem 7 g i v e s n e c e s ­
s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r L I F O - s t a b i l i t y . F i r s t we p r o v e 
n e c e s s i t y . Assume a L I F O - s t a b l e p o l i c y e x i s t s . Then ( i ) , ( i i ) , ( i i i ) o f 
N - v 
Theorem 7 a r e s a t i s f i e d . L e t t i n g c = [ l / ( s y ) ] £ (A / ( s y ) ) , we h a v e : 
i = 0 
( i i i ) => s u p h [A/(A+sy)] c ^ ^ i n f h c ^ ( v = l , . . . , N - 1 ) =* sup h ^ 
[ l + ( s y/A)] i n f h . C o n v e r s e l y , c l e a r l y t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f t h e i n e q u a l i t y 
a l l o w s t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a p r i o r i t y p a y m e n t s e t B t h a t w i l l m e e t c o n d i ­
t i o n s ( i ) and ( i i i ) ; and ( i i ) c a n a l w a y s b e s a t i s f i e d . H e n c e , t h e c o n d i ­
t i o n s u p h [ l+ ( sy/A)] i n f h i s n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t . For N = °°, 
t h e c o r o l l a r y i s p r o v e d i n a s i m i l a r f a s h i o n u s i n g Theorem 8 . • 
5 . M o d e l C: An M/M/s /N S y s t e m w i t h B a l k i n g and P r i o r i t y O p t i o n 
I n M o d e l C e a c h c u s t o m e r i s f r e e t o j o i n o r b a l k , and i f h e j o i n s 
t h e q u e u e h e c a n c h o o s e a n y p r i o r i t y payment b e B. As m i g h t b e e x p e c t e d 
t h e a n a l y s i s o f Mode l C i s c o n s i d e r a b l y more c o m p l i c a t e d t h a n t h e a n a l y s i s 
o f Mode l A and M o d e l B, t h a t h a v e j u s t o n e o p t i o n . A c o m p l e t e a n a l y s i s 
w i l l n o t b e a t t e m p t e d . I n S e c t i o n 5 . 1 we i n d i c a t e how t o p e r f o r m a t e s t 
f o r F I F O - s t a b i l i t y o r L I F O - s t a b i l i t y o f a c o m p l e t e p o l i c y . I n S e c t i o n 5 . 2 
we g i v e n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r s t a b i l i t y o f o n e p a r t i c u ­
l a r , s i m p l e p o l i c y . As i n t h e p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n t h e a n a l y s i s f o c u s e s on 
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strongly stable policies, but we deal also with strict and weak stability. 
5.1. Test for FIFO- or LIFO-Stability of a Complete Policy 
Consider a complete policy with balking limit v . Let the choice 
on balking/joining be quantified by A(v,R,h), with value 0 in case of 
balking and 1 in case of joining. The policy specifies A(v,R,h) for all 
(R,h) e ft and v = -s+l,...,N as well as b(v,R,h) e B whenever A(v,R,h) = 1 
and V > 1. We want to know whether the given policy is FIFO-stable, or 
LIFO-stable, for the M/M/s/N (N < °°) system under study. Assume N > 1. 
We start with conditions that are easy to prove and easy to apply. 
FIFO-stability requires that, for V = l,...,v , A(v,R,h) = 1 => b(v,R,h) = 
b Q e B, where b Q is a constant. LIFO-stability requires, that, for v = 
l,...,v , A(v,R,h) = 1 => b(v,R,h) = b^ £ B, where (b^) is a strictly in­
creasing sequence and b^,..., b^ are the smallest elements in B. These 
o 
results correspond to those obtained for Model B, and are proved in the 
same way. 
Assuming that the above conditions are met, the next step of the 
test is to establish stability of the policy decision for every customer 
who might arrive under the policy, and who acts on the assumption that 
other customers follow the policy. There are, in general, three categories 
of customers to consider: (a) A(v,R,h) = 1 with V < V ; the customer 
= o 
must not gain by balking, or, for 1 < V < v , by making a priority payment 
other than b Q (FIFO case), or b^ (LIFO case), (b) A(v,R,h) = 0 with 
V < V q ; if V < 0 the customer must not gain by joining, and if 1 < V < V Q 
the customer must not gain by joining, whether he makes the "policy pay­
ment" b (FIFO case) or b (LIFO case), or makes any other payment, (c) 
o V 
A(v,R,h) = 0 with v = V + 1; the customer must not gain by joining, for 
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a n y payment b £ B; g e n e r a l l y , f o r t h i s c a t e g o r y o f c u s t o m e r s t h e s p e c i f i ­
c a t i o n o f a c t i o n s f o r V > V + 1 i s n e e d e d , u n l e s s V = N. 
o o 
I n p r i n c i p l e t h e s t a t e m e n t s made a b o v e c a n b e t r a n s l a t e d i n t o q u a n ­
t i t a t i v e n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r FIFO- o r L I F O - s t a b i l i t y . 
H o w e v e r , i n some c a s e s , t h i s i s no e a s y t a s k . 
5 . 2 . E x a m p l e : A C o m p l e t e P o l i c y w i t h A l l C u s t o m e r s J o i n i n g 
THEOREM 9 . C o n s i d e r an M/M/s /N (N<°°) s y s t e m w i t h b a l k i n g o p t i o n and 
p r i o r i t y o p t i o n , and a p o l i c y d e f i n e d by t h e d e c i s i o n s : A(v,R,h) = 1 f o r 
V = - s + l , . . . , N , and b = b(v ,R,h) £ B f o r V = 1 , . . . , N . Assume t h a t 
R - b(v,R,h)-h/lJ > 0 f o r V < 0 , and a l l ( R , h ) £ fi. 
The p o l i c y i s FIFO s t a b l e i f and o n l y i f N < °°, ( i ) , ( i i ) , ( i i i ) 
o f Theorem 5 a r e s a t i s f i e d , and f u r t h e r m o r e , ( i v ) R - b Q - h [ l / y + N / ( s y ) ] ^ > ^ 0 
f o r a l l ( R , h ) £ fi, w i t h > o n l y f o r s t r i c t s t a b i l i t y . 
The p o l i c y i s L I F O - s t a b l e i f and o n l y i f N < °°, ( i ) , ( i i ) , ( i i i ) 
o f Theorem 7 a r e s a t i s f i e d , and f u r t h e r m o r e , ( i v ) R-b - h [ l / y + [ l / ( s y ) ] . 
N-V . V 
I (A / ( s r j ) ) 1 ] (>.0 f o r a l l ( R , h ) e fi and a l l V = 1 , . . . , N , w i t h > o n l y f o r 
i = 0 C ' 
s t r i c t s t a b i l i t y . 
PROOF. As u s u a l we s h a l l g i v e a p r o o f o n l y f o r t h e c a s e o f s t r o n g 
s t a b i l i t y . N o t e , h o w e v e r , e x a c t l y t h e same w o r d s a p p l y t o ' t h e c a s e o f 
weak s t a b i l i t y . 
By a s s u m p t i o n we h a v e R-b(v,R,h)-h/lJ > 0 f o r V < 0 , s o s t a b i l i t y 
f o r a l l v - c u s t o m e r s w i t h V < 0 i s a u t o m a t i c a l l y e n s u r e d . Hence we s h a l l 
c o n c e r n o u r s e l v e s o n l y w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n o f s t a b i l i t y f o r v - c u s t o m e r s 
w i t h V > 1 . 
S u p p o s e N < °°. S t a b i l i t y m e a n s two t h i n g s , n a m e l y s t a b i l i t y 
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a g a i n s t p a y m e n t s o t h e r t h a n t h e p o l i c y p a y m e n t , a n d s t a b i l i t y a g a i n s t 
b a l k i n g . 
F I F O - s t a b i l i t y w i t h r e s p e c t t o o t h e r p a y m e n t s o b v i o u s l y i s a t t a i n e d 
i f a n d o n l y i f c o n d i t i o n s ( i ) , ( i i ) , ( i i i ) o f T h e o r e m 5 ( a s s u m i n g f o r c e d 
j o i n i n g ) a r e s a t i s f i e d . G i v e n ( i ) , s t a b i l i t y w i t h r e s p e c t t o b a l k i n g w i l l 
b e a c h i e v e d i f a n d o n l y i f R-bQ-h[l/iJ + v / ( s y ) ] > 0 f o r a l l ( R , h ) e fi, 
V = 1,..., N , t h a t i s i f R - b Q - h [ l / y + N / ( s y ) ] > 0 f o r a l l ( R , h ) e fi. T h u s 
t h e s t a t e d c o n d i t i o n s a r e n e c e s s a r y a n d s u f f i c i e n t f o r F I F O - s t a b i l i t y . 
L I F O - s t a b i l i t y w i t h r e s p e c t t o o t h e r p a y m e n t s o b v i o u s l y i s a t t a i n e d 
i f a n d o n l y i f c o n d i t i o n s ( i ) , ( i i ) , ( i i i ) o f T h e o r e m 7 ( a s s u m i n g f o r c e d 
j o i n i n g ) a r e s a t i s f i e d . G i v e n ( i ) a n d ( i i ) , s t a b i l i t y w i t h r e s p e c t t o 
N-V 
b a l k i n g w i l l b e a c h i e v e d i f a n d o n l y i f R - b - h [ l / y + [ l / ( s y ) ] £ (A / ( s y ) ) ] 
V
 i=0 
> 0 f o r a l l ( R , h ) e fi a n d V = 1 , . . . , N . T h u s t h e s t a t e d c o n d i t i o n s a r e 
n e c e s s a r y a n d s u f f i c i e n t f o r L I F O - s t a b i l i t y . 
F i n a l l y , N = 0 0 p r e c l u d e s F I F O - s t a b i l i t y a s w e l l a s L I F O - s t a b i l i t y . 
F I F O - s t a b i l i t y o f t h e p o l i c y c l e a r l y i s o u t o f t h e q u e s t i o n s i n c e , f o r 
e a c h h , t h e e x p e c t e d q u e u e i n g c o s t i n c r e a s e s w i t h o u t a b o u n d a s V i n c r e a s e s , 
i . e . l i m h v / ( s y ) = °°. F o r L I F O - s t a b i l i t y t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f T h e o r e m 8 m u s t 
b e s a t i s f i e d . H e n c e b , - b > c > 0 f o r a l l v , s o l i m b = °°. I n b o t h 
c a s e s , f o r e a c h ( R , h ) t h e r e i s a g r e a t e s t V a t w h i c h i t i s p r o f i t a b l e t o 
j o i n . T h u s , w i t h a b a l k i n g o p t i o n , a s t a b l e p o l i c y a s s p e c i f i e d c a n n o t 
e x i s t . • 
6 . A p p e n d i x 
H e r e we s h a l l d i s c u s s v a r i o u s n a t u r a l c h o i c e s o f d e f i n i t i o n s of 
s t a b i l i t y a n d r e d u c e d a c t i o n s e t s . R e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e s e t o f s t a b l e 
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points and the reduced action space are derived. Our main objective is 
to explore how the reduced action space depends upon reduction scheme 
and dominance criterion. Among other things it is shown that under our 
model's strong dominance criterion (with preference rule a factor) and 
corresponding strong stability concept, the reduced action space is 
unique, that is the same for all admissible reduction schemes, and all 
strongly stable points lie in the reduced action space. 
6.1. Definitions 
Let A^ (£=l,n) denote the complete action sets. We refer to an 
action combination (a.,...,a ) , anz A„ (£=l,n), as a point in the (com-
1 n >i Jc 
plete) action space 
S = X 4 = {(a 1,...,a n): a£e. A*, £=l,n}. 
Let denote the set of all possible combinations of actions by players 
other than k, that is 
sk = X 4 = ^ a i , , , , , a k - i ' a k + i , , , , ' V : aze A\' Z=1''''»k"1»k+1»• • • »n^' 
(k=l,n) 
Let ^ ( ^ j t ) be player k's payoff when he chooses a^e A^ while others 
choose t £ S^. Let there also be given a preference rule which, for each 
k, provides a strict, simple ordering of all actions in A^. Assume 
T^ cz S^, T ^ 0. Comparing a^e A^ and a£e A^, a ^ a£, we say: 
a k strictly dominates a£ on T f c if v k ( a k ; t ) > v k ^ a k ; t ^ f o r a 1 1 1 e Tk* 
a^ strongly dominates a^ on T k if v f c(a^;t) > v ^ a ^ t ) for all t £ T k 
and, in case v1^(a1';t) = v v(a^;t) for any t £ T^, then a^ is preferred 
to a, . 
k 
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a k n o r m a l l y d o m i n a t e s ajj on T f c i f v k ( a k ; t ) > v k ( a £ ; t ) f o r a l l t E T k 
and v k ( a k ; t ) > v k ( a k ; t ) f o r some t E T. 
We s h a l l b e c o n c e r n e d o n l y w i t h c a s e s w h e r e p l a y e r k c o n s i d e r s h i s p a y o f f s 
o n t h e s u b s p a c e X A^, w h e r e c A^. Thus = X A^, a^ E A ^ a^ 'E A ^ 
i#k 
F o r c o n v e n i e n c e we may t h e n s a y " a k d o m i n a t e s a k on { A ^ } . " 
O b v i o u s l y , s t r i c t d o m i n a n c e i m p l i e s s t r o n g d o m i n a n c e a s w e l l a s 
n o r m a l d o m i n a n c e . S t r o n g d o m i n a n c e i s o u r d o m i n a n c e c o n c e p t . Normal 
d o m i n a n c e i s t h e d o m i n a n c e c o n c e p t u s u a l l y e n c o u n t e r e d i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e . 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , s t r i c t and s t r o n g d o m i n a n c e a r e p r e s e r v e d u n d e r s e t 
1 2 2 
r e d u c t i o n . T h a t i s , i f T k cz T k c S k and a k d o m i n a t e s a k o n T^, t h e n a k 
d o m i n a t e s a k a l s o on T k . I n c o n t r a s t n o r m a l d o m i n a n c e i s n o t , i n g e n e r a l , 
p r e s e r v e d u n d e r s e t r e d u c t i o n . T h i s f a c t , e a s y t o v e r i f y , h a s some u n ­
d e s i r a b l e c o n s e q u e n c e s a s we s h a l l s e e . 
From t h e s e t h r e e d o m i n a n c e c o n c e p t s d e r i v e two s t a b i l i t y c o n c e p t s 
t o b e d e f i n e d n e x t . L e t a°E A^ ( £ = l , n ) , and l e t ( a ^ ) d e n o t e t h e v e c t o r 
( a ^ , . . . , a n ) . We s a y : 
( a ° ) i s s t r i c t l y s t a b l e i f v , ( a ° , . . . , a ° , . . . , a ° ) > v , ( a ° , . . . , a , , . . . , a ° ) 
JO " K J- K n ic x ic n 
f o r a l l aKE A ^ - a ° , a l l k . 
/ O N . ., O O 0 N ^ , 0 O N ( a n ) i s s t r o n g l y s t a b l e i f v , ( a , , . . . , a . , . . . , a ) > v . ( a . , . . . , a , , . . . , a ) , X, - E—^ — k 1 k n k 1 k n 
o r , v n ( a , , . . . , a . , . . . , a ) = v . ( a , , . . . , a , , . . . , a ) b u t a, i s p r e f e r r e d 
K . 1 K. n k l k n k 
t o a k > f o r a l l aKE A^ - a ° , a l l k . 
I t i s e a s y t o s e e t h a t s t r i c t s t a b i l i t y means t h a t f o r e a c h k 
( k = l , n ) a ° s t r i c t l y ( a n d n o r m a l l y ) d o m i n a t e s a l l aKE A ^ - a ° o n t ° = 
( a ^ , . . . , a k _ ^ , a k + ^ , . . . , a n ) . S i m i l a r l y , s t r o n g s t a b i l i t y means t h a t f o r 
e a c h k ( k = l , n ) a ° s t r o n g l y d o m i n a t e s a l l a k £ A^ - a ° o n t ° . I n v i e w o f 
t h e f i r s t r e l a t i o n s h i p s t r i c t s t a b i l i t y m i g h t a l s o b e t e r m e d n o r m a l 
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s t a b i l i t y . Th i s however would be a misnomer, s i n c e s t r i c t s t a b i l i t y , j u s t 
l i k e s t r o n g s t a b i l i t y , i s not w i d e l y u s e d . The commonly used s t a b i l i t y 
concept w i l l here be c a l l e d weak s t a b i l i t y . I t i s d e f i n e d as f o l l o w s : 
(a^) i s weakly s t a b l e i f v ^ C a ^ , . . . , a k , . . . , a n ) > v^Ca^, . . . , a ^ , . . . , a n ) 
for a l l a^E A^- a°_, a l l k. 
Thus weak s t a b i l i t y i s the c o n d i t i o n t h a t f o r no k i s a ° s t r i c t l y (or 
normal ly ) dominated by any a^e A^- a ° on t ° . 
I t i s c l e a r from t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s t h a t s t r i c t s t a b i l i t y i m p l i e s 
s t r o n g s t a b i l i t y which i n turn i m p l i e s weak s t a b i l i t y . Our a n a l y s i s em­
p l o y s t h e concept of s t r o n g s t a b i l i t y e x t e n s i v e l y . However, r e s u l t s 
i n v o l v i n g t h e o t h e r s t a b i l i t y c o n c e p t s are a l s o p r e s e n t e d . 
6 . 2 . S t a b l e P o i n t s and Reduced A c t i o n Space 
We b e g i n by i n t r o d u c i n g some new t e r m i n o l o g y and n o t a t i o n . F i r s t , 
a p o i n t ( a ° ) which s a t i s f i e s t h e c o n d i t i o n for s t a b i l i t y we c a l l a s t a b l e 
p o i n t , an e q u i l i b r i u m p o i n t , o r , i n the c o n t e x t of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , a 
s t a b l e s o l u t i o n . 
Let P ( l ) , P ( 2 ) , P(3) d e n o t e the s e t s of s t r i c t l y , s t r o n g l y and 
weakly s t a b l e p o i n t s , r e s p e c t i v e l y . From the d e f i n i t i o n s , P ( l ) c P(2) c 
P(3) c S. 
A l s o , we choose t o i n d i c a t e by an argument of the reduced a c t i o n 
s e t which dominance c r i t e r i o n has been employed. Let 1 , 2 , 3 i n d i c a t e the 
u s e of s t r i c t , s t r o n g and normal dominance, r e s p e c t i v e l y . Thus, A^(2) i s 
the reduced a c t i o n s e t of p l a y e r k, o b t a i n e d under s t r o n g dominance and 
an u n s p e c i f i e d a d m i s s i b l e r e d u c t i o n scheme; and X ^ (2) i s the reduced 
a c t i o n s p a c e . 
We a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n the r e l a t i o n between P ( l ) , P(2) or P(3) on one 
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h a n d , and X A £ ( l ) , X A £ < 2 ) » o r X A £ < 3 ) o n t n e ° t h e r . The r e s u l t s a r e : 
P ( l ) e X A * ( 3 ) ( 1 7 ) 
P ( l ) c P ( 2 ) e X A * ( 2 ) ( 1 8 ) 
P ( l ) c P ( 3 ) c P ( 3 ) e X A * ( l ) ( 1 9 ) 
P r o o f s a r e e a s y . C o n s i d e r f o r i n s t a n c e t h e c a s e o f t h e s t r o n g d o m i n a n c e 
c r i t e r i o n b e i n g u s e d i n t h e r e d u c t i o n p r o c e s s , r e s u l t i n g i n X A £ , ( 2 ) . S u p ­
p o s e ( a ° ) i s s t r o n g l y s t a b l e , i . e . ( a ° ) e P ( 2 ) . I t i s i m m e d i a t e l y c l e a r 
t h a t n o n e o f t h e a c t i o n s a ° , £ = l , . . . , n , may e v e r b e d e l e t e d u n d e r a s t r o n g 
d o m i n a n c e c r i t e r i o n , a t a n y s t a g e o f t h e r e d u c t i o n p r o c e s s . Hence ( a < ^) £ 
X A * ( 2 ) , s o t h a t P ( 2 ) c ) ( A * ( 2 ) . As P ( l ) e P ( 2 ) , t h i s p r o v e s ( 1 8 ) . P r o o f s 
o f ( 1 7 ) and ( 1 9 ) a r e s i m i l a r and w i l l t h e r e f o r e b e o m i t t e d . 
N o t e , ( 1 7 ) and ( 1 8 ) c a n n o t b e s t r e n g t h e n e d . I t i s n o t t r u e i n 
g e n e r a l t h a t P ( 2 ) o r P ( 3 ) a r e c o n t a i n e d i n a " w e a k l y " r e d u c e d a c t i o n s p a c e , 
n o r t h a t P ( 3 ) i s c o n t a i n e d i n a " s t r o n g l y " r e d u c e d a c t i o n s p a c e , s e e 
S e c t i o n 6 . 4 . 
* 
S u p p o s e t h e r e d u c e d a c t i o n s p a c e c o n s i s t s o f a s i n g l e p o i n t ( a ^ ) . 
I s i t s t a b l e ? A g a i n , t h e a n s w e r i s s i m p l e and p r o o f s a r e s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . 
* 
R e d u c t i o n b y s t r i c t d o m i n a n c e => ( a ^ ) i s s t r i c t l y s t a b l e . ( 2 0 ) 
* 
R e d u c t i o n b y s t r o n g d o m i n a n c e => ( a ^ ) i s s t r o n g l y s t a b l e . ( 2 1 ) 
* 
R e d u c t i o n b y n o r m a l d o m i n a n c e => ( a ^ ) i s w e a k l y s t a b l e . ( 2 2 ) 
C o n s i d e r h e r e t h e c a s e o f s t r o n g d o m i n a n c e c r i t e r i o n . By v i r t u e o f t h e 
* * * * 
f a c t t h a t ( a ^ ) i s t h e l a s t r e m a i n i n g p o i n t , e v i d e n t l y v ^ ^ a k » t ^ > v k ^ a k ' f c k ^ 
1 * * * * * * 
f o r a l l a ^ e A^- a^ , a l l k , w i t h t ^ = (a-^y • • • , a k - l , a k + l ' * * * , a n ^ * ^ u t t f t i s 
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c o n d i t i o n i s p r e c i s e l y t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f s t r i c t s t a b i l i t y . T h i s p r o v e s 
( 2 1 ) . O t h e r p r o o f s a r e s i m i l a r , and w i l l b e o m i t t e d . 
6 . 3 . E f f e c t s o f R e d u c t i o n Scheme and D o m i n a n c e C r i t e r i o n 
We now a d d r e s s t h e i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n o f how t h e r e d u c e d a c t i o n 
s e t s d e p e n d on r e d u c t i o n s c h e m e and on d o m i n a n c e c r i t e r i o n u s e d i n t h e 
r e d u c t i o n p r o c e s s . We s h a l l p r o v e t h a t t h e r e d u c e d a c t i o n s p a c e X A^ i s 
u n i q u e i n t h e c l a s s o f a l l a d m i s s i b l e r e d u c t i o n s c h e m e s u n d e r e i t h e r s t r i c t 
o r s t r o n g d o m i n a n c e . The p r o o f h a s b e e n g e n e r a l i z e d i n a way t h a t a l l o w s 
u s t o c o m p a r e t h e r e d u c e d a c t i o n s e t s f o r d i f f e r e n t r e d u c t i o n s c h e m e s and 
d o m i n a n c e c r i t e r i a . We t h e r e b y l e a r n t h a t t h e ( u n i q u e ) X A^ o b t a i n e d 
u n d e r s t r i c t d o m i n a n c e i s a t l e a s t a s l a r g e a s t h e ( u n i q u e ) X ^£ o b t a i n e d 
u n d e r s t r o n g d o m i n a n c e and a t l e a s t a s l a r g e a s a l l o f t h e X A^ o b t a i n e d 
u n d e r n o r m a l d o m i n a n c e i n t h e c l a s s o f a d m i s s i b l e r e d u c t i o n s c h e m e s . 
L e t t h e c o m p l e t e a c t i o n s e t s {A^} b e a r b i t r a r y . F u r t h e r , l e t 
A ^ ( d ) d e n o t e t h e p a r t i a l l y r e d u c e d a c t i o n s e t o f p l a y e r k a t s t a g e i 
( p r i o r t o d e l e t i o n o f d o m i n a t e d a c t i o n s ) u n d e r r e d u c t i o n s c h e m e j and 
d o m i n a n c e c r i t e r i o n d , and l e t Rj^ ( d ) d e n o t e t h e a c t i o n s d e l e t e d by p l a y e r 
k a t s t a g e i u n d e r s c h e m e j and d o m i n a n c e c r i t e r i o n d ( k = l , . . . , n ; i = l , 2 , 
j e J E t h e c l a s s o f a d m i s s i b l e r e d u c t i o n s c h e m e s ; d = 1 ( s t r i c t ) , 
2 ( s t r o n g ) , 3 ( n o r m a l ) ) . A ^ ( d ) E A^. The c o r r e s p o n d i n g r e d u c e d a c t i o n 
*i 
s e t s a r e s y m b o l i z e d by A, ( d ) . 








( 2 3 ) 
f o r k = l , . . . , n ; a l l a^e A^; j e J , j * 2 e J ; d = 1 , 2 , 3 . Thus we c l a i m t h a t 
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i f i s dominated a t any s t a g e of r e d u c t i o n p r o c e s s 1 , d e f i n e d by 
scheme j ^ and s t r i c t dominance, then i t must a l s o be dominated a t some 
s t a g e of r e d u c t i o n p r o c e s s 2 , d e f i n e d by scheme a n < ^ a n v ° f t n e t h r e e 
dominance c r i t e r i a , l a b e l e d d. 
F i r s t c o n s i d e r the s i m p l e s t c a s e , a^ E R ^ 3 l ( l ) . Then a^ E i s 
s t r i c t l y dominated on ( A J ^ I ) } = {A^} . In p r o c e s s 2 l e t p l a y e r K have 
h i s f i r s t turn a t s t a g e i ^ , 0 < i^ < L , where L i s the upper l i m i t a s s o ­
c i a t e d w i t h scheme j ^ * At s t a g e i^ t h e p a r t i a l l y reduced a c t i o n s e t s are 
{ A l l j 2 ( d ) } = {A^-^LT R 1 J 2 ( d ) } w i t h R ° J 2 ( d ) = 0. Now, by d e f i n i t i o n of i , 
. .
 1 i = 0 
A^1 3 2 ( d ) = A^, and s i n c e a s t r i c t dominance r e l a t i o n between two a c t i o n s 
i n Aj^  i s n o t a f f e c t e d by the r e d u c t i o n from { A J " ^ ( 1 ) } = {A^} t o { A j j ^ 2 ( d ) } 
we conc lude t h a t a^ i s s t r i c t l y dominated , hence d-dominated , on 
{ A l l J 2 ( d ) L I t f o l l o w s t h a t 
iKE R ^ j l ( l ) =* a k e R £ J 2 ( d ) c U R^ J 2 (d ) 
i = l 
( 2 4 ) 
Next c o n s i d e r t h e c a s e a k e R ^ 3 l ( l ) . Then a k e A ^ 1 ( 1 ) i s s t r i c t l y 
dominated on { A ^ 3 l ( l ) } . Assume a k i s s t r i c t l y dominated by a^e A ^ 3 l ( l ) . 
Suppose t h a t i n p r o c e s s 2 p l a y e r K's f i r s t turn f o l l o w i n g s t a g e L i s a t 
s t a g e i ^ , L < 1^ < 2 L . I f a t t h i s s t a g e a k has a l r e a d y been d e l e t e d , 
then t h e r e i s no problem, so assume a k e A ^ 2 ^ 2 ( d ) . By ( 2 4 ) a l l a c t i o n s 
d e l e t e d a t s t a g e 1 of p r o c e s s 1 w i l l be d e l e t e d no l a t e r than a t s t a g e L 
of p r o c e s s 2 and hence w i l l have been d e l e t e d a t s t a g e ±^ > L. That i s , 
1 i 2 ~ l • • 1 1 * ' • ? • 
A p - U R « j 2 ( d ) C A - R 7 j l ( l ) , or A l 2 j 2 ( d ) c A p j l ( l ) , for I = l , . . . , n . 
A /
 t t A / X/ X/ A / X/ 
1 = 1 . . 
Thus, a t s t a g e i^ of p r o c e s s 2 p l a y e r K f a c e s an a c t i o n space X ^ ^ 2 ^ ^ 
which i s s m a l l e r than or e q u a l t o the one c o n s i d e r e d a t s t a g e 2 of 
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process 1, namely X A 2 j l ( l ) . By assumption, a e^ A ^ 2 j 2 ( d ) . If also a^e 
A^ 2 j 2(d) then a^ must be strictly dominated by a^ on {A^ 2 j 2(d)} since 
strict dominance relations carry over to a smaller action space. If, how­
ever, a ^ A^ 2 j 2(d) then there is an a e^ A^ 2 j 2(d) which strictly dominates 
a^ on {A^2^2(d)} because otherwise a^ could not have been deleted. In 
either case, a^ is strictly dominated, hence d-dominated, on {A^ 2^ 2(d)}. 
Thus, always, a e RT J i(l) => a e U R X J Z(d). 
K K. K • -i k i=l
In exactly the same way one proves that a^e R k J i(l) => a^e U R^J*(2) 
i=l 
for r=3 and by induction the relation is shown to hold for all r = 1,2,.., 
Hence (23) is true. 
Now, (23) implies U R£ J i(1) C U R ^ 2 ( d ) . Since \ J 1 ( 1 ) = A^ -
oo -f • * • i=l
 ro . . i=l 
U R£ j l(l) and A ^ C d ) = A^ - U R^ j 2(d) we deduce 
i=l i=l 
A k J Z(d) c \ J ( 1 ) (k=l,...,n; all j^j^J; d=l,2,3). (25) 
Also, 
A k J Z(2) c A k J i(2) (k=l,...,n; all j ^ j ^ J ) - (26) 
Relation (26) is proved by the same method by which (25) was obtained 
The key factor in the proof of (26) is that strong dominance is preserved 
under reduction of the action space. 
The most important conclusions to be drawn from (25) and (26) are 
A£ J i(1) = \ j 2 ( l ) E A£(1) (k=l,...,n; all J 1,J 2eJ), (27) 
A£ J i(2) = \ j 2 ( 2 ) E A£(2) (k=l,...,n; all J1,J2eJ). (28) 
These equations state that when the dominance criterion used in reduction 
is either strict or strong dominance then the reduced action sets are 
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unique with respect to the class of all admissible reduction schemes. 
Briefly stated, (A^(l)} and (A^(2)} are unique. 
By using (27) and (28) in (25) we find 
A£(2) C A£(1) (k=l,...,n), (29) 
A k J(3) c; Aj^d) (k=l,...,n; all jeJ). (30) 
Neither A ^ (3) cz A^(2) nor A^(2) c A ^ (3) hold in general, see Section 6.4 
6.4. Counterexample 
For a simple example which, among other things, provides proof of 
r *T 
nonuniqueness of tA^} under normal dominance, consider a two-person game 
in which each player has two alternatives, actions 1 and 2. Let the pay­
offs be 
v 1(l,l) = -v2(l,l) = 1 v 1(l,2) = -v2(l,2) = 0 
v 1(2,l) = -v2(2,l) = 2 v 1(2,2) = -v2(2,2) = 2 
Consider two different preference rules. By rule 1 action 1 is 
preferred to action 2 (both players). By rule 2 action 2 is preferred 
to action 1. 
The stable points are easily located as follows: 
Strictly stable points: P(l) = 0. 
Strongly stable points under rule 1: P 1(2) = {(2,1)} • 
Strongly stable points under rule 2: P"(2) = {(2,2)}-
Weakly stable points: P(3) = {(2,1),(2,2)} . 
For the case of normal dominance we shall discuss three types of 
reduction schemes. Under scheme 1, described I, II, player 1 reduces 
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a t s t a g e 1 , p l a y e r 2 r e d u c e s a t s t a g e 2 . Under s c h e m e 2 , d e s c r i b e d I I , 
I , p l a y e r 2 r e d u c e s a t s t a g e 1 , p l a y e r 1 r e d u c e s a t s t a g e 2 . F i n a l l y , 
u n d e r s c h e m e 3 , d e s c r i b e d ( I , I I ) , . . . , b o t h p l a y e r s r e d u c e a t s t a g e 1 . 
I n T a b l e I I I - l we l i s t t h e r e d u c e d a c t i o n s e t s u n d e r v a r i o u s 
a s s u m p t i o n s a s t o p r e f e r e n c e r u l e , d o m i n a n c e c r i t e r i o n a p p l i e d i n t h e 
r e d u c t i o n p r o c e s s , and r e d u c t i o n s c h e m e . 
T a b l e I I I - l . Reduced A c t i o n S e t s f o r V a r i o u s R e d u c t i o n P r o c e s s e s 
d o m i n a n c e 
c o n c e p t 
p r e f e r e n c e 
r u l e 
r e d u c t i o n 





s t r i c t ( 1 ) - any j £ J { 2 } { 1 , 2 } 
s t r o n g ( 2 ) 
r u l e 1 a n y j £ J { 2 } { 1 } 
r u l e 2 a n y j £ J ( 2 } { 2 } 
n o r m a l ( 3 ) 
s c h e m e 1 ( 2 } { 1 , 2 } 
s c h e m e 2 ( 2 } { 2 } 
s c h e m e 3 ( 2 } { 2 } 
F i r s t , c o m p a r e r e d u c e d a c t i o n s e t s . The t a b l e s h o w s t h a t , i n g e n e -
r a l , ( A ^ ( 3 ) } i s n o t u n i q u e . I t a l s o s h o w s t h a t , i n g e n e r a l , n e i t h e r 
A £ ( 2 ) cz A ^ ( 3 ) n o r A ^ ( 3 ) cz A ^ ( 2 ) h o l d s t r u e . T h i s c a n b e a s c r i b e d t o t h e 
f a c t t h a t s t r o n g dominance , d o e s n o t , i n g e n e r a l , i m p l y n o r m a l d o m i n a n c e , 
n o r d o e s n o r m a l d o m i n a n c e i m p l y s t r o n g d o m i n a n c e . 
S e c o n d r e l a t e s t a b l e p o i n t s and a c t i o n s e t s . Our e x a m p l e d i s p r o v e s 
t h e s t a t e m e n t s P ( 3 ) c: X A * ( 2 ) a n d p O ) c X A * ^ 3 ^ - T n a t i s > w e a k l y s t a b l e 
p o i n t s d o n o t n e c e s s a r i l y l i e i n a r e d u c e d a c t i o n s p a c e g e n e r a t e d i n a 
p r o c e s s b a s e d o n s t r o n g o r n o r m a l d o m i n a n c e . 
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CHAPTER IV 
AN M/M/l QUEUE WITH TWO USERS CHOOSING ARRIVAL RATES 
Our s u b j e c t i s d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i n an M/M/l queue w i t h two u s e r s . 
The queue i s fed by two independent P o i s s o n s t r e a m s . The a r r i v a l r a t e 
f o r s tream i ( i = T , 2 ) i s under the e x c l u s i v e c o n t r o l of u s e r i w i t h 
0 < A^< °°. Thu's, t h e i n t e r a r r i v a l t i m e s for s tream i are independent , 
e x p o n e n t i a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d v a r i a b l e s w i t h d i s t r i b u t i o n f u n c t i o n F^( t ) = 
1-e ^1*". The sum of two independent P o i s s o n s treams i s a P o i s s o n stream 
w i t h a r r i v a l r a t e equa l t o the sum of the two a r r i v a l r a t e s . Hence the 
i n t e r a r r i v a l t i m e s i n the combined s tream are independent , e x p o n e n t i a l l y 
d i s t r i b u t e d v a r i a b l e s w i t h d i s t r i b u t i o n f u n c t i o n F ( t ) = 1-e ^ l + ^ 2 ) t > 
a r r i v a l s a r e served on a f i r s t - c o m e - f i r s t - s e r v e d b a s i s . S e r v i c e t imes 
are i n d e p e n d e n t , e x p o n e n t i a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d v a r i a b l e s w i t h d i s t r i b u t i o n 
f u n c t i o n H( t ) = 1-e ^ J t , corresponding t o s e r v i c e r a t e y and mean s e r v i c e 
t ime u \ 
A u s e r r e c e i v e s a reward from the s e r v i c e of " h i s " c u s t o m e r s . Let 
R . ( A . ) be u s e r i ' s reward per u n i t t ime under a r r i v a l r a t e A . . In order i i r l 
t o avo id t r i v i a l i t i e s assume R . ( A . ) > R . ( 0 ) f o r some A. > 0. A l s o , 
i i i l 
assume R^( ) i s c o n t i n u o u s and t w i c e d i f f e r e n t i a b l e on [O, 0 0 ) w i t h c o n t i n ­
uous d e r i v a t i v e s , and t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s an upper bound on the f i r s t 
d e r i v a t i v e . Thus M." = sup_ , ^ R^(A.) < oo ( i = l , 2 ) . As R . ( A . ) > R . ( 0 ) f o r 
l O l A ^ 0 0 i i ' i i l 
some A.> 0 we have M >^ 0 ( 1 = 1 , 2 ) . C o n s t r a i n t s on the second d e r i v a t i v e l l 
w i l l be in t roduced l a t e r . 
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On the other hand, a user will incur a waiting loss when A^> 0. 
For user i this loss equals h > 0 per unit time a customer spends in the 
system. The corresponding long run average loss per unit time Is 
h A w(A +A ;y) where w(A;y) is the expected waiting time (in system) of a 
customer when A (=A^+A2>0) is the overall arrival rate and y is the service 
rate. 
The objective of each user is to maximize the difference between 
reward and waiting loss. Often we shall refer to this difference as the 
profit. 
Standard queueing theory, see for example Kleinrock [1975, p. 98], 
tells us that in the M/M/l queue the waiting time in system has the mean 
value 0 0 if A > y, and l/(y-A) if 0 < A < y (actually, the waiting time is 
here exponentially distributed). Hence, the objective function of user i 
(i-1,2) is 
( R ±(0) (A.=0), 
7 T i ( A i ; y , A j ) = R i(^ i)-h iA i/(y-A 1-A 2) (A.>0, A^A^y), (1) 
( - 0 0 (A >0, A +A2>y). 
Here as in the sequel we use the convention of letting j designate the 
other user. Thus (i,j) equals (1,2) or (2,1). By (1), *rr^ (A^ ;y,A ) depends 
on y and A_. only through their difference, y — . Therefore, as far as 
user i is concerned the effect of the presence of user j is exactly the 
same as a decrease in queue capacity, from y to V-~^^• 
In (1) it was understood that y > 0. In order to facilitate the 
statement of some results the definition of TT is extended to include 
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nonpositive y as follows. 
, R,(0) ( A =0, u<0), 




 (A.>0, y<0). 
(2) 
l Then, by (1), we have the simple relation 
Tri(Ai;y,AJ) = T T ^ A ^ U + C A +c) ( c > - A . . ) . (3) In particular, 
T T . C A . U ^ A J = TrI(Ai;u-X ,0). (4) For simplicity define <f> (X ;y) = TT^(A ;y,0). Then (4) can be written 
TTi(Ai;y,Aj) = ^ ( A ^ y - A ) . (5) 
Equation (5) explains the importance of an analysis of the one-user model 
as a preliminary step to the analysis of the two-user model. For y > 0, 
^(A ;y) is precisely the profit of user i in a one-user model, where 
user j's arrival rate is identically zero. Specifically, setting A = 0 
in (1), we have for y > 0 
R.(A.)-h.A./(n-A.) (A.<y), 
cp. ( X . ; y ) = J 1 1 1 1 1 (6) 
- °° (A.>y). 
The one-user model is analyzed in Section 1. Our main objective is 
the determination of the optimal arrival rate A and the associated profit 
cj) = (J)(A;y). We also explore A's and f s dependence on y and h. The 
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special case, R(A) = Ar is used for illustration. 
Sections 2, 3, and 4 discuss the two-user model under different 
behavioral assumptions. 
In Section 2 we begin by defining an equilibrium point (\^ ,\^ ) of 
the decision variables. It is shown that under quite general conditions 
an equilibrium point will exist and that it is unique and dynamically 
stable (globally). If so, (A^,A^) is the solution in a reciprocal rate 
adjustment model we term follower-follower. (A^,A^) and associated profits 
(TT^,TT2) are compared with (A^jA^) and ( c j ) ^ , ^ ) in the corresponding one-
user models. Furthermore, we investigate how (X^tX^) and (TT ,^"^ ) depend 
on M, h^ and h^. The special case, R^(A^) = r^X^ (i=l,2) is used for 
illustration. 
Section 3 contains an analysis of the leader-follower decision model 
in which the follower automatically adjusts his arrival rate to that of the 
leader who sets his rate, once and for all, so that his profit is maximized 
taking into account the follower's response. Calling the optimizing arri-
* * ft ft 
val rates (A ,A.9) and associated profits (TT ,TT ) for leader (subscript 
XX J c. XX J L 
1) and follower (subscript 2), respectively, it is shown that 
* ^ * * ~ * 
A. 0 < A. < A., and TT._ < TT. < TT... for i = 1,2. Again, we illustrate with i2 = I = ii i2 = l = xl 
the case R.(A.) = r.A. (i=»l,2). 
x x x x 
In Section 4 we discuss the cooperative model in which the combined 
profits = TT^  + TT^  are maximized by choice of A^ and A2» The solution of 
this model is compared to the solution of the follower-follower model. 
Here also, we use the case R.(Aj) = ^A. (i=l,2) for illustration. 
x i i x 
It appears that our two-user model has never been the subject of 
analysis in the queueing literature. Thus no literature references 
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c o n c e r n i n g t h e m o d e l c a n b e g i v e n . H o w e v e r , t h e r e a r e o t h e r m o d e l s i n 
w h i c h c u s t o m e r s o r u s e r s make d e c i s i o n s a f f e c t i n g a r r i v a l r a t e s , w i t h no 
b a l k i n g a l l o w e d . 
L i t t l e c h i l d [ 1 9 7 4 ] e x a m i n e s d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g b y i n d i v i d u a l c u s t o m e r s 
i n an M/M/l q u e u e . On t h e b a s i s o f i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e t o t a l a r r i v a l r a t e 
A , e a c h c u s t o m e r d e c i d e s w h e t h e r t o a r r i v e o r n o t ( b a l k i n g i s n o t a l l o w e d ) . 
The e x p e c t e d g a i n f rom s e r v i c e i s R - h / ( u - A ) , w h e r e h i s c o n s t a n t , b u t R 
i s a v a r i a b l e w i t h c o n t i n u o u s d i s t r i b u t i o n f u n c t i o n . I t i s shown t h a t a 
u n i q u e e q u i l i b r i u m a r r i v a l r a t e A q e x i s t s . The e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e b e ­
t w e e n o u r s and L i t t l e c h i l d 1 s m o d e l i s t h a t we h a v e o n l y two u s e r s w h e r e a s 
h e h a s i n f i n i t e l y many (= c u s t o m e r s ) . The e f f e c t i s a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t 
m o d e l . For o n e t h i n g , n o c u s t o m e r s e t s a n a r r i v a l r a t e and t h e q u e s t i o n 
o f b e h a v i o r a l a s s u m p t i o n d o e s n o t a r i s e . 
B a l a c h a n d r a n and S c h a e f e r [ 1 9 7 6 [ a n a l y z e L i t t l e c h i l d 1 s m o d e l 
w i t h t h e d i f f e r e n c e t h a t c u s t o m e r s f a l l i n t o k c l a s s e s w i t h c o n s t a n t 
( R i , h . ) ( i = l , k ) i n s t e a d o f b e i n g c h a r a c t e r i z e d by c o n s t a n t h and c o n t i n u ­
o u s l y d i s t r i b u t e d R. A n o t h e r p a p e r by t h e same a u t h o r s [ u n p u b l i s h e d ] 
d e a l s w i t h t h e M / G / l q u e u e . 
C l o s e l y r e l a t e d m o d e l s a p p e a r i n t h e e c o n o m i c s l i t e r a t u r e u n d e r 
t h e names o f d u o p s o n y ( t w o b u y e r s ) and d u o p o l y ( t w o s e l l e r s ) . For a d i s ­
c u s s i o n o f t h e s e m o d e l s , s e e H e n d e r s o n and Quandt [ 1 9 7 1 ] and I n t r i l i g a t o r 
[ 1 9 7 1 ] . Our a s s u m p t i o n s a r e s t r o n g e r t h a n t h o s e o f t h e g e n e r a l t h e o r y . 
Hence we h a v e many r e s u l t s t h a t d o n o t f o l l o w f rom t h e a v a i l a b l e l i t e r a t u r e 
on d u o p s o n y and d u o p o l y . 
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- oo (X>y). 
Evidently, no X>y can ever maximize <f> so the user need consider only values 
of X on the interval [0,y). By our assumptions about R, cj) will be continu­
ous and twice differentiable on [0,y). cf>(0;y) = R(0) < 0 0. Also, as 
R'(X) < it follows that cj)(X;y) < R(0)+X(M'- h/(y-X)), so lim <f>(X;y) = 
X+y 
- o o . Hence there exists a X , 0 < X < u, such that cb(X;y) < ct(0;y) for 
o o 
A _ X . We deduce that (j) has a global maximum (j) for at least one 
X e [0,X q] and hence for at least one X £ [0,y). We assume that the 
user chooses the minimal X satisfying <J)(X;y) = cj) and call it X. 
Differentiating <p twice with respect to X we derive 
<jT(X;y) E d<j)(X;y)/dX = R'(X)-hy/(u-X)2 (X<y), (8) 
<j)"(X;y) E d2<j)(X;u)/dX2= BT'(X)-2hy/(y-X)3 (X<y) . (9) 
As is well known, (J)^ (X;y) = 0 is a necessary condition, and cj)^ (X;y) = 0, 
cf)^(X;y) < 0 are sufficient conditions for cj) to possess a local maximum at 
X £ (0,y). Later we shall impose a condition on R ^ ( ) under which 
<J)^ (X;y)=0 is sufficient for a unique global maximum at X, i.e. <|>(X;y) > 
<j)(X;y) for all X / X. 
1.1. General Results 
We shall begin by presenting a useful upper bound on X. By (8) and 
R'(X) < M', 
In this section there is no need for a subscript identifying the 
user so we leave it out and write the objective function, (6), as 
89 
2 
Solving M'-hy/(y-A)2 = 0 for A results in A = y-/yh/M'. Hence 
<J)'(A;y) < 0 (y-/yh/M" < A < y). 
Since <j)^ (A;y) < 0 precludes optimality, except at A = 0, we conclude that 
A < max(0,y-/yh/M"). (10) 
At this point few constraints have been placed on R and not much 
of value can be said on the determination of A and cj). It is of interest, 
however, in what way A and cj) respond to change in the parameters y and h. 
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 below state our findings. 
it it 
LEMMA 1. For given R and h, there exists a y , 0 < y < °°, such that 
A = 0 if and only if y < y . For y e [y ,°°), <j) is continuous and 
strictly increasing in y; and A is strictly increasing in y, but is not 
necessarily continuous in y. 
LEMMA 2. For given R and y, there exists an h , 0 < h < °°, such that 
_ * * _ 
A = 0 if and only if h > h . For h e (0,h ] , cf) is continuous and strictly 
decreasing in h; and A is strictly decreasing in h, but is not necessarily 
continuous in h. 
Proofs are presented in Section 5. We hint only that a key to the 
proof is that the waiting loss function z = hA/(y-A) for 0 < A < y has 
the properties 
dz/dy = - hA/(y-A)2< 0, (11) 
d2z/dydA = - h(y+A)/(y-A)3< 0, (12) 
<J>'(\;y) < M'-hy/(y-A) (A<y). 
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dz/dh = A/(y-A) > 0, (13) 
and, by Lemma 2, 
h* < yM'. (16) 
1.2. The Extra Condition on R 
Henceforth we shall impose a condition on R which will ensure that 
(f> has a unique global maximum and, connected therewith, that A is con­
tinuous in y and h. Condition 1 is that condition. Other conditions we 
may use, namely Conditions 2 and 3, are stronger conditions which imply 
Condition 1. For easy reference we state all of these conditions here. 
CONDITION 1. R"(A) < 2hy/(y-A) 3 (all A<y). (17) 
CONDITION 2. R"(A) < h/(y-A) 2 (all A<y). (18) 
CONDITION 3. R"(A) < 0 (all A>0). (19) 
By (9), Condition 1 means nothing but < 0 for all A < y. 
That is, the condition imposes strict concavity on (f) on [0,y). We have 
already found that (f> has a global maximum on [0,y). By a fundamental 
property of strictly concave functions, Condition 1 guarantees that (f> has 
a unique global maximum for some A e [0,y). If (f)^ (0;y) < 0, then A = 0, 
and if 4>"(0;y) > 0, then X > 0 and it satisfies < j > ' ( T ; y ) = 0. 
d2z/dhdA = y/(y-A) 2 > 0. (14) 
Note, by (10), A = 0 if y-/yh/M" < 0. Thus A = 0 if y < h/M", or, 
equivalently, if h > yM". Hence, by Lemma 1, 
y* > h/M', (15) 
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Note, Condition 3 => Condition 2 =* Condition 1 ((19)=>(18)^(17)) , as 
2 3 
0 < h/(y-A) < 2hy/(y-A) for all A < y. Obviously, the satisfaction of 
Condition 3 does not depend, on y and h. Lemma 3 tells us how the satis­
faction of Conditions 1 and 2 depends on the parameter y. Lemma 4 tells 
us how the satisfaction of the conditions depends on h. 
LEMMA 3. Let R and h be given. If R"(A) > 0 for some A > 0, then there 




 » (18). If R"(A) < 0 for all A > 0 then (17) and (18) hold for 
all y. Setting y ^ = y ^ = 0 0 the above equivalence relations hold also 
in this case. 
LEMMA 4. Let R and y be given. If R~(A) > 0 for some A, 0 < A < y, 
then there exist t/1^ and h ^ 2 \ 0 < r/1^ < < «>,
 s u c h that h > h ^ 
» (17) and h > h ( 2 ) « (18). If R~(A) < 0 for all A, 0 < A < y, then 
(17) and (18) hold for all h. Setting h ^ = h ^ = 0 the above equivalence 
relations hold also in this case. 
Proofs of the lemmas are given in Section 5. We shall mention only 
that the proof depends in an obvious way on the fact that, for any A < y, 
3 2 
both 2hy/(y-A) and h/(y-A) are strictly decreasing in y, and strictly 
increasing in h. In the following, Lemma 3 is of crucial importance. 
The result we need is that if Condition 1 holds for a given y, then it 
will hold for all smaller y's, and similarly for Condition 2. 
1.3. The Solution X 
Condition 1 has been assumed to hold. Hence, as previously stated, 
(J) will have a unique global maximum for a A e [0,y). If <$>'(Q;\i) < 0, 
that is, by (8), if R^(0) < h/y, then since <p is strictly concave we 
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have (j)(0;y) > (j)(A;y) f o r a l l A > 0, and t h e r e f o r e A = 0. D e f i n i n g 
y = h / R ' ( 0 ) , (20) 
we have 
A = 0 (y<y ) • (21) 
I f , on the o t h e r hand, (j)'(0;y) > 0 , t h a t i s i f y > y , then <f> has an 
i n t e r i o r maximum a t A (0<A<y) , which i s t h e s o l u t i o n of ({ / (Ajy) = 0 . 
Thus, by ( 8 ) , 
The c o r r e s p o n d i n g (f>, namely (f>, must be c a l c u l a t e d by i n s e r t i o n of A i n t o 
( 7 ) : 0 « R(A) - h X / ( y - X ) . 
1 . 4 . The Dependence of A on y and h 
As ment ioned , C o n d i t i o n 1 i m p l i e s c o n t i n u i t y of A i n y and h. 
Lemma 5 c o n t a i n s the formal s t a t e m e n t of t h i s r e s u l t . Proof i s found i n 
S e c t i o n 5 . 
LEMMA 5 . For g i v e n R and h, A i s c o n t i n u o u s i n y on ( 0 , y ^ ) . For g i v e n 
R and y , A i s c o n t i n u o u s i n h on ( h ^ x ^ , ° ° ) . 
We want t o f i n d out how A i s a f f e c t e d by a s m a l l change dy for a 
(1) * 
y s a t i s f y i n g C o n d i t i o n 1 , i . e . y < y . I f y < y , t h e n , of c o u r s e , 
_ * _ 
dA/dy = 0, by ( 2 1 ) . I f y > y , then (22) a p p l i e s , and dA/dy i s d e r i v e d by 
i m p l i c i t d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of (22) w i t h r e s p e c t to A and y . The r e s u l t i s 
R'(A) = h y / ( y - A ) 2 (y>y ) • (22) 
[R"(A) - 2 h y / ( y - A ) 3 ] d A + [ h ( y + A ) / ( y - A ) 3 ] d y = 0, 
by which 
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dA , h(y+X)/(y-A) 3
 > Q ( y * < ) J < y ( l ) ) B ( 2 3 ) 
d y
 2hy/(y-A) - R"(A) 
We conclude that A is continuous and differentiable in y on, at least, 
* (1) the interval [y ,y ]. 
Similarly, defining h = R^(0)y, we obtain 
dA . U/(P-X) 2 < o
 ( h ( D < h < h * ) , (24) 
d h
 R"(X) - 2hy/(y-X)J 
and we conclude that X is continuous and differentiable in h on, at least, 
(1) * 
the interval [h ,h ]. 
1.5. A Condition for 0 < dX/dy < 1 
As we have seen, Condition 1 is sufficient for a unique X and 
dA/dy > 0. Is there a simple, stronger condition that, in addition, 
guarantees dA/dy < 1? Assume Condition 1 is met, that is, 0 < y < y^^. 
* — * CI) 
If y < y , then 0 = dA/dy < 1. If y < y < y v , the requirement 
dA/dy < 1, according to (23), translates into 
h(y+X)/(y -X) 3
 < ^ 
2hy/(y-A) 3 - R~(A) 
Observe, under Condition 1, the denominator of the left-hand side fraction 
is positive. The above inequality reduces to 
R"(A) < h / ( y - X ) 2 . 
In Lemma 6 we state this and related results that are easily shown to 
hold. 
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LEMMA 6. Suppose Condition 1 holds, and y > y . Then 
(i) dA/dy < 1 if and only if R"(A) < h/(y-A) 2, 
(ii) dA/dy = 1 if and only if R"(A) = h/(y-A) , 
(iii) dA/dy > 1 if and only if R"(X) > h/(y - X ) 2 . 
We are now in the position to state and prove a theorem that is of 
great importance in our analysis of the two-user model. 
THEOREM 1. If Condition 2 holds and y > y*= h/R'(0), then 0 < dX/dy < 1. 
/ \ 
PROOF. Let y > y and let A be the corresponding optimal arrival rate. 
Assume furthermore Condition 2 holds. Then, by previous remarks, also 
Condition 1 will hold, so Lemma 6 applies. By Condition 2, in particular, 
— — 2 — 
R"(A) < h/(y-A) . By Lemma 6, part (i), it follows that dA/dy < 1. The 
We want to find out how cf) is affected by a small change dy for a 
(1) * — y satisfying Condition 1, i.e. y < y . If y < y , then (J> = R(0), so 
_ * — 
d(j)/dy = 0. If y > y , then A > 0 and 
other inequality, dA/dy > 0, results from (23). 
• 
1.6. The Dependence of (j) on y and h 
<f> = R(A) - hA/(y-A). 
Differentiating $ with respect to y we derive 
h(y^-A)/(y-A) 2 
Insertion of R'(A) = hy/(y-A) , by (22), results in 
d<j>/du = hA/(y-A) 2 > 0 (y <y<y (1) ) . (25) 
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In a similar fashion we derive 
— — — (1) * 
dcj)/dh = - X/(y-X) < 0 (hK ;<h<h ). (26) 
1.7. Example. R(X) = rX 
Here 
4>(X;y) = rX - hX/(y-X) (X<y). (27) 
R"(X) E 0, so Conditions 1 and 2 are met by all y. By (20), (21), (22), 
* _ * _ 2 * 
y = h/r; X = 0 if y < y ; r = hy/(y-X) if u > u . From the last equa­
tion an explicit solution can be obtained, namely 
X = y - /yh/r (y>y*=h/r). (28) 
This expression has also been obtained by Balachandran and Schaefer [to 
_ * — 
appear in IJPR]. Clearly, <J> = 0 if u < u . Otherwise, tj) is calculated 
by substituting X = X from (28) into (27), the result being 
cj) = h + ry - 2/hry (y>y =h/r), (29) 
showing, incidentally, that cj) depends on r and y only through their 
product ry. Curiously, cj) = (/ry - /h) . 
Our main interest here is how X depends on the parameters y, h, 
and r. First, by differentiation of (28) with respect to y, we obtain 
dX/dy = 1 - ~ /h/(ry) (y>y*=h/r), 
d 2X/dy 2 > 0 (y>y*=h/r). 
In the present case, then, X is an increasing, strictly convex function 
* _ * — 
on [y ,°°). Interestingly, dX/dy = 1/2 at y = y , and lim dX/dy = 1. 
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Equation (28) can be rewritten 
Hence A/y depends solely on the ratio . This fact permits the con­
struction of a normalized graph from which A can be easily derived for 
any y and y = h/r. A/y is depicted as a function of y/y in Figure IV-1. 
A/y 
By d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f (28) we d e r i v e e a s i l y 
d X / d h = - \ / y / ( r h ) < 0, 
d X / d r = > 0. 
We conclude this section with a simple numerical example we shall 
use throughout the chapter, Let y = 1, R(A) = rA, r = 8, h = 2. Note, 
y* = 0.25. We find X = 0.50, = 2.00. 
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2. The Equilibrium Point Solution 
max, 71". (A . ;u, A . ) = max, cb.(A.;u-A.) 
A . i i j A . i i j so 
A ±[Aj] = A±(y-A ) (i=l,2) (30) 
with A. [A.] = 0 if y-A. < 0. 
1
 J J = 
DEFINITION (Equilibrium Point). (A 1 S s a ^ t o ^ e a n e<lulllhrium 
point if A = A 1[A 2] and A,, = A^A.^]. 
An equilibrium point is simply a pair of choices (A^A^) such that 
none of the users can gain by making a different choice, provided the 
other user's choice remains the same. Clearly, behavioral assumptions 
made by users are a factor in determining the arrival rates ultimately 
selected by the two users of the service facility. We shall see that 
under some plausible behavioral assumptions, the users will settle for 
an equilibrium point solution if only the functions A_^ [A ] (i=l,2) are 
sufficiently well behaved. 
2.1. Dynamic Stability 
Imagine that the decision-process evolves in time through a sequence 
of decisions on arrival rate made by the two users. Assume both arrival 
rates are known by both users. Suppose the users adjust their arrival 
Let A_(u) denote user i's optimal choice as a sole user, given 
that the service rate is u. Let A_^ [A^ .] be user i's optimal choice given 
the choice A by user j (i=l,2), with the service rate u being understood, 
As explained, each two-user objective function is closely related 
to the corresponding one-user objective function, by (5). Hence, the 
functions A^[A ] and A^(u) are closely related. Obviously, by (5), 
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rates at certain intervals, with each user choosing his new arrival rate 
as some function of his and the other user's current arrival rates. The 
length of the time intervals between rate adjustments is immaterial to us 
since we are interested only in the final arrival rates. 
A variety of adjustment processes are conceivable. Perhaps the 
simplest ones let each user make a complete adjustment to the current rate 
used by the other user, as if that rate will never be changed. In the 
real world it may seem unlikely that two users should adopt such a myopic 
strategy of decision-making. Yet in many markets a similar mode of 
decision-making has been frequently observed. Also, as we shall see, a 
reciprocal adjustment (or mutual accommodation) process as outlined may 
serve to effect a compromise between users with conflicting interests. 
We shall consider two variants with complete adjustment, namely 
the alternate decision model, B^, in which the users alternate adjusting 
their arrival rates, and the simultaneous decision model, B^ ? in which 
the users adjust the arrival rates at the same time. Take an arbitrary 
initial arrival rate combination ( A ^ A ^ ) . Let ( A ^ , A n ) , n = 1,2,..., be 
the arrival rates in effect following the decision(s) at the n'th step. 
Under B,, when user i makes the first move, we have: (A"!",A"!") = 1 l j 
( A . [ A ° ] , A ° ) , ( A 2 , A 2 ) = ( A 1 , A . [ A h ) , ( A 3 , A 3 ) = ( A . [ A 2 ] , A 2 ) , etc. Under 
1
 J J ij iji 1 J 1 3 3 
B 2: ( A n , A n ) = (A [A 1?" 1] , A . [ A ? " 1 ] ) , n = 1,2,... . 
A A 
DEFINITION (Dynamic Stability). An equilibrium point ( A ^ A ^ is said 
to be dynamically stable, if, for arbitrary (A^jA^), lim A^ = A^, i = 1,2, 
under both B^ and B^. 
LEMMA 7- Let A^[ ] and ] be continuous on [O,00) such that 
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-1 < dX^/dA^ < 0, i = 1,2. Then an equilibrium point (X^yX^) exists, it 
is unique, and it is dynamically stable. 
PROOF. In a Cartesian coordinate system, plot X^ and X^[X^] along the 
x-axis, and plot X^ and X^[X^] along the y-axis. Each point of inter­
section of the two curves representing X^[ ] and X^[ ] is an equilibrium 
point. Obviously, the curves intersect once and only once given the slope 
of the curves. A demonstration of dynamic stability as defined is also 
quite straightforward, but: is rather tedious since various classes of 
starting points need to be considered under both and B^. We omit the 
proof. • 
Now return to our two-user model. Assume Condition 2 is met by 
both users. Then, by our results in Section 1, X ( ) is continuous on 
(0 , y ] , and 0 < dX^dm < 1 for each service rate m e (0 ,u ], i = 1,2. By 
(30) 
dX./dX. = - dX /dmI , (0<X .<y) . (31) 
Consequently, 
- 1 < dAi/dX < 0 (i=l,2). (32) 
Hence, if both users meet Condition 2, then the conditions of Lemma 7 are 
satisfied. Applying the lemma we obtain 
THEOREM 2. Let both users satisfy Condition 2, that is, R^'(X_L) < 
hJ(\A-X^) for all X ^ y , i = 1,2. Then an equilibrium point (X.^^) 
exists, it is unique, and it is dynamically stable. 
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2 . 2 . E q u i l i b r i u m P o i n t S o l u t i o n and One-User S o l u t i o n s 
Suppose C o n d i t i o n 2 i s met by both u s e r s . In g e n e r a l , the e q u i l i -
brium p o i n t s o l u t i o n (A n a s t o be c a l c u l a t e d by numerica l methods . 
However, we a r e i n t e r e s t e d not o n l y i n (X^X^) and the corresponding 
p r o f i t s ( T T ^ , ' b u t a ^ s o i n n o w t n e s e q u a n t i t i e s compare w i t h (X^,X^) 
and ( (J)^ ,^^) , r e s p e c t i v e l y . Some s imple r e l a t i o n s h i p s e x i s t . 
There a r e e x a c t l y four d i f f e r e n t c a s e s t o c o n s i d e r . We l a b e l them 
( a ) , ( b ) , ( c ) , and ( d ) . A l l four c a s e s are i l l u s t r a t e d i n F i g u r e I V - 2 . 
The e q u i l i b r i u m p o i n t s o l u t i o n (X^X^) i s marked by a c i r c l e . Note , 











J J 1 
X^XJX ] 
F i g u r e IV-2 (A^,A^) i n t h e Four P o s s i b l e Cases . 
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Using Figure IV-2 for reference one can convince himself of the 
truth of the equivalence relations (33)-(36) below. First of all, the four 
cases (a)-(d) as defined by the left-hand side of the equivalence relations 
are mutually exclusive and together they exhaust all possibilities. In 
_ _ _ * 
order to see this, observe that when X.> 0 and X.> 0, then X.> u-u. 
i 3 i= J 
_ * 
implies X^< y - y ^ , due to the slope of the curves. 
Since Condition 2 is met, Equation (32) holds and, by Theorem 2, 
(X^,X^) is the unique equilibrium point. Using these facts in conjunction 
with Equations (1) and (7) the right-hand sides of (33)-(36) are easily 
derived. Perhaps the only results that are not evident are TT.< cb. in 
case (c), and TT^ < cb^ (i=l,2) in case (d). We have: (c) TT. = 7r.(0;u,X_^) 
= <|> (0 ;y) < <(> ( X . . ; y ) E $ ; (d) TT^  = T T^X^ y.X ) < T ^ U ^ y . O ) = 4>1(X±;y) < 
< J > i ( X i ; y ) = < f . 
(a) (A.=0,A.=o) *» ((0=X i=X i=X 1+X 2, T \ ± = ^ ± ) , i-1,2) . 
(33) 
(b) 
. 0<X.=X.=X1+X_, 7T.=(b.,\ 
(X.>0,X.=0> « { * J- 1 * 1 _ \ . (34) 
\
 0=X.=X.<X 1+X o, ft =<b. 1 J J 1 2 j Yj 
_ _ _ * / 0<X.=X.=X +X , TT.=<j>.,\ 
(c) (X.>0,X.>0,X.>y-y.) » ( 1 ~ ~ 1 1 > . (35) 
1 J 1 = J
 \0=X.<X.<X 1 +X 9, TT.<0./ 
* 3 3 1 2 3 3' 
(d) (o^ y^-y*, i=l,2 ) ((^i^ j^i+V ' i=1»2) • (36) 
From the right-hand sides of the equivalence relations (33)-(36) 
we obtain easily the conclusion of our next theorem. 
THEOREM 3. Let both users satisfy Condition 2. Then 0 < X < X. < X..+ X 0 
= i = 1 = 1 2 
and TT. < d>, for i = 1,2. 
1 = i 
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In o t h e r words , i f Cond i t i on 2 i s met , and the u s e r s f o l l o w s t r a t e -
g i e s t h a t l e a d t o the c h o i c e s (X^jX^), then each u s e r ' s a r r i v a l r a t e w i l l 
be l e s s than or equa l t o the a r r i v a l r a t e he would choose i f a l o n e , but 
the a g g r e g a t e a r r i v a l r a t e w i l l be g r e a t e r than or equal to both of the 
o n e - u s e r r a t e s . A l s o , o b v i o u s l y , the p r o f i t w i l l d e c r e a s e or a t b e s t 
s t a y the same i n the e v e n t of the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a second u s e r . 
2 . 3 . S e n s i t i v i t y A n a l y s i s . P r e l i m i n a r i e s 
The l a s t q u e s t i o n to be addressed i s how (X^jX^) and a s s o c i a t e d 
p r o f i t s O'r j T ^ ) are a f f e c t e d by s m a l l changes i n the parameters y , h^ 
and h^. Again , o n l y parameter s e t s which s a t i s f y Cond i t i on 2 are 
c o n s i d e r e d . 
In c a s e s ( a ) , ( b ) , and ( c ) , X e q u a l s 0 or X^ ( i = l , 2 ) . Thus i t i s 
a s i m p l e mat t er t o deduce the e f f e c t of a change in y , h^ or h^. We j u s t 
apply the r e s u l t s of t h e a n a l y s i s of t h e o n e - u s e r model , d i s r e g a r d i n g 
the i n a c t i v e u s e r . 
Case (d) i s t h e most i n t e r e s t i n g c a s e . Here , for the g i v e n R^, R^, 
/ \ / \ 
y , h^, h^, we have 0 < X^< y , 0 < X^< y . Let and d e n o t e the s l o p e s 
/ \ / \ 
of t h e two c u r v e s a t X^ and X^, r e s p e c t i v e l y . That i s , 
a . = d X . [ X . ] / d X . | ( i = l , 2 ) . (37) 
1 1 1 1 A . — A . 
J J 
By (31) 
a. = - dX./dml r ( i = l , 2 ) . (38) 
I l 'm=y-X. 
J 
and may be e v a l u a t e d by u s e of ( 2 3 ) , provided X^ and X 2 are 
a l r e a d y known. Observe, - 1 < a < 0 , i = 1 , 2 . 
The two i n t e r s e c t i n g c u r v e s r e p r e s e n t f u n c t i o n s t h a t w i l l be 
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c o n s i d e r e d dependent on a parameter p . A s m a l l change i n p w i l l r e s u l t 
i n a smal l change i n one or both f u n c t i o n s . To u s , what m a t t e r s i s the 
r a t e of change i n the two f u n c t i o n s , a t and A^, r e s p e c t i v e l y . Let 
3 ± = dA [ A J / d p | A = l ( i = l , 2 ) . (39) 
j j 
By standard methods of c a l c u l u s we d e r i v e 
dA ± /dp = (0±+0 a ± ) / ( l - a 1 a 2 ) ( i = l , 2 ) . (40) 
2 . 4 . E f f e c t s of a Change in y 
F i r s t we d i s c u s s the c a s e p = y . An i n c r e a s e i n y by Ay > 0 w i l l 
s imply r e s u l t i n a t r a n s l a t i o n of the two c u r v e s away from the o r i g i n . 
R e f e r r i n g t o F igure I V - 2 ( d ) , A^[ ] w i l l s l i d e a long the y - a x i s , A [ ] 
a l o n g t h e x - a x i s , both c u r v e s b e i n g d i s p l a c e d by Ay u n i t s . I t i s s e e n 
t h a t here 3, = - a , and 3~ = - a 0 . I n s e r t i n g i n t o (40) we o b t a i n I I z z 
/ \ 
d A . M y = ( - a . M l - t a J / U - a - c O ( i = l , 2 ) . (41) l l j 1 2 
Now, a s - 1 < a ± < 0 ( i = l , 2 ) , we have 0 < - a < 1 , 0 < l + a ± < 1 , 0 < l - a ^ a ^ 1 
( i = l , 2 ) . We c o n c l u d e 
0 < d A ± / d y < 1 ( i = l , 2 ) . 
A l s o , 
0 < d ( A x + A 2 ) / d y < 1 . 
One might e x p e c t both u s e r s t o i n c r e a s e the p r o f i t when, i n c a s e ( d ) , 
y i s i n c r e a s e d . Th i s we s h a l l p r o v e . Let ATI\ d e n o t e the change i n p r o f i t 
f o r u s e r i caused by an i n c r e a s e Ay i n t h e s e r v i c e r a t e . We must show 
ATT > 0 i f Ay > 0 . 
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By definition, 
A 7 Ti = i ri( A I + A A I"»L J + A U»A.j+AAj) - 7Ti(Ai;y,A_.) 
This may be rewritten as 
/ \ / \ / S / N / S / \ / \ 
ATK = [iri(Ai+AA1;y+Ay,A +AA^ .) - ir^A^u+Au.A +AA )] (42) 
+ [TT. (A.;y+Ay,A.+AA.) - TT. (A . ;y, A.) ]. 
i I J J i i J 
By definition of an equilibrium point and the fact AA_^  > 0, clearly 
TT . (A .+AA . ;y+Ay, A,+AA . ) - TT.(A ;y+Ay,A,+AA.) > 0. (43) 
i i i J J i i J J 
Additionally, 
TRi(A±;y+Ay,A +AA )-TRi(A±;y,A ) = <$>±(\±; (y-A ) + (Ay-AA ))-<(>i(Ai;y-A J 
(44) 
> 0 [A_L>0;Eq. (6) ;dA_./dy<X=>AA <Ay]. 
By (42), (43), and (44), A7r± > 0. By symmetry, ATT_. > 0. 
2.5. Effects of a Change in h^ or h^ 
Next we discuss the case p = h. (i=l,2). Take p = h.. Here 
r
 l r l 
3^  = dA^/dh^, evaluated by (24) with y~Aj replacing y, and A_^  replacing 
J± (subscript i added in (24)). By (24), 3±< 0. Also, 3..= dX_./dh±= 0. 
Thus, by (40), 
dA./dh. = 3./(l-a1ct9) < 0, (*5) i i l 1 ^  
dA./dh. = a .3-/(1-^00 > 0. (46) 
J i 3 1 1 2 
Also worth noting, 
d(A 1+A 0)/dh. = 3.U-Kx,)/(l-a-1cO < 0. (47) 1 L 1 l 3 - L A , 
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The direction of change in profits is found by a series of 
^i'h. ~ 7 Ti^i ; ] J ' ' V'h, > ^i^i+^i^'^j) LH> [by definition of (X^X^] 




Thus, ATT. = TT. L , - TT. L < 0 if Ah. > 0. l l'h.+Ah. i'h. l i i i 
Next we examine the effect on user j's profit. We have 
"i'h ~
 7 R I ( X I ; I J , X I ) LH < 7 r i ( x i ^ , A . + A X i ) | h [by (1)] I J J I J J I 
- W ' ^ V L H . + A h . 
J J
 1 1 
< « a x ir ( A ; y , X + A X ) | ^ 
3 
= TT. (X.+AX. ;u,X.+AX.) L j j j i i 'h.+Ah. i i 
~
 7 1
 j 'h.+Ah.* J
 i I 
~ i / s" I 
Thus, ATT. = TT I , ., - TT.L > 0 if Ah. > 0. Because of the symmetry 1 j h.+Ah j 1h. I J J J
 i I J I 
in case (d), the results apply for i = 1,2. 
Our results are summarized in Theorem 4 that covers all cases, not 
just case (d). For the other cases the results follow easily from previous 
comparisons. Since h^ has not been included as an argument of TT we 
shall employ the usual "conditional upon" or "given" notation. Let 
Ah i> 0. Recall that in case (d) under discussion, A > 0, X 2> 0. By 
(45), (46), then we have AX_^ < 0, AX.> 0. We may assume Ah^ is small 
enough so that X.+AX. > 0. 
i i 
First we examine the effect on user i Ts profit. We have 
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remarks and the findings in Section 1. 
THEOREM 4. Let both users satisfy Condition 2 for given R , R 2» y, h^, 
h2« Then the equilibrium point solution (X^,X2) has the properties 
(i) 0 < dX /dy < 1 (i=l,2), 
(ii) 0 < d(X x+X 2)/dy < 1, 
(iii) dn /dy > 0 (i=l,2). 
Equality holds in (i) and (iii) if and only if X - 0; and in (ii) if and 
only if X^= X 2= 0. Also, 
(iv) dX./dh. < 0, dX./dh. > 0 (i=l,2), I I = J I = \ » / » 
(v) d(X 1+X 2)/dh ± < 0 (1=1,2), 
dl\±/dh± < 0, di[ /dh± > 0 (i=l,2). (vi) 
Equality holds in first statement of (iv) and (vi) if and only if X^ = 0; 
in second statement of (iv) and (vi) if and only if X^ = 0 or X.= 0; and 
in (v) if and only if X^= 0. 
(i) and (ii) become evident when one realizes that a translation 
Ay of curves with slopes greater than -1 but nonpositive (by Condition 2) 
will cause (X^+AX^,X^+lsX^) to be located in the triangle defined by 
(X^,X 2), (X^+Ay,X2), (X^,X2+Ay), excepting the line connecting the last 
two points. (iv) is obvious given the slopes of the curves and the down-
ward shift in X.[ ] for a. Ah.> 0. Now, for user i, a reduction AX.< 0 l l ' J ' I 
has the effect of an increase -AX. in y. Thus, under Condition 2, 
I 
0 < AX_.< -AXi- Hence, AX^< 0 implies that AXj+AX < 0, explaining (v). 
2.6. Example. R-^X.^) = r.^, ^ 2 ^ 2 ^ = r2^2 
We begin with the observation that Condition 2 is met for all y 
for both users. As explained, (X^,X2) and (y^,y2) are functions of 
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r l ' r 2 ' ^' ^ 1 ' ^2" P a r a m e t e r s s u c n t h a t c a s e ( a ) , ( b ) , or ( c ) , 
a p p l i e s i t i s a s imple mat ter t o d e r i v e ( X ^ , X 2 ) and (TT ,^TT )^ by r e s o r t 
t o t h e r e s u l t s of our o n e - u s e r model a n a l y s i s . A l s o , t h e s e q u a n t i t i e s ' 
dependence on y , h^, and h^, can be determined i n t h i s way. T h e r e f o r e , 
we w i l l d i s c u s s o n l y c a s e ( d ) , where the parameter v a l u e s r e s u l t i n 
X^> 0 , X 2 > 0 . The d i s c u s s i o n w i l l be l i m i t e d t o the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of 
X^ and X^. 
F i r s t , we d e r i v e a u s e f u l n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n for 
c a s e ( d ) , i n our l i n e a r model . The b a s i c o b s e r v a t i o n i s 
<0 < X.< y-y*> « <y > y * , y > ( y * ) 2 / y * > ( i = l , 2 ) . (48) 
The v a r i a b l e s a r e t h o s e d e f i n e d f o r the o n e - u s e r model . R e c a l l t h a t 
* _ * _ 
y . = h . / r . . Assume 0 < X.< y - y . . According t o S e c t i o n 1 . 7 , X.> 0 => 
i i i i 3 l 
* — /~~* -r y > y_ ,^ and X_^  = y - / y y ^ . S u b s t i t u t i n g the e x p r e s s i o n for X^ i n t o 
— * * 2 * 
X^< y - y . , and r e d u c i n g , we d e r i v e y > ( y . ) /VU* C o n v e r s e l y , assume 
ft ft 2 ft ft 
y > y_^  and y > ( y . ) By S e c t i o n 1 . 7 , y > y_^  => X±> 0 , and, by ( 2 8 ) , 
— / * ft 2 * / * * 
X.= y - / y y . . Now, y > ( y . ) / y . i s the same as / y y . > y . . Hence l l j l l 3 
_ / ft * 
X_^  = y - /yy_^ < y - y . . Th i s p r o v e s ( 4 8 ) . 
* * * 2 * * * ft 2 * Suppose y > y_ .^ Then (y^ ) /y,^ > y_. > y_^  > ( y i ) / y . Consequent ly , 
* * 2 
* ft ? * ( m a x ( y 1 , y ? ) ) 
<(y > y , , y > ( y J Z / y , ) , i = l , 2 > « y > . (49) 
From (48) and (49) we c o n c l u d e : 
m i n ( y 1 » y 2 ) 
c 
* ft 2 (max(y ,y ) ) 
*\ . . . «\ . . . . ^ 1 z 
a s e (d) E <(0 < X ± < VI~PJ), 1 = 1 , 2 ) « y > ft ft 
m i n ( y 1 , y 2 ) 
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* * * * If u ^ = u 2= y , then case (d) « y > y . 
Assume the parameters meet the conditions for case (d). As 
always, A^< y, A 2< y, A^+ A 2 < y. In Section 1 we derived A = y - /yy 
* / * 
if y > y . Similarly, in the two-user model, A. [A.] = (y-A,) - /(y-A.)y 
i 3 j 3 i 
•ft ^ k 
if y-A > y^, i = 1,2. In case (d) clearly y-A > y_^ , i = 1,2, as seen 
from Figure IV-2(d). Hence, 
A. = y - A. - /y-X.)y* (i=l,2). 
i 3 3 i 
(50) 
/ ~ * / x * 
We see that /(y-A^y^ = /(y-A^)y2 by which 
~ ~ * ' 
y - x x y x 
Use of this relation in (50) results in 
A. = - 4 ( y - A . ) - /(y-X.)y? U«i,2). 1
 i 1 3 
y. 
(51) 
(51) is a quadratic equation in A_^ . We shall not give the solution since 
the expression is rather complicated. In the special case in which the 
* * * 
users are identical, r^ = r 2 and h^ = h 2» so that y^ = y 2 = y , (51) 
reduces to 
- y - A, - /(y-AJy* (i=l,2). A 
1 1 1 
Solving, we obtain 
\ = A 2 = [4y-y*- /8yy*+(y*)2]/8, 
109 
In our numerical example with y = 1, r^= r^= 8, h^= h^= 2, we find 
\ = A2 = ° * 2 9 , ^1 = ^2 = °' 9 4* 
3. The Leader-Follower Solution 
The model to be explored in this section is called the leader-
follower model. In contrast with the previously analyzed two-user model 
in which both users are followers, now one user plays the role of a leader 
while the other is a follower. That is, the follower, say user j, auto­
matically chooses the conditionally optimal arrival rate A [A_^ ] for any 
choice A. by the leader, who will choose A. so as to maximize his profit, 
I l 
taking into account the follower's response A_.[AJ. 
New notation is needed to distinguish leader and follower. As 
usual, subscript i or j, shall denote the user, but we may add the number 
1 to designate the leader, or 2 to designate the follower. Thus 7 i \ ^ 
shall denote user i Ts objective function when he is the leader; A ^ will 
be user i's optimal choice as a leader; A. „ = A.[A..,] is the corresponding 
j2 J il 
* * * * 
choice by user j as the follower; TT . = TT.(A..;y,A.0) and TT.0 = 
il I il j2 j2 
77j ^ Aj2'^* Ail^ d e n o t e t n e resulting profits. 
If A.< y, then always A. [A.] < y-A., or A.+ A.[A.] < y. Hence, by 
i y j i l i j i J 
(1), the leader's objective function is 
R.(A )-h A /(y-A.-A [A.]) (A <y), 
Tr.,tt.;y,A.[A.]) = j (1=1,2). (52) 
1 1 1 J 1
 '-co (A.>y), 
Obviously, A j< y, i = 1,2. If user i is the leader, then, of course, he 
may select A.= A. in which case the follower response is A. = A.[A 1 = A . 
i i H j J i j 
Thus, a leader can assure himself of the equilibrium point profit, here 
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TT^ = 7i\(A^;u, X ) . The question is whether he can do better. As we shall 
see, the answer is that frequently he can. 
Throughout the analysis of this model R^, R 2» y, h^, and h^, are 
fixed, and we assume that Condition 2 is satisfied by both users. 
3.1. A. < A # 1 and Related Results l = ii 
We will show that the leader's optimal arrival rate is at least as 
great as his equilibrium arrival rate. Suppose user i is the leader. If 
* 
A_^ = 0, then, trivially, A ^ > A_^ , so assume A^> 0. Then 
TT. = T T . ( A . ; U , A . ) 
I i i 3 
/s. ^ 
> TT ( A ;y , A ) ( A . < A . ) [by definition of ( A , A ) ] 
i i j i l 
> T r I ( A i ; u , A J [ A I ] ) {X±<\±) [ A J [ A ± ] > A ^; Eq.(l)] 
= T r 1 1(A i;u,A [A±]) . 
Now, TT.> TT . (X . ;y ,X . [X. ] ) for all A < A . implies A > A . We conclude 
l l l l j l 1 1 l - L - l 
that, in any case, 
A . < A * (i=l,2) . 
l = ii 
Correspondingly, X^ 2 < X^ .. 
Evidently, TT > TT .. On the other hand, TT. < TT . To see this, 
•
7 i l = i J ^ - J 
note that 
TT.(X.;y,X* ) < TT (X ;y,X.) (all A ) [\±1 > X.; Eq.(l)], 
J 3 ii J J -J 
which implies 
Ill 
* * ~ 
TT.0 = max, TT . (A . ;y, A ., ) < max, TT . (A.;y, A . ) = TT.. 
The above inequalities can be strengthened somewhat in special 
cases. It is easy to see that in cases (a) and (b), and also in case (c), 
provided the leader is user i, where A^ > y-VU » w e have (A^,A
 2 ) = 
(A_^,A^.). Consequently, equality holds in these cases, and the leader-
follower solution is identical to the equilibrium point solution. Also 
in case (d), to be discussed next, can the inequalities be strengthened. 
3.2. Case (d): A.< A. < y-y. 
1 1 1 = 1 
* 
It has been shown that, in general, A. < A.,. We will show that 
l = il 
* * * 
in case (d) A.< A., < y-y.. First we prove A.< A.-. 
l il = j l il 
Note, TT ^  as given by (52) is continuous and right differentiable 
with respect to A^ on [0,y). (Left and right derivatives are different 
* 
at A^=y-y., so we focus on the right derivative.) Differentiation of 
(52) results in the following expression for the right derivative: 
dTT y-(-A;[A.])A.-A.[A.] 
- r y ^ = R : C A ) - h 3 — - 1 \ 1 (A <y). (53) 
d A i 1 1 1 (y-A.-A.[A.])2 
In (53), A"[A.] = dA.[A.]/dA.. For A.< y-y* we have A.[A.] > 0 and 
J 1 j i i i j J i 
ft 
-A7[A.] > 0, but for A. > y-y. we have A.[A.] = 0 and -A'[A.] = 0. 
J i 1 = J J i J i 
Recall that in case (d) A^> 0, A^> 0. Hence, by definition of 
(A X,A 2), d T T i / d A ± | x = ~ x =~ = 0. By (1) then 
y-A. 
R i ( V - h i = 0- (54) 
1 1 1
 ( y - A r A 2 ) z 
From (53) and (54) 
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dTT „ y - ( - A ' [ A . ] ) A . - A . 
dxrlx =A, - W - h i , \ \ ,2 -1 < * > ] 
( y - A 1 - A 2 ) 
> R ; a . ) - h T\
 2 t - X r t X ] > 0 , X > 0] 
1
 ( y - A ^ r J 
0 . [by ( 5 4 ) ] 
C l e a r l y , d T T ^ / d A ^ | ^ _^ > 0 i m p l i e s X^ ^ A ^. I t i s known a l r e a d y t h a t 
X. < X . . . We c o n c l u d e X. < X . . . I = i i I i i 
Next we prove A < y - y . by showing t h a t TT ^ i s s t r i c t l y d e c r e a s i n g 
on [ y - y , y ) . By remarks above , (53) s p e c i a l i z e s to 
d 7 T i l / d X i = R ^ ( X i ) - h . y / ( y - X i ) 2 ( y - y * < X.< y ) . (55) 
In c a s e ( d ) , X_^ > 0 and s a t i s f i e s c b ^ ( X ^ ; y ) = 0 . N o t e , Condi t ion 1, which 
i s impl i ed by our C o n d i t i o n 2, imposes s t r i c t c o n c a v i t y on cb . Hence 
<t>T(X i;y) < <j>^(X ;y ) f o r a l l X ±> X . I t f o l l o w s t h a t <j^(A ; y ) < 0 for a l l 
X±> X . That i s , by ( 8 ) , 
d c b . ( A . ; y ) / d A . = R : ( X . ) - h . y / ( y - X . ) 2 < 0 ( A . > A . ) . (56) I I I 1 1 1 1 i i 
_ * * _ 
S i n c e i n c a s e (d) A.< y - y . , c l e a r l y X. > y - y . i m p l i e s X.> X. . By (55) 
i J i = J i i 
and ( 5 6 ) , t h e n , 
7C 
d T T ^ / d X . = d e b . ( A - y ) / d A . < 0 ( y - y . < A.< y ) . i i l I i I j = l 
X X 
This proves t h a t A ^ < y - y . In summary, 
A ±< X*±1 < y - y * ( c a s e ( d ) ) . (57) 
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From (57) we deduce easily, see Figure IV-2(d), that 0 < A < A., with 
A.~ = 0 if and only if A. = y - y . . If, instead, user i had been the follower j2 il j 
and user j the leader, everything said holds with subscripts i and j 
interchanged. Thus we arrive at the statement 
0 < A* < A.< A* < y - y * (i=l,2) (case (d)). (58) 
= i2 I il = j 
As for profits, obviously TT . < T T . , . On the other hand, TT. > T T . 0 as r
 '
 J
 l il l i2 
T T i = T T i(A i ; y,A ) 
> T T i ( A i 2 ; y , A ) [A^ < A_^  and definition of (A^,A2)] 
> T T i( A i 2 ;^' A : ji> [ A * X y Xy Eq.(l)] 
5
 '12-
Combining the last two inequalities we obtain 
7 Ti2 < lf±< \l ( i = 1 » 2 ) ( c a s e W ) ) . (59) 
Finally, we note that the optimal aggregate arrival rate in the 
/ \ / \ 
leader-follower model exceeds A,+ A_ in case (d). As -1 < dA.[A.]/dA. < 0 
1 2 j l l 
* * ^ ^ * 
everywhere on ( A . , y - y . ) , it must be true that A. - A. > A.- A.„. Hence, 
1
 J il i J J 2 
A l + A2 < A i l + Aj2 ( i = 1» 2) < c a s e ( d))- (6°) 
3.3. Statement of Results 
We are now ready to state the results of the analysis. Our theorem 
covers all cases, (a)-(d). In cases (a) and (b) proofs are trivial and 
are omitted. In case (c) the proof has been left out in order not to 
14 
repeat arguments used in case (d). 
k ^ k 
THEOREM 5. Let both users satisfy Condition 2. Then A.. < A. < A., < 
i2 = l = il = 
^ ^ k k k y\ k max (A. , y - y . ) , A + A_ < A . . + A . _ , TT.0 < TT. < TT., , i = 1,2. Equality holds I j 1 2 = il j2 i2 = I = il everywher  in cases (a) and (b). In case (d) strict inequality holds in al relations betwen A's or TT'S. 
We se  that a user may gain and wil never lose by asuming leader­ship rather than follwing the other user. In cases wher  it is to both users' advantage to lead rather than folow, as in cse (), the stage is set for conflict. In the realworld a fight fo suprmacy may occur,or on  uer may resit another user's atempt to set himself up as a leader. The two users may prefer to setle for a compromise solution. One may view mutal acommodatin as in the follwer-follwer models as a compromise. Another possible resolution of the conflict is cooperation whic  we shal study in the next section. 3.4. Example. R^A ) = r A , R2(A2) = r^  Note, Condition 2 is met by both users. Supose user i, i = 1 or 
_ _ * 2, is the leader, and user j is the folwer. If A. = 0 or A. > y-y., i i = J 
* _ then clearly A = A . Asume therefore r^, r2» y, h^, h2 are such that 
_ * * 0 < A. < y-y . Our sole objective is the detrmination of A.-. By (52) i j il 
Tr . , ( A . ; y , A . [ A . ] ) = r . A . - h. A . / (y-A . -A . [ A . ]) (A .<y ) . (61) lliji iiii iji I 
Consider the function TI\^ on [0,y-y^ .]. By remarks in Section 2, if 
A. < y - y . , then A . [A . ] = y - A. - / ( y - A . ) y * . Insertion of this expresion 
into (61) yields 
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TT (A ;y,A [A ]) = r.A. - h A .//(y-A )y* (A <y-y*). (62) 
IX 1 J 1 1 1 1 1 1 J 1 J 
Differentiation leads to 
d 7 r i l / d A i = r. - h iy*(y-A./2)[(y-A i)y*]" 3 / 2, (63) 
d2ii±1/d\2± = -h.(y*) 2(y-A i/4)[(y-A i)y*]" 5 / 2. (64) 
By (64), IT is strictly concave on [0,y-y.]. 
For A_^  e [y-y^.,y) we have TT^CA^y, A [A_^ ]) = ^ ( A ^ y ) . By Condition 
2 (j)^  is strictly concave on [0,y). Hence, TT ^  is strictly concave also 
on [y-y ,y).. 
At A^ = y _y^ the left and right derivatives differ. By (63) and 
(8) we have 
d
*il / d Xil(y-y*)- " r . - h ^ p + y * ) / ^ * ) 2 , (65) 
d \ l / D A J ( y - y * ) + = V ^ / ( M J ) 2 . <66> 
It is seen that the left derivative is greater than the right derivative 
at A^= y-y . We conclude that TI\^ is strictly concave on [0,y) and there­
fore has a unique maximum. 
_ * * 2 * 
By (48), 0 < A i< y-y. implies y > (y.) /y^, which in turn implies 
d T r.wdA. , * N , < 0. Hence, A # 1 e [0,y-y.]. Perhaps A., is most easily il i'(y-y^.)+ il ' j r il 
calculated directly from (62) by exploitation of the concavity property. 
/ * 
By (63), dir.-/dA. I _ = r. - h.//yy.. If d T T.-/dA.| n < 0, or, equiva-y
 il i'0 I I j il l 10 = 
lently, \i\i./(\i±) < 1, then A ^ = 0. Similarly, if d 7 r i l / d A i I = °» 
1 * * * 2 * * J 
or, equivalently, by (65), . / (V.) < 1, then A = y-y.. Otherwise, 
z J i J — ij- J 
* * * * * * 
0 < A i l < y-Pj • Observe that if y^ = y 2» then, always, 0 < A_^ < y-y . 
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In our numerical example with ]i = 1, r^= r^= 8, h^= h^= 2, we have 
i | j ( A 1 , A 2 ; y ) = T T ^ A ^ U . A ^ + T T 2 ( A 2 ; y , . (67) 
Once more, the decision-maker will never choose A-j+A2 > y since in 
that case i|;(A , A ;y) = - °°. By (1), 
i | ) ( A 1 , A 2 ; y ) = [R±(A^-h.^/ ( y - A ^ ) ] + [R£ ( A £ ) - h ^ / ( y - A . ^ ) ] 
( A 1 + A 2 < y ) . (68) 
The question of how the maximized total profit, say is redis­
tributed to the two users, we shall not discuss, except to state that it 
would seem reasonable that each user should receive as his share at least 
the equilibrium point profit, but no more than he might gain as a leader. 
4.1. A Region Containing All Solutions 
Let R^, R 2 > y , h^, h 2 be fixed and assume that Condition 2 holds 
for each constituent objective function, TT^  and Our first goal is 
the definition of a suitably small region which any ( A ^ , A 2 ) = ( A ° , A ° ) 
maximizing i[» must lie in. 
X.= 0.50 and u * = 0.25, so 0 < X. < y - y * (i=l,2). We find A* = A* = 0.47, 
l l i. j 11 21 
A12 = ^22 = °*17> = ^21 = 1 - 1 8 > T T 12 = ^22 = 0 , Z f 3 -
A. The Cooperative Solution 
In this section we suppose our two users agree to choose arrival 
rates A^ and A^ which maximize the sum of their profits. In effect then 





( X r X 2 ) A 2[A 1] 
I l X 1,A [A2] 
Figure IV-3. A Region Containing All Solutions. 
Consider Figure IV-3 illustrating case (d). For the purpose of 
comparison we have indicated solutions under other behavioral assumptions 
dealt with in previous sections. The points A=(X^,0) and B=(0,X2) mark 
the one-user solutions; E=(X^,X2) is the equilibrium point solution; the 
curve segments EC and ED, excluding E, contain the leader-follower solu-
* * * * 
tions, namely ( A;Q> A22^ a n C* ^ A12 , A21^ r e s P e c t i v e l y • We will prove that 
a cooperative solution must lie in the set Y, shown as a shaded area, 
defined as the interior of the figure OBEA plus A and B. 
For another illustration of the discussed solution concepts see 
Figure 8.10 in Intriligator [1971, p. 212]. 
Define 
= sup^ ^ i^(X1,X2;u), 
S = {(X°,X°): iKX°,X 0;u)=^°}. 
(69) 
(70) 
S is the solution set for the cooperative model. A (A ,A 2) e S will 
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o o 
usually be denoted by (X^,X^). 
Let the sets X, Y, Z be defined as 
X = { ( X 1 , X 2 ) : 0 < X 1 < X 1 [ X 2 ] , 0 < X 2 < X 2 [ X 1 ] } , (71) 
Y = X U ( A ^ O ) U ( 0 , " X 2 ) , (72) 
Z = { ( X 1 , X 2 ) : 0 < A 1 < X 1 [ X 2 ] , 0 < A ^ A ^ ] } . (73) 
Clearly, X c y c z . In case (d), illustrated by Figure IV-3, X is 
the interior of the figure with corners 0, B, E, A. Y includes also A 
and B, and Z is the closure of X. We will show that, in any case, S c y. 
First we show S c z . Let ( X ^ , X 2 ) f. Z. We must prove ( X ^ , X 2 ) f S. 
Suppose X 2 > X 2 [ X 1 ] . If A.^ = 0, then T r ^ A ^ y ^ ) = T r ^ A ^ y , A 2 [ A . ^ ) and 
7 T 2 ( X 2 ; y , X 1 ) < 7 T 2 ( X 2 [ X 1 ] ; y , X 1 ) , so i / K A ^ A ^ y ) < ^ [ A J ; y ) • If \> 0, 
then 7 T 1 ( A 1 ; y , A 2 ) < T T ^ A ^ y ^ t A ]) and 7 T 2 ( A 2 ; y , A 1 ) < 7 T 2 ( A [A ] ; y , A ) , 
so, again, ^ ( A ^ A ^ y ) < T | / ( A ^ , A 2 [ A ] ; y ) . These results follow easily from 
Equation (1) and the fact that A 2 [ A ^ ] uniquely maximizes the conditional 
objective function. Hence ( A ^ , A 2 ) i. S. Similarly, if A^> A ^ [ A 2 ] , then 
( A 1 ? A 2 ) t S. Since ( A ^ A ^ £ Z means that either A.^> A [A,,] or A 2 > A [A.^] 
we conclude ( A ^ A ^ t Z => ( A ^ A ^ t S. Equivalently, S c z . 
We have proved S c: z . We shall prove the stronger statement S c y. 
Thus, all points on the boundary of Z, except A=(A^,0) and B=(0 ,A 2 ) will 
be ruled out as elements of S. 
First we rule out all remaining points on the axes, except A and 
B. Suppose A ^ 0 and A 2 < A 2[0] = X . Then T T ^ C ^ y , A 2 ) = T T ^ C ^ y , A 2 [0]) 
and Tr 2(A 2;y,0) < TT 2 (A 2[0] ;y, 0 ) , so i p(0 ,X 2 ;u ) < iKO,A^O] ; y ) . Thus, if 
A 2 < A 2[0] then (0 ,A 2 ) i S. Similarly, if A ^ A [0] then (A.^0) t S. 
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Next we rule out all remaining points on the two curves X^[X^] 
and A^[A^], except A and B. Suppose A^ > 0 and A^ = A^[A^] > 0. Here 
we need to study the marginal change in \p caused by a change in A^. By 
(67), (68), d^/dA£ = dTT1/dA2 + dTT2/dA2, where dTr 1/dA 2 = (p-A^-A^ 2< 
and dTT2/dA2 = 0 by definition of X^[X^] and the assumption that A 2 = 
A 2[A^] > 0. Hence, dty/dX^ < 0. It follows that a sufficiently small 
reduction in A 2 will lead to an increase in ty. Thus (A^,A2[A^]) t S. 
Similarly, if A 2> 0 and A = A [A 2] > 0, then (A^A ],A ) t S. Our con­
clusion is that S cz Y. 
By our assumptions about TT^ and obviously is continuous in 
A^ and A 2 for A^+A2< p. Hence, \p is continuous on the compact set Z. By 
a well-known theorem it follows that ip possesses a maximum value on Z. 
Thus S is nonempty. 
In summary our findings are: 
LEMMA 8. Let both users satisfy Condition 2. Let the objective function 
be ^ ( A 1 , A 2 ; p ) = T I ^ C A ^ U . A ^ + T T 2 ( A 2 ; p , A ^ . Then, S C Y , and S is non­
empty. 
The points A = (A^,0) and B = (0,A2) cannot, in general, be ruled 
out as solutions. Every case of linear reward functions, R^(A^) = 
r i A i ^=-'-,2)» provides a counterexample, as we shall see. 
As stated in the lemma, a solution always exists. However, a 
solution is not necessarily unique as we shall see in the analysis of 
linear reward functions. 
4.2. Solutions 
In cases (a) and (b) there is the rather obvious unique solution 
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o , o (A^.A^) = (A^,A 2). Thus we shall consider cases (c) and (d) only. 
By Lemma 8, if neither (A^,0) nor (O.A^) maximizes ip, then a solu­
tion will exist on the open set X. By our assumptions about TT^  and TT^  , ^ 
is continuous and twice differentiable in A^ and A^ for A i + A 2 < t-1. There­
fore, a necessary condition that a ( X ^ 9 X ^ ) e X maximizes is that d i p / d X y 
0, dijVdA2= 0. Hence, we will be looking for (A^,A2)'s satisfying 
dTT dTT
 r h (y-A ) h A 
i i i 
dX 2 " dX 2 dX 2 - L » 2 - 2 ' 2 
R ; ;CAJ - 1 1 
h 0(y-A n) -, h-A 
1 1
 = 0 . (75) 
(y-A,-A 0) 2 1 "2 y V K 1 2 
2 2 
By Lemma 3, Condition 2 guarantees d TT^/dA^ < 0 (i=l,2) for all A j + A 2 < >^ 
2 2 2 2 
and evidently d TT./dA. < 0 for all A +A < y. Hence, d ip/dA. < 0 (i=l,2) 
J 1 X L. 1 
for all A 1 + A 2 < Vi. 
The economic interpretation of (74) and (75) is this: For user i 
(i=l,2) the marginal revenue per unit increase in arrival rate A^ (i.e. 
R_T(A^)) should equal the marginal waiting loss of the two users put to­
gether (i.e. [h.(y-A.)+h.A.]/(y-A -A ) 2 ) . 
1
 J J J x z 
Simplification of (74), (75) results in the equivalent necessary 
conditions 
R{(A 1)-h 1/(y-A 1-A 2) = R 2(A 2)-h 2/(y-A 1-A 2) = ( h ^ + h ^ ) / ( y - A ^ ) 2 . 
Interestingly, RT(A^)-h^/(y-A^-A2) is the marginal gain for per unit 
increase in A^ for fixed X^+A2« 
In the special case h^= h 2= h (74), (75) reduce to 
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R 1 ( V = R 2 ( X 2 ) = *V/(V-\-*2>2 ( h ^ h ^ h ) . (76) 
\p(A1,A2;y) = r^A^ + - (h 1A 1+h 2A 2) /(u-Aj-A^ , (77) 
which can be rewritten as 
^(A 1,A 2;y) = [ r ^ + A p - h £ ( A ^ ) / (y- ( A ^ ) ) ] (78) 
+ [(r x-r 2) + (h 2-h 1)/(y-(X 1+X 2))]-X 1 
= f(X 1+X 2) + g(x1+x2)-x1> 
where the equation defines f and g as functions of A^+A^ Thus, for fixed 
Using (76) it will often be quite easy to locate all (A^,A 2)' s satisfying 
the first-order necessary conditions for optimality, and thereby identify 
S. 
4.3. Comparison with Equilibrium Solution 
The definition of \\), Lemma 8, and our results concerning the slope 
of X^[X^] and X^[X^]9 see Equation (32), lead to the following conclusions: 
o o o o o 
In cases (a) and (b), A^=A^, A 2=A 2, ^ = 7 T1 + 7 T2' i n c a s e (c)> A l + A 2 - A i + A 2 ' 
/\ /\ . 
o ^ ^ o o o 
> T T ^ + T T ^ ; in case (d) A^+A2 < A l + A 2 ' ^ y T ri + T r2* ^ 6 s u n n n a r i z e o u r 
results as follows: 
THEOREM 6. Let both users satisfy Condition 2. Suppose (A°,A°) e S, i.e. 
ip(A1,A2;y)=ip =max^ ^ i K A ^ A ^ y ) . Then A°+A2 < X^+X^ and ip > TT-J+T^, where 
inequality may hold. 
4.4. Example. R^A.^) = r^A^, R 2 ^ A 2 ^ = r 2 A 2 
In this case i[i becomes 
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A l + A 2 * ^ i s a linear function in X^ (or in X^). Simple results are a 
consequence of this property. 
First of all, for any given X=X^+X^ will be maximized for X^=0 
or X^=X depending on the sign of g(X^+X^). Should g(X^+X^) happen to 
be zero, then the choice of X^ does not matter. The linearity property 
thus implies that a search for a (X°,X°) that maximizes \p can be limited 
to the boundary set 
L = {(X 1,0): X 1 > 0} U {(0,X 2): X £ > 0}. 
On the X^-axis the unique optimal solution is (X^,0), and on the X^-axis 
the unique optimal solution is (0,X 2). Hence, either (X^,0) or (0,X 2), 
or both, maximize \\). 
Suppose r-j = r^, h^= h^. Then X^= X^ and = i|;(X^,0;u) = 
\\)(09X^;\i). Moreover, as g(X^+X2) = 0, every point on the line segment 
connecting (X^,0) and (0,X2) also maximizes \p, and no other point does 
so. 
We will prove that an interior point (not in L) may maximize \p only 
if r^= r2» h^= h 2 < Suppose a point (X°,X 2), with X^> 0 and X 2> 0 maximizes 
\p. Then g(X°,X°) = 0, since otherwise, by (78), \p might be increased by 
a change in the arrival rates which leaves the total arrival rate at 
X°+X°. It follows that (X°+X°,0) and (0,X°+X°) both maximize i>. By 
uniqueness of X^ and X 2 > we find X^= X 2= X°+X°. Hence i|;(X^,0;u) = 
^(0 ,X 2;u) = \\)°. Now, by (28), X ± = u - S\ihjr^. Thus, A ^ X ^ implies 
h^/r^ = h 2/r 2- Alternatively, for some k > 0, r 2= kr^ and h 2= kh^. 
Inserting these expressions for r 2 and h 2 into i|;(0,X2;y) as given by 
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(77) we obtain 
i K 0 , X 2;y) = r 2 X 2 - h 2 X /(y - X 2 ) 
= k t r ^ - h 1 X 1 / ( y - X 1 ) ] [ X 1 = X 2 ] 
We conclude that k = 1. That is, r^= and h^= h2» as was to be shown. 
Suppose X > 0, X 2 > 0. Then both A = ( X ^ O ) and B = ( 0 , X 2 ) may 
maximize \p even if 4 r 2 or h^ 4 h^. Parameter sets with this property 
are easily constructed. Take an arbitrary parameter set » 
h ^ , r ^ , h ^ such that h ^ / r ^ < y ™ , h ^ / r ™ < y ( 1 ) and 
h l 1 ) / r i 1 ) ^ h 2 1 ) / r 2 1 ) * B y r e s u l t s i n Section 1, X ^ 1 ^ 0, X ^ 1 ) > 0, 
X ^ 1 ^ X ^ . There exists k'> 0 such that ( X ^ 1 ) , 0;y ( 1 )) = 
^^(O . l jHy^) . Now consider the parameter set y ( 2 ) = y ( 1 ) , r[ 2 )= r ^ , 
h< 2>- h<». r< 2>- kr^. h< 2 ) = < > . Clearly, T<2>- T<«, X<2>= l f > , 
and ^ 2>(I< 2 \ o;p ( 2>) = * ( 1 > ( X ^ . O ; ^ ) . By (77) *<2> (O . X f ;y<2>) -
k ^ W ^ y ™ ) . Hence, * ( 2> ( i f > , 0;p ( 2>) - * ( 2 ) (O .Xf > ; p ( 2 ) ) , 
proving our assertion. 
In particular cases, g(A^+A2) is either positive or negative for 
all A=A^+A2, and it is easy to determine whether (A^,0) or (0,A 2) is the 
solution. Specifically, if r^ > r 2 and h^< h2» or, r^> r 2 and h^= h2» 
then S = (A^ ,0) ; and if r^ < r 2 and h^> h 2, or, r^< r 2 and h^= h 2, then 
S = ( 0 , X 2 ) . 
We summarize our findings as follows. 
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THEOREM 7. Let ip(X ,X ;y) be given by Equation (77). Then, 
(i) If r^= and h^= h^, then A^= and 
S = {(A 1,A 2): (A X,A 2) = (oX^(1-a)X 1 ) , 0 < a < l}, 
(ii) If ^ r 2 or h^ ^ h 2 > then S equals (A^,0), or 
(0 , X 2 ) , or (X 1,0) U (0 , X 2 ) . 
2 2 2 2 2 
Finally, let ^ = d lJj/dA , IJJ22= d ip/dX , ^ 1 2 = ^21 = d ^ / d A i d A 2 * 
Let A denote the 2x2 Hessian determinant. We derive 
2 
A = *u hi 
hi hi 
(h -h )' 
< 0 (A.,+A0<u). (79) 4 = " v'^-'^ 
(u-A -A ) 
A nonpositive A implies that nowhere on the interior (A^>0,A2>0) can 
have a (strict) local maximum or minimum. This agrees with our results, 
since A < 0 does not rule out a local or global maximum on the boundary 
L; nor does it rule out a local nonstrict maximum at points in the 
interior. 
In our numerical example with u = 1, r^= r 2= 8, h^= h 2= 2, we have 
Xj= X 2 = 0.50. Hence, ^° = i | ; (X 1 >0 ;u) = 2.00 and the solution set is 
S = {(A1,A ): (A ,A 2) = (a0.50,(1-a)0.50), 0 < a < 1}. 
5. Append ix 
In this section we give proof of Lemmas 1 through 5 of Section 1. 
To avoid confusion we usually will denote by A(u) the optimal arrival rate 
at service rate u rather than by A. Similarly we use the notation 
cf)(y) = <f>(A(u);u) instead of <j). When h is treated as a variable, as in 
Lemma 2, its value will be indicated by the usual "conditional upon" 
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or "given" notation. 
5.1. Proof of Lemma 1 
Let {X: 0<A<«>, R(X)>R(0)}. By assumption A ^ 0 . Obviously, 
X(y) e {0} U A , for any y. We shall derive the set of y's such that 
X(y) = 0, for given R and h. 
For fixed X e A^ consider <{)(X;VI) as a function of y. By (7), 
(|)(X;y) = - o o for y < X, and on the interval (X,00) <{)(X;y) is continuous 
and strictly increasing in y, with lim <{)(X;y) = - 0 0 and lim (j)(X;y) = 
y-*X y^ °° 
= R(X) > R(0). By the intermediate value theorem it follows that 
there is a (unique) y, say y(X) > X, such that <J)(X;y(X)) = R(0). 
k k 
Let y = inf^ ^ y(X). We will show y > 0. Recall that, by 
o o 
assumption, R^(X) < for all X, with 0 < M'< °°. Hence, for 0 < X < y, 
<KX;y) = R(X)-hX/(y-X) 
< R(0)+X[M'- h/(y-X)] 
< R(0)+X[M'- h/y]. 
It is seen that <J)(X;y) < R(0) for 0 < X < y < h/M". Also <J>(X;y) = 
- oo < R(0) if X > 0 and y < X. Hence, 
<)>(X;y) < R(0) (X>0; y<h/M"). 
In particular, <J>(X;y) < R(0) for all X e A^ and all y < h/M'. Therefore, 
y(X) > h/M' for all X e A^. Hence, y* > h/M'> 0. 
By the definition of y , clearly X(y) = 0 for y < y , and X(y) > 0 
* _ * 
for y > y . The question then is, what is X(y )? If there is no 
k k k 
\ q£ A^ such that y(A Q) = y , then <J>(X;y ) < ^(0;y ) = R(0) for all 
£ £ 
X e A , so <J>(y ) = R(0) and X(y ) = 0. If, on the other hand, there is 
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a A q £ such that y( A Q) = u , then (A q;y ) = <p(0;y ) = cp(y ) = R(0). 
But, by assumption, we always choose the smallest A satisfying cp(A;y) = 
<j)(y), so again <p(y ) = R(0) and A(y ) = 0. We have shown that A(y) = 0 
if and only if y < y , for the given R and h. 
Next, we shall show that <j)(y) a n d A(y) are strictly increasing 
in y on [y ,°°). By the above analysis, for y > y we have cp(y) > cp(y ) = 
_ _ X _ _ 
R(0) and A(y) > A(y ) = 0, so we need only show that cp and A are strictly 
X X _ 
increasing in y on (y ,°°). Suppose y < y < y, . We must prove cp(y ) < 
a b a 
cp(yK), A(y ) < A(y ). b a b 
Note, 0 < A(y ) < y , 0 < A(y^) < y, . By (7) and the definition 
a a b b 
of A, 
cp(ya) = <p(A(ya);ya) < cp(A(ya);yb) < cp(A(yb);yb) = cp(yb). 
_ _ _ X 
Hence, cp(y ) < cp(y ). Thus cp is strictly increasing on (y ,°°), and 
c i D 
X 
therefore on [y ,°°). 
The arguments needed for proof of A(y ) < A(y ) are more involved 
a b 
We begin by showing that A(y ) < A(y,). Our starting point is the 
a = b 
inequality 
cp(A(y );y ) > cp(A;y ) (A<A(y )), 
c l Si SL Si 
implied by the definition of A(y ). Now, by (11), for given A > 0, the 
c l 
waiting loss z = hA/(y-A) is a decreasing function of y on (A, 0 0), and 
by (12) the rate of decrease is greater the greater A is. Hence, the 
rate of increase in cp is greater at A(y ) than at any A < A(y ). 
a a 
Consequently, 
cp(A(y );y ) - cp(A(y );y ) > cp(A;y,) - cp(A;y ) (A<A(y )). 
a D a a. D a a 
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"Adding" the two above inequalities we obtain 
cj)(X(Ua);ub) > <KA;ub) (A<A(ua)) 
Evidently, <f> (X(yfe); yfo) > <J)(X(y );yfe). Hence 
(f>(A(yb);yb) > <f>(A;yb) (A<A(y&)) 
From this we deduce that A(y ) < A(y. ). 
a = b 
We can also rule out the possibility A(y ) = A(y, ) as 
a b 
d<t>U;Pb) 
a x | X ( y ) " * ' < M y a > > - h y < v X ( u a > ) 2 
i a 
> R'(X(u ))-hy /(y -A(y ) ) 2 [A(y )<y <u ] 
a a a a a a b 
= 0 [A(y )>0 => ( T(A(y );y )=0]. 
3 . 3 . 3 . 
2 -1 -1 (To see that the inequality holds write y/(y-A) as (y-A) (1-A/y) .) 
We conclude that A(y ) < A(y ). Thus A is strictly increasing on 
c l D 
(y ,°°) and therefore on [y ,°°). 
It remains to discuss the question of continuity. First consider 
<f). We shall prove that (j) is continuous in y, for any given R and h. 
(j)(y) = R(0) for y<y , so clearly <f) is continuous on (0,y ] . We must 
prove (j) is continuous on [y ,°°). Let y < y < y < 00. Our first step is 
= a b 
to show that for a fixed y (y, ) a sufficiently close value of y, (y ) 
a b b a 
will ensure A(y, ) < y . 
b a 
* _ 
Fix y, > y . As always, A(y,) < y, . Obviously, any y e 
b b D a 
* _ _ 
(max[y ,A(y,)],y.) will satisfy A(y ) < y . 
D D D a 
Fix y a >y*. For any y b> y &, clearly 0 < X(yft) < A(yb> . Thus, by 
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( 1 0 ) , A(u,) < y - / y , h/M^. T h e r e f o r e , i f y, i s chosen so that y, < y b = b b b b a 
+ /u, h/M^, then A(y, ) < y a s d e s i r e d . Hence, i f y , < y + / y h/M^, b b a b a a 
then A(y, ) < y . We have shown t h a t i f , for f i x e d y or y, , y and y, b a a b a D 
a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y c l o s e , then A(y, ) < y . 
b a 
* * — 
Suppose u, > y i s f i x e d and y e (max[y , A ( y , ) ] , y , ) i s v a r i a b l e ; 
b a D b 
or suppose y >y i s f i x e d and y, e (y ,y + / y h/M^) i s v a r i a b l e . In 
a = b a a a 
e i t h e r c a s e A(y, ) < y and b a 
_ _ _ * 
0 < <J>(p, ) - cp(y ) [cp i s s t r i c t l y i n c r e a s i n g on [y ,°°)] 
b a 
= < p ( X ( y , ) ; y , ) - cp(X(y ) ; y ) b b a a 
< c p(A ( y b ) ; y b ) - <J) (X(UB> ; Pfl) [by d e f i n i t i o n of X ] 
h A ( y b ) h A ( y b ) 
[A(y^)<y : E q . ( 7 ) ] 
li a-X(P b) V X ( y b ) L ^ ^ b ^ - a 
Taking l i m i t s one o b t a i n s 
0 < l i m y ^ y ( ? ( y b ) -?(P a)) < 0 ( P b > y * ; y a £ ( m a x [ y * , X ( y b ) ] , y b ) ) , 
a b 
0 < l im (cp(y ) - cp(y ) ) < 0 (y >y ; y e (u , y + 
— y,->- y D a = a— D a a a b a 







t h a t cp i s c o n t i n u o u s on [y ,°°) . S i n c e cp i s a l s o c o n t i n u o u s on ( 0 , y ] , 
we c o n c l u d e t h a t cp i s c o n t i n u o u s i n y on (0 , ° ° ) , for any g i v e n R and h. 
F i n a l l y , we show by counterexample t h a t A i s n o t , in g e n e r a l , 
c o n t i n u o u s i n y . Take t h e c a s e of a reward f u n c t i o n R w i t h two l o c a l 
maxima, one a t A , another at A, , where 0 < A < A, and R(0) < R(A ) < 
a b a b a 
R(A ) . For s u f f i c i e n t l y smal l y , c l e a r l y A (y) < A . For s u f f i c i e n t l y 
D 3 
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l a r g e y , c l e a r l y X^ - e < X(y) < X^ for a r b i t r a r y e > 0 . Equal ly c l e a r , 
f o r no y w i l l X(y) be such t h a t R^(X) < 0. Thus, a s y i n c r e a s e s , X w i l l 
jump from l e s s than X t o some X > X such t h a t R^(X) > 0. • 
a a 
5 . 2 . Proof of Lemma 2 
Let A^= {X: 0<X<y, R(X)>R(C))}. Consider f i r s t the t r i v i a l c a s e 
— i * A^= 0. E v i d e n t l y X ( y ) | h = 0 for a l l h > h = 0. I t f o l l o w s t h a t i n t h e 
— i * p r e s e n t c a s e X ( y ) | b = 0 i f and o n l y i f h > h = 0 . 
Now c o n s i d e r t h e c a s e A ^ 0. For f i x e d X e A , l e t us examine 
y y* 
<J)(X;y)| b a s a f u n c t i o n of h. By (7) CF) i s s t r i c t l y d e c r e a s i n g i n h. The 
s o l u t i o n of <J>(A;y)|h= R(0) i s e a s i l y found t o be h(X) = [ R ( X ) - R ( 0 ) ] . 
[ ( y / X ) - l ] > 0. S i n c e , for every X e A , h(X) < y [ R ( X ) - R ( 0 ) ] / X < y*T, i t 
i s c l e a r t h e r e i s an upper bound t o h ( X ) . Let h = sup^ ^ h(X) d e n o t e the 
l e a s t upper bound. C l e a r l y , h > 0 a s h(X) > 0 f o r a l l X e A . The 
* _ . * _ . 
d e f i n i t i o n of h i m p l i e s t h a t X(y) = 0 i f h > h and X(y) > 0 i f 
h h 
* _ * 
h < h . By arguments s i m i l a r to t h o s e employed i n the proof of X(y ) = 0 
i n Lemma 1 i t can be shown t h a t X ( y ) L * = 0 . Hence, i f A 4 0 t h e r e 
h y 
* * _ . * 
e x i s t s an h , 0 < h < °°, such t h a t X(y) = 0 i f and o n l y i f h > h . 
h = 
Next we w i l l show t h a t cf) and X a r e s t r i c t l y d e c r e a s i n g in h on 
( 0 , h * ] . By the above , X(y)I > X ( y ) | * = 0 a n d ^ ( y ) | , > 7 (y)L * = R(0) for 
h h h h 
* _ _ 
a l l h < h . Thus we need to show o n l y t h a t <p and X are s t r i c t l y d e c r e a s -
* * 
ing i n h on ( 0 , h ) . Assume t h e r e f o r e 0 < h < h < h . For n o t a t i o n a l 
a b 
c o n v e n i e n c e , l e t X = X(y)L , X = X(y) L . N o t e , X > 0 and X > 0 . 
a h b n. a b 
_
a
 T> * 
F i r s t we prove t h a t <p i s s t r i c t l y d e c r e a s i n g i n h on ( 0 , h ) . By 
(7) and the d e f i n i t i o n of X 
<|>(y)| h E ^ V ^ ' h = * ( A b ; y ) ' h > * ( A b ; y ) ' h E(t)(VI)L^ 
a a a b D 
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Thus <p(y) > <p(y) , prov ing our s t a t e m e n t , 
n n, 
a b . 
— * 
Second we prove t h a t A i s s t r i c t l y d e c r e a s i n g i n h on ( 0 , h ) . 
Proceed ing a l o n g the l i n e s of the proof of Lemma 1 we show s u c c e s s i v e l y 
cp(A b;y) | h > cp(A;y) | 
b D 
(A<A b ) , 
c p ( A b ; y ) | h - c p ( A b ; y ) | h > cp(A;y) | h - cp(A;y) | ( A <V > 
a b a D 
c j ) ( A b ; y ) | h > c p ( A ; y ) | h 
a a 
(A<A b ) , 
cp(A ;y) > cp(A;y) 
a h n 
a a 
(A<A b ) . 
I t f o l l o w s t h a t A > A, . The p o s s i b i l i t y A = A, can a l s o be ru l ed out a s 
a = b a b 
dcp(A;y) 
dA j - R " ( A a ) - h b y / ( y - A a )
2 
b a 
< R"(A ) - h y / ( y - A ) 2 
a a a 
= 0 [A > 0 => cp (^A ;y) I = 0] . 
a a h 
a 
We conc lude t h a t A^> X^. Thus A i s s t r i c t l y d e c r e a s i n g on ( 0 , h ) and 
t h e r e f o r e on ( 0 , h ] . 
_ * _ 
O b v i o u s l y , cp i s c o n t i n u o u s i n h on [h ,°°) s i n c e cp = R(0) on t h a t 
i n t e r v a l . We s h a l l prove c o n t i n u i t y on ( 0 , h 1. Let 0 < h < h < h . 
a b = 
Then 
0 < c p ( y ) | h - c p ( y ) | h 
a b 
[cp i s s t r i c t l y d e c r e a s i n g on ( 0 , h ] ] 
a b 
< * ( A a ; y ) l h - 4>(Aa;y)L 
a T> 
[by d e f i n i t i o n of A] 
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h, A h A 
b a a a
 [byEq.(7)] y-A y-A 
a a 
= (h - h ) X / ( y - X ) . 
b a a a 
Whether h h, or h h we derive easily lim (cf)(y) I - (b(y)l ) = 0. 
a b b a n 1 h, 
* _
 a b 
This proves that cj) is continuous on (0,h ] . Since cj) is also continuous 
* _ 
on [h ,°°) we conclude that <j) is continuous in h on (0,°°), for any given 
R and y. 
Finally, the counterexample at the end of Section 5.1 (add that 
A^< y) also serves to prove that X is not, in general, continuous in h. 
There is no need for repeating the argument. • 
5.3. Proof of Lemma 3 
We begin by proving the statements about the values of y which 
satisfy (17) (Condition 1). Clearly, if R " " ( A ) < 0 for all X > 0, then 
(17) holds for all y, and if we set y ^ = 0 0 then it is evident that 
y < y ( 1 ) » (17). 
Now consider the alternative, R ^ ( A ) > 0 for some X > 0. As a 
first step we demonstrate that (17) is satisfied for sufficiently small 
y. Toward this end, take any A Q > 0. By assumption, R ^ is continuous, 
so will have a maximum R ^ < °° somewhere on the closed interval 
o 
[0 ,A ]. If R""< 0 then it is clear that (17) is satisfied for all y < X , 
o o = o 
3 
Thus suppose R^"> 0. Now, 2hy/(y-A) is strictly increasing in X on 
2 2 [0,y) and attains its minimum value 2h/y for X = 0. Solving R^ = 2h/y 
for y we get y = /2h/R' Now let y = m i n ( y , A ) > 0. We see that 
y < y Q => (17). 
For each X > 0, let y ^ ( A ) = °° if R""(A) < 0. If, on the other 
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hand, R " ' ( A ) > 0 , then d e f i n e y ^ ( A ) , A < y ^ ( A ) < °°, a s the s o l u t i o n 
3 3 
of R (A) = 2hu/ (u-A) w i t h r e s p e c t t o y . Now, 2 h y / ( y - A ) i s s t r i c t l y 
d e c r e a s i n g i n y on (A,°°) . Hence, i n any c a s e , 
A < y < y ( 1 ) ( A ) « R " ( A ) < 2 h y / ( y - A ) 3 (A>0). 
Let i n f ^ y ^ ( A ) < °°. From the above r e l a t i o n we deduce t h a t (17) 
i s s a t i s f i e d f o r y < but i s not s a t i s f i e d f o r y > y ^ . We know 
t h a t (17) i s s a t i s f i e d f o r s u f f i c i e n t l y smal l y . Our c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t 
t h e r e e x i s t s a y ^ \ 0 < y ^ < °°, such t h a t y < y ^ » ( 1 7 ) , w i t h y ^ as 
d e f i n e d . 
The s t a t e m e n t s concern ing the v a l u e s of y which s a t i s f y (18) 
(Condi t ion 2) are proved i n the same way, so we omit the proof . 
I t remains t o show t h a t i f R ^ ( A ) > 0 f o r some A > 0 , then y ^ 
(2) 3 2 
> y v . We have 2hy / (y -A)~ > h / ( y - A ) for A < y . I t f o l l o w s t h a t i f 
R " ( A ) > 0 then y ( 1 ) ( A ) > y ( 2 ) ( A ) , where y ( 2 ) ( A ) > A i s the s o l u t i o n of 
R " ( A ) = h / ( y - A ) 2 f o r y . Hence y ( 1 ) > y ( 2 ) . We can r u l e out y ( 1 ) = y ( 2 ) , 
s o y < 1 > > y < 2 ) . " • 
5 . 4 . Proof of Lemma 4 
We f i r s t prove the s t a t e m e n t s concern ing v a l u e s of h which s a t i s f y 
(17) ( C o n d i t i o n 1 ) . C l e a r l y , i f R ~ ( A ) < 0 f o r a l l A < y , then (17) h o l d s 
f o r a l l h , and i f we s e t h ( 1 ) = 0 , then h > h ( 1 ) » ( 1 7 ) . 
Now c o n s i d e r the c a s e where R ^ ( A ) > 0 f o r some A e [ 0 , y ) . We w i l l 
show t h a t (17) i s s a t i s f i e d f o r s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e h. By c o n t i n u i t y , R ^ 
p o s s e s s e s a maximum on [ 0 , y ] . Let R ^ = m a x w R ^ ( A ) , where 0 < R ^ < ° ° . 
o A<y o 
? ~ 2 
Denote by h the s o l u t i o n of R = 2h /y . Thus h = R ^ y / 2 > 0. C l e a r l y , J
 o o o o 
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h > h o (17) . 
o 
For each X e [ 0 , y ) l e t h ^ ( y ) = 0 i f R " ( X ) < 0 . I f , however, 
CI) 3 
R ( X ) > 0 , then h v J ( X ) i s d e f i n e d as the s o l u t i o n of R ~ ( X ) = 2 h y / ( y - X ) 
Thus h ^ ( X ) = R " " ( X ) ( y - X ) 3 / ( 2 y ) . As 2 h y / ( y - X ) 3 i s s t r i c t l y i n c r e a s i n g 
i n h 
h > h ( 1 ) ( X ) « R " ( X ) < 2 h y / ( y - X ) 3 ( 0 < X < y ) . 
Let h ( 1 ) = s u p x h ( 1 ) ( X ) > 0 . Fr om the above r e l a t i o n we deduce t h a t (17) 
i s s a t i s f i e d for h > h ^ , but i s not s a t i s f i e d f o r h < h ^ . We know 
t h a t (17) i s s a t i s f i e d f o r s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e h, so we conc lude t h e r e 
e x i s t s an 0 < h* 1 ^ < °°, such t h a t h > h ^ » ( 1 7 ) , w i t h a s 
d e f i n e d . 
The s t a t e m e n t s concern ing the v a l u e s of h which s a t i s f y (18) 
( C o n d i t i o n 2) a r e proved in t h e same way, so we omit t h e proof . 
F i n a l l y , we must show t h a t i f R ^ ( X ) > 0 f o r some X e [ 0 , y ) , then 
h ( l ) < h ( 2 ) ^ L e t h ( 2 ) ( X ) b e t h e s o l u t i o n 0 f R " ( X ) = h / ( y - X ) 2 f o r h. 
Thus h ( 2 ) ( X ) = R " ( X ) ( y - X ) 2 . I t i s s e e n t h a t h ( 1 ) ( X ) < | h ( 2 ) ( X ) f o r a l l 
X < y . Hence, h ( 1 ) < \ h ( 2 ) < h ( 2 ) . • 
5 . 5 . Proof of Lemma 5 
The two p a r t s of the lemma are proved i n a lmost i d e n t i c a l manner. 
There fore we g i v e o n l y t h e proof of the f i r s t p a r t . 
Let R and h be g i v e n . We s h a l l prove t h a t X i s c o n t i n u o u s i n y on 
( 0 , y ^ ) . I f y ^ < y* , then ~X(y) = 0 for a l l y < y ^ , so i n t h i s c a s e 
(1) (1) * 
c l e a r l y X i s c o n t i n u o u s i n y on ( 0 , y ) . Assume t h e r e f o r e y > y . As 
_ * _ * 
X ( y ) = 0 f o r y < y , X i s c o n t i n u o u s i n y on ( 0 , y ] . Thus, we have t o 
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* (1) 
prove c o n t i n u i t y on [ y , y ) . 
cp(X(y ) ; y ) > cp (X(y ) + e ; y ) . 
o o o o 
Now, cp(X;y) i s c o n t i n u o u s i n y f o r any f i x e d X < y . I t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e r e 
i s a 6 > 0 such t h a t 
c p ( X ( y o ) ; y ) > c j > ( X ( y o ) - e ; y ) , 
c p ( X ( y o ) ; y ) > c p ( X ( y Q ) + £ ; y ) , 
* (1) (1) f o r a l l y £ (y Q-6 ,y o+6) c (y , y v 7 ) . Moreover, f o r each such y , y < y , 
s o , by Lemma 3 , C o n d i t i o n 1 i s met for each y £ (y -6,y +6). Hence cp(X;y) 
o o 
i s s t r i c t l y concave i n X on [ 0 , y ) . By the two above i n e q u a l i t i e s , cp(X;y) 
w i l l have i t s maximum f o r a X £ (X(y ) - £ , X(y ) + £ ) . That i s , 
o o 
y £ (y -6,y +6) => X(y) £ (X(y ) - £ , X ( y ) + £ ) . E q u i v a l e n t l y , 
o o o o 
I y - y I < 6 => | X ( y ) - X ( y ) I < e. 1
 o 1 o 1 
— * (1) This means t h a t X i s c o n t i n u o u s i n y a t y Q £ (y , y ) . 
C o n t i n u i t y a t y i s proved i n a s i m i l a r way. Thus X i s c o n t i n u o u s 
* (1) — (1) i n y on [y , y ) . We conc lude t h a t X i s c o n t i n u o u s i n y on ( 0 , y ) , a s 
s t a t e d i n the lemma. • 
We b e g i n by prov ing c o n t i n u i t y on t h e open i n t e r v a l ( y , y ) . 
* (1) — Consider any U q £ ( u , y ) . The a s s o c i a t e d opt imal v a l u e of X i s X ( U Q ) . 
Choose an £ > 0 s m a l l enough so t h a t X ( y ) - £ > 0 and X ( y ) + £ < y . We 
° o o o 
must show t h e r e e x i s t s a 6 > 0 such t h a t | y - y I < 6 => | X ( y ) - X ( y ) I < £ . 
o o 
By Lemma 3 , C o n d i t i o n 1 i s met for l J = y o < y ^ . Thus c p ( X ; y o ) i s 
s t r i c t l y concave i n X on [ 0 , y Q ) . Hence, 
c p ( X ( y ) ; y ) > c p ( X ( y ) - e ; y ) , 




THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAXIMAL QUEUE 
LENGTH IN THE M/G/l QUEUE 
We consider the M/G/l/n queue: customers arrive according to a 
Poisson process, with rate A, at a system composed of a single server and 
n waiting positions. Service times are identically distributed, positive 
random variables, independent of the arrival process and each other, with 
. 0 0 
distribution function H(x) and mean value a = xdH(x). An arriving 
customer who finds the server busy and all n waiting positions occupied is 
cleared from the system; all others wait as long as necessary for service. 
The order of service is not specified. 
This model, with explicit specification of the maximum allowable 
queue size, is important in applications because it allows one to examine 
the relationship between the number of waiting positions provided and the 
proportion of customers who will be denied service. The finiteness of the 
size of the waiting room makes the analysis of this model more difficult 
than that of its Infinite-waiting room counterpart (see, for example, 
Cohen [1969], Cooper [1972] and Riordan [1962]). Of interest in this con­
text are the mean duration of the busy period as a function of the number 
n of waiting positions, and the distribution of maximal queue length dur­
ing a busy period in the corresponding system with an unlimited number of 
waiting positions. In this paper we show that these two quantities are 
intimately connected. In particular, we use this observation to augment 
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a theorem of Takacs, namely Theorem 3 of Takacs [1969], which we now state. 
In what follows, we adopt the notation and terminology of Takacs [1969]. 
Let £(t) be the queue size at time t, that is, the total number of 
customers in the system at time t. £(0) is the initial queue size, that 
is, the number of customers already waiting for service at time t=0. 
Let 0Q be the length of the initial busy period, and for 0<i<k define 
P(k|i) = P{ sup £(t) < k | £(0)-i} (1) 
o<teQ 
as the probability that the maximal queue size during the initial busy 
period is < k given that the initial queue size is i. Let Ti\. be the prob­
ability that exactly j customers arrive during a service time; then 
TTj = /~ e " A X -i^-dH(x) (j=0,l,2,...), (2) 
r°° 1 i i 
with generating function TT (Z) = Z J
=
Q given, for |z|< 1, by 
TT(Z) = <KA - Az), (3) 
where i^(s) is the Laplace-Stieltjes transform of the service-time distri­
bution function, 
ij;(s) = Jo e" S XdH(x). (4) 
Then Takacs's theorem (Theorem 3 of Takacs [1969]) is as follows: 
Theorem, For 0<i<k we have 
Qk-i 




v k V ( z ) 
for |z|< 6 and 6 is the smallest non-negative real root of 
7 T ( Z ) = Z . (7) 
If Xa < 1, then 6 = 1 and if Xa > 1, then 6 < 1. QQ is an arbitrary non-
null constant. 
In his proof, Takacs shows that 
Q k = I ^Qk+i.-j (k=0,l,2,...), (8) 
j=0 J J 
from which (6) follows immediately. (The proof given in Takacs [1969] is 
more elementary than his earlier proofs—see the references in Takacs 
[1969]). Cohen [1967], [1969] has also studied the distribution of maximal 
queue length; his results (see pp. 252, 571-2 of Cohen [1969] appear to be 
more complicated than those of Takacs.) Note that the probability P(k|i) 
is the same whether the waiting-room size n is finite or infinite, as long 
as n+l > k. It is worth remarking here that, with P(0|0) = 1, (5) implies 
P(k|i) = P(k|k)/P(k-i|k-i); thus may be given the interpretation 
[P(k|k)]_1. 
In this paper we show that 
b, , 
P(k|i) = , (9) 
bk 
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where b^ is the mean busy period in the M/G/l/n queue; that is, if we take 
Q~ = b,, = a, then Q = b . 0 0 n n 
1. The Mean Busy Period 
We begin with the following recurrence on n for the M/G/l/n queue: 




 + I I \ + I ^ I K (n=0,l,2,...), (10) 
n
 j=l Jk=n-j+l K j=n Jk=l K 
with the convention that any undefined sum is taken to equal zero. To 
prove (10) observe first that, clearly, b^ = a. Now assume n > 1. Observe 
that the busy period is composed of the service time of the first customer 
plus some additional time if there are any new arrivals during the first 
service time. Suppose that exactly j (l<j<n-l) arrivals occur during the 
first service time. Then, as the second service time begins, there will 
be j-1 customers waiting in the queue. Since the length of the busy period 
does not depend on the order of service of waiting customers, we can imag­
ine that none of these j-1 waiting customers will enter service until any 
and all new customers are served who enter the waiting room after the 
start of the second service time. Thus the mean time until the next (if 




only n-j+1 waiting positions were available to new arrivals during this 
time). Hence, using this queue discipline, the mean time required to serve 
all of the original j waiting customers is b^ * * + b n» this explains 
the second term on the right side of (10). Finally, if j>n customers 
arrive during the first service time, then the mean time until the comple­
tion of service of those n customers who enter the waiting room during the 
first service time is b,+...+ b . 
1 n 
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Equation (10) can be written 
n-1 k 
b = a + I (1 - I TT )b (n=0,l,...). (11) 
n
 k=o j=o 3 n " k 
If we subtract the (n-l)th equation from the nth in the above set, we get 
the following system, which appears most suitable for calculation of 
b^jb^,... by recurrence: 
I TT"1 a (n=l) 
b_ = j (12) 
i=2,3,...). 
n , „ 
n-2 TT"1 R l - T T j b . - I TT . b 1 (n= 0 L 1 n-1 ^ n-j jj 
Observe that Equation (12) can be written 
k 
b k = V w - l - J (k=0,l,...; b - a ) . (13) 
J=0 J J 
Equation (13) is identical to Equation (8); therefore, Equation (9) 
is true as asserted, and further, if we take = a then Q = b 
0 n n 
(n=0,l,2,...). 
Similar results have been obtained by Tomko [1967], Cohen [1971] 
and Rosenlund [1973]. 
2. 'Direct1 Derivation of Equation (9) 
We have shown that the distribution of maximal queue length is a 
ratio of mean busy periods, but this equality appeared as a consequence of 
the fact that the quantities b^ and Qn(n=0,l,2,...) satisfy the same 
recurrence (8). We now show that (9) can be obtained directly from 
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arguments that relate only to the l>n(n=0,l,2,...) . 
We begin by defining the i-busy period as the continuous busy time 
of a server that starts serving when i customers are in the system. (The 
1-busy period is thus the ordinary busy period.) Let ^(i) b e t b e d u r a ~ 
tion of the i-busy period in the M/G/l/k queue (l<i<k+l), and define 
BTO(i) = B(i), B k(l) = B k, E[Bk(i)] = b k(i), and b k(l) = b f c. (Note that, 
in Takacs's notation, 0^ = BQo(i) when £(0) = i.) 
Now, it is clear that 
B k(i) = B k + 1 _ ± + B k(i-1) (k=l,2,...; i=2,...,k+l), (14) 
from which it follows that 
b k(i) = + b k + 2 - ± + ... + b k (k=0,l,...; i=l,...,k+l). (15) 
It is also true that 
b,(i) = b. ,(±) + [1 - P{ sup C(t) < k | £(0) =i}]bv (l<i<k). (16) 
K K 1
 0<t<B(i) K 
To prove (16) observe that during the i-busy period in the M/G/l/k 
queue we can imagine that the customer C, if any, whose arrival causes the 
waiting room to be fully occupied for the first time, will not enter ser­
vice until there are no other waiting customers. Then the mean time from 
the start of the i-busy period until the system is cleared of everyone but 
C (if he exists) is b k ^(i). If in fact no such customer C arrives during 
[0,B(i)j, then the i-busy period ends; if C does arrive, which occurs with 
probability 1 - P{supQ < t < B ^ £ (t) < k [ £(0)=i}, then the additional mean 
time required to serve C and all his descendents is b, (1) = b, . 
141 
Equations (15) and (16) together imply (9). Thus, we have given 
a 'direct' proof of (9), as promised. 
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